STATE-BUILDING IN SOMALI

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Lessons learned & the way forward

Proceedings of the 2nd annual east Africa development forum, 2023.

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Mogadishu-Somalia

Editors

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About DAD

East Africa Association for Research and Development (DAD) is a nonprofit and nonpartisan organization dedicated to addressing social, economic, and political challenges in East Africa. Our primary objective is to enhance the safety, security, health, and prosperity of the communities across the region. Established in May 2017 by a group of esteemed educational experts, influential social leaders, and East African students who graduated from Turkish universities, DAD is committed to serving the public interest. DAD strives to cultivate the human capital of the region by fostering the development of insights in the fields of politics, economy and environment. We aim to provide accurate and up-to-date analysis, equipping policymakers, civil society organizations, businesses, and the general public with valuable information about the ever-changing political, economic, social, and cultural landscape of the region. By doing so, we empower stakeholders to make informed decisions and contribute to the progress and the well-being of East Africa region.

Vision

A pioneer in research and development to uplift the standard of living in East Africa.

Mission

Promoting development in East Africa through extensive research on the challenges of the region and forming a knowledge base to inform policymakers and civil society organizations on changing political, economic and social conditions of the region.

Objectives

- Establishing a strong bridge between Africa and Turkey in order to develop cross sector relations.
- Supporting education projects in Eastern African countries, and creating new projects that target the development of the region.
- Enhancing the quality of higher education institutions and research centers in the region.
- Studying business and economic opportunities of the region, its geopolitical importance and discovering the realities of the region to tackle social, economic, and developmental challenges in the region.

About Proceedings of he 2nd Annual East Africa Development Forum, 2023

Somalia has become an enigmatic model for post-colonial state-building in Africa. The ethnically and religiously unified Somali people have failed to build an effective state from 1960 to the present day, which is a period of 63 years. Somalia is still politically divided, its people live in poverty, and its land suffers from droughts. The Somali society is plagued by extremism in the name of Islam and polarization in the name of the clan. Past attempts at sustainable solutions have failed. So, East Africa Association for Research and Development (DAD) in collaboration with three universities in Somalia (Mogadishu University, Benadir University and Hormuud University) has organized a conference inviting scholars and experts to revisit Somalia's past and present to propose new approaches to addressing the state-building in Somalia.
The papers that have been submitted by the participants focus on subjects under the following themes:

1. The repercussions of the colonial legacy and the Cold War on the predicament of Somalia and its impact on the creation of the devious elite political culture.
2. Studying post-colonial Somali state, its economic policies, democracy, foreign relations, and the state's relationship with its society.
3. The impact of the civil war, building state institutions, and approaches to reconciliation.
4. The constitutional stalemate and its impact on institution-building, security, and developmental programs.
5. The role of Islam and women in building the Somali state and how to establish a reconciled state and society that lives in peace with itself and with the world.

This conference book contains the papers accepted as per the standards used in the institution in the conference sessions. The aim of this conference book is to provide a reliable reference to critical re-examination of Somalia's both past and present and to provide recommendations to policymakers in order to create a common understanding that leads to a better future for all Somalis.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

AMISO	African Union Mission in Somalia
AOGs	Armed Opposition Groups
ATMIS	AU Transition Mission in Somalia
AU	African Union
CP	Comprehensive Perspective
CRD	Center for Research and Dialogue
CS	Civil Society
CVI	Content Validity Index
DAD	East Africa Association for Research and Development
DCPs	Developing Country Partners
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization, and Re-integration
DFID	Department for International Development
ESSP	Education Sector Strategic Plan
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
FMS	Federal Member States
HDMS	Hizbia Dastur Mustaqil al-Somalia
ICU	Islamic Courts Union
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IRF	Inclusive Reconciliation Framework
KDF	Kenya Defense Forces
LMICs	Low- and Middle-Income Countries
MBA	Master of Business Administration
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
NDI	National Democratic Institute
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PAR	participatory action research
PDRC	Puntland Development and Research Center
PhD	Doctor of Philosophy
PPPs	Public-private partnerships
PSC	Protracted Social Conflict
SCR	Security Council Resolution
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SNA	Somali National Alliance
SNM	Somali National Movement

SOHRA	Somali Human Rights Association
SPM	Somali Patriotic Movement
SRC	Supreme Revolutionary Council
SRSP	Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party
SSDF	Somali Salvation Democratic Front
SWDC	Somali Women Development Centre
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
TNG	Transitional National Government
TNG	Transitional National Government
UHC	Universal Health Coverage
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
USA	United States of America
USC	United Somali Congress
WHO	World Health Organization

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The East Africa Association for Research and Development (DAD) would like to extend its sincere appreciation and heartfelt acknowledgement to the individuals and organizations whose invaluable contributions made the 2nd East Africa Development Forum in 2023 a resounding success. Without their dedicated efforts, this forum would not have been possible. We extend our heartfelt gratitude to the authors, presenters, and panelists for their exceptional contributions, fostering scholarly discourse and meaningful collaborations at the conference. We also appreciate the diligent article reviewers, editors, scholars, and experts for ensuring research quality. Many thanks go to the esteemed keynote speakers whose insightful perspectives inspired participants. Their collective efforts made the event impactful, advancing academic excellence and knowledge in East Africa's development.

We extend our heartfelt thanks to the host Universities: Mogadishu University, Benadir University, and Hormuud University for graciously hosting the 2nd East Africa Development Forum, 2023. Their unwavering support and collaboration played a pivotal role in creating a conducive environment for knowledge sharing and academic exchange. The commitment and dedication of these host universities were instrumental in ensuring the success of the event. In addition, we also thank to the dedicated organizing committee as well as the protocol team for their solid commitment and careful planning, which were crucial in ensuring the conference's resounding success. Their efforts in managing logistics, designing the program, and coordinating participants played a pivotal role in creating a seamless and enriching experience for all attendees.

Furthermore, we are deeply honored and sincerely grateful to the Sadar Development and Resilience Institute (Sadar Institute) for their extraordinary sponsorship of the Conference. Their steadfast commitment to fostering development and resilience has been truly remarkable and has left an indelible impact on the 2nd East Africa Development Forum, 2023. We would also like to extend our appreciation to Hormuud Telecom, Salaam Somali Bank, and Premier Bank and all other individuals for their invaluable sponsorship, which played a vital role in making the conference a resounding success.

DEDICATION

This volume is dedicated to the resilient Somali people, whose unwavering spirit and profound determination continues to be the cornerstone of the nation's journey towards peace, prosperity, and stability. It honors the tireless efforts of individuals working on the front lines of state-building, development, and research, whose collective endeavors are paving the way for a brighter, more sustainable future for Somali and the broader East African nations.

Furthermore, we pay tribute to the conference organizers, participants, scholars, and sponsors of the 2nd East Africa Development Forum, 2023. Your insightful contributions, innovative solutions, and shared visions for progress not only enrich this conference but also serve as a beacon of hope and a roadmap for action in the ongoing quest for peace and development in Somalia and its neighboring nations.

FOREWORD



Dear honored guests,

Welcome to the 2nd East Africa Development Forum, 2023, where we gather to discuss "State Building in Somalia: Lessons Learned and Ways Forward." This conference serves as a platform for experts, policymakers, scholars, and practitioners as to engage in fruitful discussions on Somalia's journey towards building a stable and prosperous nation.

Throughout the conference, our goal is to shed light on the lessons learned from Somalia's challenges and explore innovative ways to move forward. We have a diverse range of speakers and panelists who will provide valuable insights into the complexities of state building and chart a path towards Somalia's sustainable development.

We encourage all participants to actively engage in dialogues, share experiences, and foster meaningful partnerships. Collaboration is key in addressing the unique challenges faced by Somalia. This conference offers an excellent opportunity to develop concrete strategies and actionable plans for a brighter future. We extend our gratitude to our sponsors and supporters, whose commitment and vision have made this conference possible. Your contributions have played a significant role in bringing this event to reality.

We hope this conference expands your knowledge and inspires you to actively contribute to the state-building efforts in Somalia. Together, we can pave the way for a stronger, more resilient Somalia that thrives in the face of adversity.

Thank you, and let us embark on this enriching journey of learning and collaboration at the 2nd East Africa Development forum, 2023, with the theme of "State Building in Somalia: Lessons Learned and Ways Forward".

Abdiwali Sheikh Mohamed
Chair of the Conference
East Africa Association for Research and Development (DAD

INTRODUCTION

Prof. Dr. Ali Sheikh Ahmed, General Director of DAD

This book presents the proceedings of the 2nd East Africa Development Forum, held between July 22-23, 2023, in Mogadishu, Somalia, under the theme "State-building in Somalia: Lessons Learned and the Way Forward." In collaboration with three universities in Somalia, namely Mogadishu University, Benadir University, and Hormuud University, the East Africa Association for Research and Development (DAD) organized this conference. Scholars and experts were invited to revisit Somalia's past and present, proposing new approaches to address the challenges of state-building in the country.

The 1st East Africa Development Forum took place in Istanbul, Türkeye, in December 2018, under the theme "Turkey-Somalia Relations: A Step Forward." This conference served as a platform to convene high-level government representatives, as well as participants from academia, civil society, media, and the diaspora. Over the course of two days, attendees engaged in constructive discussions on various strategies to strengthen the multifaceted relations between Turkey and Somalia. Drawing upon their shared history and common interests, participants explored ways to enhance cooperation and collaboration between the two countries.

The 2nd conference, originally scheduled for 2020, faced multiple postponements due to the outbreak of the coronavirus and the subsequent restrictions and implications of the corona. However, it finally took place on July 22-23, 2023. The primary goal of the 2nd East Africa Development forum, 2023, was to address the political divisions, poverty, droughts, extremism, and clan polarization that have impeded Somalia's progress. To achieve this objective, the conference brought together a diverse range of scholars, experts, and politicians. They collectively revisited Somalia's history, assessed the current situation, and put forth innovative approaches and strategies for effective state-building.

The forum fostered constructive dialogue among participants through debates and panel discussions, facilitating the generation of fresh ideas. It examined lessons learned from past experiences and identified viable paths forward. The primary aim of the forum was to serve as a platform for collaborative thinking, with the ultimate goal of overcoming the challenges faced by Somalia and promoting its sustainable development.

The conference pursued several key objectives, aiming to contribute to the ongoing dialogue on Somalia's state-building process. These objectives included:

- To analyze the causes and dynamics of state failure in Somalia, drawing from historical, political, and socio-economic perspectives.
- To explore potential strategies and approaches for effective state-building, taking into account the unique challenges and opportunities presented by Somalia's context.
- To highlight the critical role of education in post-conflict recovery, nation-building, and the development of robust state institutions.
- To foster an inclusive discussion on governance and public service, addressing issues such as corruption, decentralization, and social accountability.
- To examine the impact of environmental degradation and climate change on Somalia and identify sustainable mitigation strategies.
- To acknowledge and celebrate the instrumental role of civil society, particularly women, in contributing to the state-building process.
- To deliberate on the prospects and challenges of achieving universal suffrage in Somalia, considering the importance of a functioning and inclusive political system.

This proceedings book comprises a collection of academic papers, presentations, keynote addresses, and panel discussions, all focusing on the following five themes:

Theme One: State-Building in Somalia: Insights from Somali Studies, and Conflict Resolution
Theme Two: Education for Recovery & State Building
Theme Three: Effective Governance and Public Service
Theme Four: Environment and Climate Change in Somalia: Mitigations and Sustainable Solutions
Theme Five: Civil Society in the State-Building Process

However, the selected papers in this proceedings book include contributions from both those who had the opportunity to present their work at the conference and those who were unable to attend in person. The book aims to capture a broader range of perspectives, enriching the dialogue and advancing understanding of the discussed topics. Its ultimate goal is to provide a reliable reference for the critical re-examination of Somalia's past and present, along with offering policymakers recommendations to foster a common understanding and create a better future for all Somalis.

The conference commenced with an opening speech delivered by Prof. Dr. Ali Sheikh Ahmed, the Director of the East Africa Association for Research and Development (DAD). He warmly welcomed and expressed appreciation to the diverse group of participants, including esteemed dignitaries such as government ministers, the governor, and the mayor of the capital, university rectors, representatives from invited institutions, and other seasoned scholars. Prof. Dr. Ahmed also extended his sincere appreciation and gratitude to the generous sponsors of the conference, whose invaluable support played a vital role in its success. Emphasizing the conference's central theme on state-building studies from Somalia's independence on June 26, 1960, to the present day of July 22, 2023, Prof. Dr. Ahmed concluded his address by officially inaugurating the conference and expressing his best wishes for fruitful deliberations among the participants.

The conference witnessed keynote addresses from several esteemed dignitaries. Among them were Prof. Dr. Mohamed Mohamud Hassan (Biday), the Rector of Benadir University and Chairman of the Association of Somali Universities. Another notable speaker was Prof. Hassan Abdi Keynan, who served as the main keynote speaker. Additionally, H.E. Yusuf Hussein Jimale (Madaale), the Governor of Benadir Region and Mayor of Mogadishu City, H.E. Jama Taqal Abbas, the Minister of Energy and Water Resources for the Federal Government of Somalia, H.E. Dr. Mohamed Sheikh Ali (Doodishe), the Minister of Internal Security, and H.E. Farah Sheikh Abdulkadir, the Minister of Education, Culture, and Higher Education for the Federal Government of Somalia, all graced the event with their presence. It was H.E. Farah Sheikh Abdulkadir who officially inaugurated the forum, marking its official commencement.

The scholars started presenting their academic papers, starting with those under theme one (State-Building in Somalia: Insights from Somali Studies, And Conflict Resolution). These included papers like; Theorizing Stability of Somali State: In the Light of the Comprehensive Perspective of Somali Studies by Prof. Dr. Abdirahman M. Abdullahi (Baadiyow). This paper used the Comprehensive Perspective model to analyze the Somali state-building process' challenges and explored the relationship between modern state structures and traditional Somali society. The second paper presented under same theme was “Challenges of Somali State Building” by Hassan Haji Mahmoud Abdullah. The paper used literature review approach to assess the multifaceted political and socio-economic challenges that hinder state building in Somalia. The third paper presented under theme one was “Revisiting the Causes of The Somali Civil War in The Light of The Protracted Social Conflict Perspective” by Hassan Mudane, Hormuud University. The paper utilized a qualitative approach to critical

evaluation of literature on Somalia's civil war to demonstrate the underlying causes of and thereby offer a strong explanation for its outbreak.

The fourth paper was "The Role of ATMIS in Conflict Resolutions and Reconciliation ın Somalia" by Mohamed Ghedi Jumale. The paper adopted desk research methodology using John Paul Lederaches' reconciliation approaches to analyze the function of ATMIS in the resolution and reconciliation of Somalia conflict. The fifth paper under theme one was "Rebuilding the Somali Nation-State: The Needs for Sustainable Peace" by Dr. Abdisalam M Issa-Salwe. Using desk research methodology, the paper discussed the ways conflict resolution and sustainable peacebuilding can transform Somali society to achieve sustainable peace and economic development. The sixth paper was "Glimpse into the Drawbacks in the Somali Political Landscape in 1960-1969" by Mustafa Feiruz. The paper used desk research methodology to delve into the political dynamics of Somalia's first political era after independence, with a particular focus on the drawbacks that emerged and influenced its trajectory. The last paper presented under theme one was "The Role of Federalism on State Building in Somalia" by Abdullahi Abshir Abdirahman. The paper utilized cross-sectional and quantitative methodology to investigate the impact of federalism on state building in Somalia.

The papers presented under theme two (Education for Recovery & State Building) was a paper by Dr. Abdishakur Tarah, titled "The Impact of Armed Conflict on Leadership and Management of Schools in Benaadır Region, Somali Head Teachers' Perspective". This paper used qualitative, semi-structured interviews to capture both current and retired Head teachers' perspectives on managing and leading schools during active conflict. Under theme three (Effective Governance and Public Service), the paper presented was "Health Investment and Economic Growth: A Pathway to Sustainable Development for Somalia" by Dr. Mohammed A.M Ahmed. Utilizing secondary data, this paper presented an in-depth analysis of the correlation between increased healthcare investment and subsequent economic development, emphasizing the role of improved health conditions in fostering a more productive and educated workforce.

Under theme Four (Environment and Climate Change in Somalia: Mitigations and Sustainable Solutions), the paper presented was "Climate Change Impact and Mitigation in Somalia: Water Harvesting and Conservation" by Dr. Shariff Osman. Using a qualitative research approach, the study examines the far-reaching consequences of climate change in Somalia, highlighting the severe repercussions of annual flooding, droughts, and erratic seasonal rainfall, which have resulted in dire famine in the country. The first paper under theme

five (Civil Society in the State-Building Process) was “The Role of Civil Society on State Building in Somalia” by Ahmed Osman Nur. The study focused on a comprehensive review of existing literature, reports, and case studies to examine Civil Society Organizations’ involvement and their overall impact and significance in Somalia's state-building efforts.

The second paper under theme five was “The Role of Women in State-Building in Somalia: Lesson Learned & Amp; The Way Forwarded” by Suad Haji Hassan Mohamed. The scholar used cross sectional and quantitative research design to a analyze the role of women in state building in Somalia through focusing on promoting awareness and changing societal attitudes towards gender roles and active participation of women in political processes.

The main conference discussion panelists included; Dr. Abdirazak Mohamud Takar, the president of East Africa University. Dr. Adan Shidane Guleed, the president of Hormuud University and Notable Figure in the Academic Community. Mr. Mahad Wasuge, the Executive Director of the Somali Public Agenda. Engineer Asad Noh, the Head of the Board of Trustees of Red Sea University. Shukri Hassan Osman, a Lecturer at Mogadishu University and a Dedicated Humanitarian Worker. Prof. Abdi Ahmed Mohamed Baafo, former Minister of Agriculture in Somalia and Executive director of Dhaxalreeb. Prof. Ibrahim Farah Bursalid, an Expert in State and Peacebuilding as well as International Relations. Mrs. Halima Ibrahim (Yareey), the chair of Galmudug Election Commission and the Former Chairperson of the Transitional National Electoral Commission and Dr. Hassan Sheikh Ali, Prominent Academic Figure.

The closing remarks were made by Prof. Dr. Ali Sheikh Ahmed, General Director of East Africa Association for Research and Development (DAD) and H.E. Hassan M. Mohamud, the Minister of Justice and Constitutional affairs of the Federal Government of Somalia. This expressed heartfelt gratitude to every participant who had played a pivotal role in ensuring that the conference was successful. They also argued all participants to pick at least one learning point towards Somalia state building and implement it for the betterment of Somalia.

As part of this conference book, Dr. Mohamed Osman Mohamoud, the Executive Director of Sadar Institute wrote the conclusion chapter where he summarized the key learning points and the implications of all the papers presented in the conference. He ended this chapter by challenging Somali scholars to invest in research about the role of good governance and transformative leadership towards achieving Somalia’s political and economic liberation.

The last section of this book presents the key points and the official communique of the conference. Among the key points, Islam was emphasized for its central role in guiding Somalia's state-building journey, highlighting its unifying potential and capacity to transcend clan divisions. Other key points included unity among various Somali elites, clan elders and religious scholars, politicians, and civil society players. İnclusivity, human rights, and dignity were highlighted as fundamental elements for building a just and equitable Somali state.

PART 1

OPENING SESSION





Prof. Dr. Ali Sheikh Ahmed

Director of East Africa Association for Research and Development

Official Host Speech

Praise be to Allah and prayers and peace be upon the Messenger of Allah, and the end is for the pious, so there is no aggression except against the unjust.

Excellences, Ministers, Members of Parliament in both Houses, Governor of Benadir, and the Mayor of the Capital, various leaders of the State, heads of universities and officials of various educational institutions, businessmen and employees of media institutions, dear attendees: Peace be upon you and God's mercy and blessings.

It is a great opportunity to take advantage of this occasion - in the presence of an elite of experts in various fields of life along with the leaders of the state and the respected civil society - to discuss many research papers prepared by a distinguished elite of Somali and non-Somali researchers from inside and outside the country, whose topics relate to the contemporary history of this country and to anticipate its future developments in view of the repercussions of the current situation.

As for the agenda of this conference, it focuses mainly on the study of the period that extends from the independence of the country on June 26, 1960 of the last century to this day, July 22, 2023, which is the same period during which our people exerted a lot of efforts to build this homeland, and both the achievements and the failures were ours. After we accomplished a lot of national works and tasks over thirty years, we later did crazy work unfortunately to destroy what we built with our hands in cooperation with our enemies. A large number of army leaders and politicians participated in these actions without awareness and a road map that guides them to a specific destination, and we believed God's words, the most praise: {Do not invalidate your actions}. This amazing paradox is worth pausing for a long time, thinking about its causes and the motives behind it.

History lessons are very important, but understanding the historical transformations and their zigzags is an urgent necessity to avoid their repetition

in the future and to correct the resulting distortions in the course of our lives. İt also allows taking advantage of the beneficial and harmonious aspects of history with the conditions of the times. Quranic references and stories such as this saying: {Explain to them these historical stories, perhaps they reflect} are divine directives related to the history of past nations and their actions and include the negative and positive aspects.

We can take this as a guide, because a nation that does not know how to learn from its history and benefit from its successive events has not really learned anything, and cannot build the desired future. The reason is that it can easily repeat the mistakes it committed previously, which will prevent its progress due to the absence of a clear goal that helps the leadership and society to move to reach the final station to achieve the comprehensive renaissance of educational, economic and security progress. Without this, we will go through a vicious cycle that leads to the scattering of efforts and the creation of exhausting stumbling factors and successive endless setbacks, and the results of this inevitably are miserable failures. Failure in planning and working without a goal is successful planning for failure.

There is no particular party that declares and acknowledges its responsibility for these historical mistakes. In fact, we must declare the collective responsibility for what happened as leadership and the people alike, because it is the people who do not choose a good leadership to rule the country that enabled the corrupt to reach the center of leadership. The task of saving this homeland from the repercussions of those mistakes falls today primarily on the educated elite in this society of religious sheikhs, state leaders and educational leaders like you. Dear attendees, the question that arises here: Is the destruction that has befallen the country caused by circumstances that were later formed during our march to build Somalia? Or was the path we took to build the state and the approach we followed for the renaissance from the beginning a wrong path and a broken approach?

We inherited a state and a system of government that was made according to the standards of enemies who occupied our country, and we were busy fighting them without finding enough opportunity to learn from them what is useful to us. We inherited a system of government that was made according to the standards of Europeans - the owners of the dominant civilization in the present era without a competitor - at a time when there was no modern Islamic system of government to manage the state in line with our traditions. State administration is originally a culture that stems from the collective awareness of its citizens, and we did not have in our collective consciousness a culture that is consistent with the requirements of the state administration in its contemporary

form. We did not try to take from the culture of the West what we see as appropriate to our customs and traditions, nor did the leaders of the state after independence make any effort to harmonize the system of government with the beliefs of the people and consider the benefits of reducing disharmony between the people and the state. This is one of the important topics that will be addressed by the researchers participating in this conference.

We are a warrior people by nature, but our wars did not exclude anyone. We fought English, Italian and French colonialism, we fought the Soviets and America, we fought our neighbors, and we fought our country, and after we brought down our country. Hatred broke out between us until we fought each other, blood flowed in our land rivers. Our children orphaned us, we raped our women, and we failed to be compassionate brothers among ourselves, and our hearts became full of hatred. In light of these facts, we have to ask: Why are we fighting everyone? Why do we beg in front of everyone? Why did we fail to make friends and alliances around the world? We have not succeeded in accomplishing anything because we have destroyed everything we have accomplished. The saying of Allah Almighty applies to us: (And be not like her who undoes the thread which she has spun after it has become strong, by taking your oaths a means of deception among yourselves). We are not the first society to fail in its life, and we are not the first country to be led by people who are not qualified to run the state. The important thing is to move according to a deliberate methodology from which to build our society and our state and explore the imbalances in our society, as well as conduct comprehensive research studies on the state, democracy, federalism and administrative structures of the contemporary state in the hope of success in treating our social, political, security, educational, economic and moral diseases.

The failure of our homeland does not mean that our people are dead and unable to move and regenerate. The Somalis have shown many signs that they are a people that adhere to life and are able to change if there are some reasons and circumstances. When the Somalis left their devastated country for other countries, they proved their existence in a peerless way. We only need to make collective efforts by an elite of our minds to blame our people and correct what is different from us.

This conference is a call for everyone to reconsider these matters, and an opportunity to highlight the imbalances that have been ignored since independence. Since I consider myself a veteran of public work, because have been working in this country, in this field for three decades, I would like to say that there are tremendous efforts made to revive the state, build educational institutions, and revive trade, many of which have been crowned with success,

praise be to God. But what no one has discussed, is the cause of the collapse in the first place. We are like the case of someone who took medicine to treat himself for a disease whose diagnosis is unknown. Finally, I would like to express my gratitude for your participation and presence. Despair is not a characteristic of people of high determination, nor is helplessness the nature of lovers of change for their societies, and every diligent person has a share. God says most praise: {And those who fought hard in us to guide us to our paths, and God is with the doers of good}.

I wish you success in this conference, gentlemen and ladies, peace be upon you and God's mercy and blessings.



Prof. Dr. Mohamed Mohamud Hassan Biday

Chairman of the Association of Somali Universities and Rector of Benadir University

Host Speech

In the realm of academia, few luminaries shine as brightly as Prof. Dr. Mohamed Mohamud Hassan Biday. Holding the esteemed positions of Chairman of the Association of Somali Universities and Rector of Benadir University, Prof. Biday's presence conference was nothing short of momentous. His extensive experience and unwavering dedication to education made him an emblematic figure in the pursuit of knowledge and progress in Somalia.

During his address, delivered on behalf of the three universities co-hosting the conference - Mogadishu, Benadir, and Hormuud University, Prof. Biday exuded a profound appreciation for the transformative potential of academic gatherings. He understood that within the academic crucible, critical issues are not merely discussed but dissected, innovative solutions are not just contemplated but explored, and collaborative bridges are not merely conceptualized but actively constructed among universities. Prof. Biday's words resonated deeply, reiterating the belief that academia possesses the keys to unlocking solutions to even the most complex challenges facing Somalia.

Moreover, his advocacy for collaboration among universities underscored the importance of unity in the pursuit of knowledge and progress. In a nation as

diverse and dynamic as Somalia, the amalgamation of intellectual resources from multiple universities holds the promise of multifaceted solutions to multifaceted challenges. Prof. Biday's presence at the conference embodied the unwavering commitment of the academic community to guide the nation toward a brighter tomorrow through the power of education and collaboration.



Prof. Hassan Abdi Keynan
Keynote and Featured Presenter

In the esteemed realm of international development and academia, Prof. Hassan Keynan stands as a revered figure. At the conference, he assumed the role of keynote speaker, bringing to the stage not only his extensive international experience but also a groundbreaking perspective on Somalia's challenges.

Prof. Keynan's address unveiled a topic he had previously presented in 1996 in Norway, a subject that has since become seminal in discussions about Somalia's trajectory. This topic introduced "The Somali Equation," a pioneering conceptual framework that promised to shed light on the root causes of the nation's challenges. With this equation, Prof. Keynan embarked on a journey to unravel the complexities that have hindered Somalia's progress. The equation identified four pivotal factors that contributed to the friction within Somalia: Clan dynamics, Islam, Nomadism, and its far-reaching socio-economic impacts, and the imposition of a modern state by colonial powers. Prof. Keynan's insights revealed the intricate web of historical, cultural, and political factors that have shaped the nation's trajectory.What became apparent through Prof. Keynan's address was the pressing need for a visionary architect capable of skillfully harmonizing these factors. He envisioned a Somalia where governance would draw inspiration from a unique "Islamo-Somalo Heritage." This vision encapsulated the essence of his address - the imperative of redefining governance in Somalia by respecting its rich historical and cultural tapestry while charting a progressive course forward.

In summary, Prof. Keynan's keynote address was nothing short of visionary. It not only offered an intellectual framework for understanding Somalia's challenges but also ignited a collective imagination for the nation's potential. His

insights served as a clarion call for a new era in Somalia's governance, one that would honor its heritage while steering a course toward progress and prosperity.



H.E. Yusuf Hussein Jimale (Madaale)
Governor of Benadir Region and Mayor of Mogadishu - Guest Speaker

The Governor of Benadir Region and Mayor of Mogadishu Yusuf Madale provided a distinct perspective during the conference, emphasizing the crucial role of applying knowledge in practical ways. He underscored that knowledge finds its true worth when it leads to tangible action, echoing the sentiment that Somalia's path to progress is marked not only by intellectual exploration but by concrete outcomes that improve citizens' lives.

Mayor Madaale also highlighted the significance of reviving the Somali language as a means of preserving the nation's cultural heritage and identity. In his view, language serves as more than just a medium of communication; it's a vessel for safeguarding Somalia's rich legacy. Education, he argued, is at the core of this transformative process, serving as the foundation upon which a brighter future for Somalia can be built. His message resonated as a call to action, reminding all present that the real value of knowledge lies not in its accumulation but in its practical application for the advancement of Somalia and its people.



H.E. Jama Taqal Abbas

Ministry of Energy and Water Resources, Federal Government of Somalia - Guest Speaker

Jama Taqal, an esteemed alumnus of Mogadishu University, took the stage to commend the East Africa Association for Research and Development for its unwavering dedication to advancing the discourse on Somalia. He expressed his deep appreciation for the organization's tireless efforts, emphasizing the critical role it plays in elevating the intellectual discussions surrounding Somalia.

In his address, Mr. Taqal underscored the pivotal importance of having Somali scholars actively contribute to the body of knowledge about their nation. He emphasized the significance of these scholars standing shoulder to shoulder with their foreign counterparts. In his view, the recognition of local expertise not only enriches the discourse but also leads to a more comprehensive and holistic understanding of Somalia's intricate and multifaceted realities. Jama' Taqal's words were a call to embrace and celebrate the wealth of intellectual talent within Somalia, fostering a collaborative environment where local and international scholars work together to shed light on the nation's challenges and opportunities.



H.E. Dr. Mohamed Sheikh Ali (Doodishe)

Minister of Internal Security - Guest Speaker

In a thought-provoking address, Dr. Mohamed Sheikh Ali Doodishe, representing the Ministry of Security, urged conference attendees to adopt a more comprehensive perspective on governance, one that transcends mere political considerations. He challenged the audience to look beyond immediate political dynamics and delve into the broader evolution of Western nations, where civilization, education, and technology have played pivotal roles in their development.

Doodishe's words carried a profound message, emphasizing the importance of Somalia making informed decisions about which aspects of Western development it chooses to emulate. He called for a nuanced approach, one that takes into account the lessons learned from Western nations' histories. His address encouraged attendees to engage in critical thinking about

how Somalia can leverage civilization, education, and technology to shape its path towards sustainable progress. In doing so, Dr. Mohamed Sheikh Ali Doodishe illuminated the need for a governance perspective that encompasses not only political dimensions but also the socio-cultural and technological forces that shape a nation's destiny. Such as IA, nanotechnologies, genetic engineering, geopolitics and all other concurrent technological changes.



H.E. Farah Sheikh Abdulkadir

Ministry of Education, Culture and Higher Education – Official Opening Guest Speaker

In a candid and impactful address, Mr. Farah Abdulkadir, representing the Ministry of Education, confronted the stark realities of Somalia's educational landscape. With unwavering resolve, he presented sobering statistics, notably the distressing fact that 63 percent of the population remains illiterate, unable to even read the nation's constitution. Abdulkadir's address served as a powerful wake-up call, shedding light on the urgent need to address pervasive challenges, including hunger and clan-based conflicts. Passionately advocating for change, Mr. Abdulkadir underscored the critical importance of civic education, social education, and the adoption of micro-responsibilities as essential steps toward progress. His message resonated with a call to action, emphasizing the imperative of shifting from the divisive forces of clannism to a unified sense of nationhood, ethics, and unity. In this transformative journey, education emerged as the driving force, the catalyst that has the potential to rewrite Somalia's narrative from one of adversity to one of hope and opportunity. Farah Abdulkadir's address was a poignant reminder that education is not just a path to knowledge; it is the pathway to a brighter future for Somalia and its people.

In summation, the Opening Session of the "State Building in Somalia: Lessons Learned and the Way Forward" Conference was a defining moment. It brought together a consortium of visionary leaders, scholars, and policymakers, converging to contemplate Somalia's intricate challenges. Their collective wisdom and commitment to transformative change set the stage for a conference characterized by introspection, collaborative exploration, and a forward-looking spirit. This session served as a beacon of hope, illuminating the path towards a Somalia that harnesses its intellectual capital to overcome obstacles and pave the way for a prosperous future.

PART 2

STATE-BUILDING IN SOMALIA: INSIGHTS FROM SOMALI STUDIES, AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION



Theorizing Stability of Somali State: In the Light of the Comprehensive Perspective of Somali Studies

Prof. Dr. Abdirahman M. Abdullahi (Baadiyow)

Abstract

This essay addresses the Somali state-building process' challenges and emphasizes the need to explore the relationship between modern state structures and traditional Somali society. Critiquing existing perspectives such as the Anthropological, Marxist, and Revisionist approaches, the author proposes an alternative viewpoint called the "Comprehensive Perspective" (CP). The CP rejects sectionalization, colonization, secularization, and patriarchization within Somali studies, advocating for an inclusive approach encompassing all elements of Somali society. The essay presents six scenarios representing the Somali mindset, highlighting the varying loyalties to Islam, nationalism, and clan, which pose significant challenges to state-building. The classification and dynamics of traditional and modern Somali elites are also examined. The CP offers an alternative perspective for Somali studies and a solution through the Inclusive Reconciliation Framework (IRF). The essay concludes that reconciliation between state and society requires reconciling political elites, restructuring traditional institutions, addressing past grievances, and establishing a foundation for a shared future. This process should be reflected in constitutional provisions and legal frameworks while involving non-state actors like civil society organizations and business communities to contribute to the Somali state-building effort. Integrating non-state actors leads to developing a "stability model for Somali state-building."

Key word: *theorizing, state, comprehensives, perspective, sectionalization, anthropology*

Introduction

The Comprehensive Perspective is the fourth Somali studies perspective developed to criticize the other three perspectives. Somali studies are a multi-disciplinary academic term for studying the Somali people in the Horn of Africa, their diasporic communities, and their interactions with other people's worldwide. The main fields in Somali studies are social science, humanities, and fine arts. Somali studies analyze the historical, social, economic, and political

aspects and their interaction with local culture. It is rooted in the ancient history of the Horn of Africa. It draws from the chronicles and literature written by Greek, Jewish, Chinese, and Arab/Muslim geographers and explorers in the Middle Ages.[1] It is also embedded in the works of scholars of Islam who focused mainly on Islamic studies, memorized rich poetic literature, and travelogues of the European explorers of the nineteenth century.[2] Moreover, Somali studies hinge on colonial literature and archives and scholarly work produced by researchers and found in published books.[3] Furthermore, since the Somali people bridge Africa and the Middle East, Somali studies are influenced by African and Middle Eastern studies.[4] The term Somali studies was coined in 1978 with the establishment of the Somali Studies International Association, emulating other country studies that were booming during that period.[5]

Somali studies have continued to grow since adopting Latin orthography as the official national alphabet of the Somali language in 1972 and establishing various state institutions to promote arts, theatre, and culture.[6] Somali studies were booming with the growing trend of publishing books in Somali, English, Arabic, and other languages. Annual book fairs started throughout Somalia's big cities, and publishing houses and translation services are booming. Moreover, several specialized journals on Somali studies are being published.[7] Additionally, the annual conferences of Somali Studies are conducted at many universities and institutes, such as Mogadishu, JigJiga, SIMAD, Banadir

[1] The Chinese explorers were Tuan Chéng-Sbib, Chou Ju-Hua, Zheng. The Arab explorers and geographers were Ibnu Said al-Magribi, Mohammad al-Idrisi, and Ibn Battuta. In addition, there was also a Jewish traveler, Benjamin of Tudela.

[2] The European explorers of Somalia were mainly Italians, including Luigi Robecchi - Bricchetti, Vittorio Bottego, and Prince Luigi Amedeo, Duke of the Abruzzi. They focused their trips on southern Somalia. On the other hand, the British explorer who visited northern Somalia was Richard Burton.

[3] Most notable books on Somali Studies developed from the Ph.D. thesis were authored by Lee Cassanelli, Saadia Touval, Ahmed Samatar, Abdi Samatar, Said Samatar, Abdi Sheikh Abdi, Afyare Abdi Elmi, Robert Hees, Virginia Lulling, Mohamed Nuh, Abdirahman Ahmed Noor, Scott Rees, Mary Hope Schwoebel, Abdurahman Baadiyow, Abdislam Salwe, and others.

[4] Abdurahman Abdullahi, "Revisiting Somali historiography: critique and idea of comprehensive perspective," Journal of Somali Studies: Research on Somalia and the Greater Horn of African Countries 5, no. 1–2, 2018, 31–59, 32.

[5] Lee Cassanelli, "The Somali Studies International Association: A Brief History," Bildhaan 1, 2001, 1–10.

[6] These institutions include the establishment of the Somali Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1973, the national theatre in 1967, and the National Museum in 1933.

[7] See "Somaliland Standard," Retrieved 26 April 2023. Also, see Mogadishu Book Fair. https://qz.com/africa/740313/somalias-new-love-affair-with-books-ramps-up-as-safety-returns-to-the-country (accessed on 27 April 2023).

universities, and East African Association for Research and Development (DAD) and Heritage Institute.[8]

However, with all this progress in Somali studies, the fundamental question of why the Somali state collapsed within 30 years (1960-1991) and how to re-institute it remains disputed. Even worse, the military regimes' elite political culture and policies are recuperated in the new state-building processes.[9] Studies explaining the Somali state collapse and its causes could be summarized into three main categories. To simplify, let us compare the Somali state collapse to a crumbled building. What are the possible factors that can collapse this building? The first factor may be external, like tsunamis, artillery shells, or missiles hitting the building. The second factor may be the quality of the material that was incapable of bearing the burden of the structure. Hence, the building collapses due to engineering miscalculations or the poor quality of the building materials. The third factor may be the defective engineering of the building that, over time, collapses by itself.

Comparing the collapsed Somali state to the collapsed building, we can assert that the causes of the breakdown of the Somali state were multiple external factors (colonial legacy, war with Ethiopia, Cold War, etc.), defective engineering of state-building, and the low capacity of the political leadership. The flawed engineering mimics the state's inimical relation with its societal roots: Islam and the clan system. The poor quality of the construction materials is comparable to the political elites' low capacity and the society's poor cohesion. Fig 1 demonstrates the concept of state-society relations in which the Islamic belief and the clan system are the basis while the modern state is the superstructure. The state-society conflict is like a foolish person representing the state's political elite who cuts the tree's root where he sits (figure 2). Is there any doubt that this person should fall?

[8] The most famous specialized journals on Somali studies are Bildhaan, Journal of Somali Studies, and Somali Studies: A Peer-reviewed Academic Journal.

[9] Abdurahman Abdullahi, "The Somali Elite Political Culture: Conceptions, Structures, and Historical Evolution." Available from https://mu.edu.so/somali-elite-political-culture/ (accessed on 26 April 2013).



Figure 1. The Somali Societal Base and Superstructure



Figure 2. An example of the Somali political elites cutting the roots of Somali society:

Islam and the clan system

Even though this paper focuses on Somalia, its main thesis applies to other countries sharing similar postcolonial conflict history with Somalia. Such countries include Yemen, Libya, Sudan, Chad, Mauritania, and Afghanistan. These countries experienced a similar historical trajectory to Somalia, from weak postcolonial regimes to military dictatorships and civil wars that created instability and continuous state-society conflict. This paper briefly produces the theoretical backdrop of the three theories employed in this research. Moreover, the paper offers the critical challenges of Somali state-building that expound on the root cause of the current crisis and proceeds into the overview of the various perspectives of Somali Studies as a background for developing the comprehensive perspective (CP). Finally, after exploring and categorizing the main Somali conflicts, this essay suggests the Inclusive Reconciliation Framework (IRF), which could be developed into the Stability Model (SM) for Somali state-building.

Theoretical Base of the Comprehensive Perspective

In theorizing the comprehensive perspective, this paper utilizes three theoretical frameworks: the theory of state-society relations, the elite theory, and the ibn-Khaldun's theory of solidarity. These three frameworks focus on the relationship between the state and society, which cuts across aspects of the theoretical borderlines, exploring how governance and society interact and influence one another. We will briefly produce an overview of these theories. Firstly, scholars in state-society relations agree that society provides crucial support for a state's effectiveness and that a state is critical to collective action in society.[10] The UK Department for International Development (DFID) defined state-society relations as 'interactions between state institutions and societal groups to negotiate how public authority is exercised and how people can influence it. They are focused on issues such as defining the mutual rights and obligations of the state and society, negotiating how public resources should be allocated, and establishing different modes of representation and accountability.''[11]

Earlier scholars of state-society relations considered strong traditional societies structured into tribal communities and religious groups in postcolonial countries an obstacle to modern development. However, in the later period, strong states and strong societies in collaboration were conjectured to offer a better prospect for development.[12] The challenging nature of Somali state relations with its society stems from the strangeness between the postcolonial form and character of the state and the underlying social, economic, and political configurations of Somali society. The resulting tensions in state-society relations are directly attributable to the enduring influence of colonial legacy.[13] Thus, the

[10] Atul Kohli, "State, Society, and Development." In *Political Science: The State of the Discipline*, ed. Ira Katznelson and Helen Milner (eds.). New York: Norton, 2002, 84-117; Joel Migdal, *State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute Each Other* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Peter Evans, *Embedded Autonomy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Stephen Haggard, *Pathways from the Periphery* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990).

[11] *Building Peaceful States and Societies: A DFID Practice Paper* (London: Department for International Development, 2010), 15.

[12] Spalding, Nancy Jackson. "State-Society Relations in Africa: An Exploration of the Tanzanian Experience." *Polity*, vol. 29, no. 1, 1996, pp. 65–96. Also, for the definition of the development see Dr. Reem Abuiyada, Traditional Development Theories have failed to Address the Needs of the majority of People at Grassroots Levels with Reference to GAD. Social Sciences Department Dhofar University Salalah, Sultanate of Oman. International Journal of Business and Social Science Vol. 9, No. 9. September 2018.

[13] Shaheen Mozaffar, Dimensions of state-society Relations in Africa. African Studies Center, 1985, 1.

independent Somali state (1960-1991) embarked on a policy of suppressing its strong society, and the reaction of society in encountering it caused the state to collapse in 1991. Additionally, the resilience of Somali society and its ability to survive and even develop more than 30 years of hardship is associated with its strong social networks, deep-rooted clan culture, strong Islamist groups, and relative networks.[14] Indeed, the state and society are not separate and wholly independent entities from one another since the state's top institutions are occupied by individuals representing the interests of various segments of society. Thus, state and society are interdependent, and while the state adopted modernization programs against traditional ethos, Somali clans hardly accepted the state's laws and programs and preserved their traditional customary laws and networks.

Secondly, the elite theory seeks to describe power relationships in contemporary society and posits that a small minority holds the most power. The central premise of the elite theory is as follows: 'No societies are governed by the people, by a majority; all societies, including societies called democratic, are ruled by a minority.'[15] Even when entire groups are supposedly excluded from the state's traditional power networks, elite theory recognizes that "counter-elites" frequently develop within such excluded groups. The elitist method permits the integration of the two levels of analysis: micro-systems studies by anthropology and macro-systems that fall in the domain of political science.[16]

In the Qur'an, the elite is synonymous with the Arabic term al-Mala, which means the great one, the chieftains, the leaders, the notables, the eminent, the dignitaries, the elders, and the ruling circle.[17] Being the ruling elites and the privileged class, the Qur'an characterized these elites as ardent refusers of the prophets' messages. This is so because the prophets' message carried fundamental ideological change and a vision for the socio-economic reform of societies. As class theory postulates, political elites not only drive political power by owning economic resources, they acquire from other resources that promote access to and retention of political power. These resources include social backgrounds, such as gender and educational qualifications, and communal

[14] Islamist organizations played an important role in mitigating conflicts, spreading Islamic values, creating formal and informal education programs, establishing business pan-clan networks, establishing charities, etc.
[15] James Burnham, The Machiavellians: Defenders of Freedom (The John Day Company, 1943), 165.
[16] Asaf Hussein, Political Perspectives on the Muslim World (New York: Praeger, 1981), 81.
[17] See the meaning of *al-Mala* in the Qur'anic translations of Pickthall, Yusuf Ali, Shakir, Arberry, and others.

attributes, like ethnicity, religious affiliation, and political party affiliations.[18] Critical elite analysts insist that the political elite, despite their nominally different nature, stem from common backgrounds, which explains their similar political socialization, the formation of attitudes, and interest cohesion.[19] The concept of the elite is someone with a community reputation and enjoys the best social, economic, political, and cultural levels.[20]

Thirdly, Ibn-Khaldun's theory of Asabiyah explains how conflicts develop in the tribal nomadic societies, what happens after their conquest of the urban centers, and how to mitigate their destructive culture. The Muqaddimah (prolegomena) to the Universal History, authored by Ibn-Khaldun, delves into the studies of the relations between civilizations and nomadic people. The societies of Ibn-Khaldun's subject of study were clans and tribes, and their religion was Islam. It explains the difficulties of resuscitating the collapsed state because nomads do not agree to one leadership, which prolongs the conflict. Moreover, Ibn-Khaldun connotes Asabiyah as "basically a social force which offers the ability for confrontation, whether that confrontation [political] demands or defends [from threats]."[21] How the nomads behave when they conquer urban cities, Ibn Khaldun writes that "palaces that succumb to the Arabs [nomads] are quickly ruined."[22]

Furthermore, Ibn-Khaldun deals with mitigating the nomads' destructive behaviour. This theory suggests that Asabiyah cannot be weakened without the intervention of a religious, moral standard that lessens its ferocity and savageness with the teaching of universal values. Addressing this question, Ibn-Khaldun wrote: "Arabs [nomads] can obtain royal authority only by using some religious coloring such as prophecy, sainthood, or some great religious event in general."[23] "But when there is a religion [among them] through prophecy or sainthood, they have some restraining influence. The quality of haughtiness and jealousy leaves them. Then, it is easy for them to subordinate themselves and unite."[24]

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[18] Weber M. *The theory of social and economic organization* (New York: Oxford University Press 1943).
[19] Prewitt K, Stone A. "The ruling elite." In Olsen ME, Marger MN, Eds. *Power in modern societies. Boulder* (Westview Press 1993).
[20] A. R. Khajeh-Sarvi, *Political Competition and Political Stability in Iran* (Tehran: Revolution Documents Center Publications, 2003), 339.
[21] Ibid., 257.
[22] Ibn-Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History* (Princeton University Press, 1980), 302.
[23] Ibid., 305.
[24] Ibid.

In the post-colonial Somali state, the theory of state-society relations studies indicated confrontations between the state and society because of the secular view of the state that disdained the culture and norms of the clan-based Muslim society. Secondly, the elite theory deals with the modern elites who were the product of the colonial education system and retained the political ideology and culture inherited from the colonial rulers. These elites acquired predatory elite political culture mixing colonial governance culture (top-down) with the local clan culture (clannism) that continued and even worsened after the collapse of the state in 1991. Finally, Ibn-Khaldun's theory of solidarity offers a remedy to the chaotic nature of clan-based societies by introducing Islamic ethics and charismatic leaders into the equation, calling for Islamic principles of brotherhood, peace, justice, and good governance.

Background One: The Key Challenges of Somali State-building

The main challenges of Somali state-building are its strategic geographic location, the division of the Somali territory among multiple colonial powers and the Somali aspiration for uniting them (Greater Somalia), and the Westernized state model in conflict with its society. The geography of Somalia connects Asia, Europe, and Africa, which attracted competition among the various colonial powers to dominate Somalia. Also, adjacent to the Suez Canal and the oil-rich Gulf region, Somalia became part of the Cold War zones by the 1950s. Moreover, Somalia was drawn to the river Nile politics between Egypt and Ethiopia.25 Furthermore, Somalia became a place where the double identity of Arabness and Africanness compete and conflict.26 Presently, global terrorism designated Somalia as a suitable location to wage what they called global Jihad to restore the Islamic Caliphate. Finally, the renewed superpower rivalries between USA and China and rising regional powers like Turkey, the Gulf states, and neighboring countries pose new challenges for Somali state-building.

The second challenge was dividing the Somali cultural nation into five parts among multiple colonial powers, which inspired Somali nationalists to struggle to unify all Somali territories. This venture positioned Somalia on a collision course with international conventions on the inviolability of the colonially

[25] Osman Abdullahi, "The Role of Egypt, Ethiopia the Blue Nile in the Failure of the Somali Conflict Resolutions: A Zero-Sum Game" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Hilton Hawaiian Village, Honolulu, Hawaii, March 2005).
[26] See Ibrahim Farah, "Foreign Policy and Conflict in Somalia, 1960-1990" (Ph.D. diss., University of Nairobi, 2009), 187.

inherited borders.27 Moreover, it also embroiled Somalia in continuous conflict with its neighbors. Gradually, Somali nationalism began to decline with the defeat of Somalia in the war with Ethiopia in 1977/78 and the proclamation of the independent Republic of Djibouti in 1977. What is more, the repressive policy of the military regime and the armed opposition movements organized on a clan basis further weakened Somali nationalism.28 Therefore, the centrifugal forces of Somali clannish particularism overwhelmed the centripetal forces of nationalism that were substantially weakened during long years of dictatorship (1969–1991), and the Somali state collapsed in 1991. Since then, Somalia has remained the emblem of the longest-collapsed state in modern history. Indeed, Somali nationalism never dies because it is organic and alive among all Somalis; however, it requires a new vision and interpretations that draw lessons from past experiences.

The third challenge is the postcolonial state built on the Westernized model, which failed to accommodate the Somali traditions (i.e., Islam and the clan system). Consequently, the pervasive state penetration in the society ineptly collided with a strong society based on the clan system and Islam, thus kindling a defense mechanism that provoked rebellious confrontations. Therefore, strained state-society relations instigated the emergence of three competing ideologies: clannism, Islamism, and nationalism, even though these ideologies are dynamic, crosscurrent, and often overlap.29 However, without a reconciliatory arrangement, the notion of their mutual exclusion prevailed. Indeed, the polarization of the society started manifesting with the enforced secular reforms of the military regime, which provoked the emergence of insurgencies under the banners of Islam and clan. Therefore, it is arguable that Somali society has been systematically radicalized since 1969.

[27] Somalia did not endorse the declaration of the Organization of African Unity on the sanctity of the borders in Cairo, 1964; Saadia Touval, "The Organization of African Unity and Borders," *International Organization* 21, no. 1 (1967): 102–27.
[28] The Armed opposition movements established with the support of Ethiopia were Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), Somali National Movement (SNM), United Somali Congress (USC), and Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM).
[29] Abdurahman Abdullahi, *Tribalism, Nationalism, and Islam*.



Figure 3. The three Key Successive Challenges of Somali State-building

The two challenges related to the strategic location that attracts foreign powers' competition and the division of Somalia into five parts are political realities that compel pragmatic handling. Dealing with foreign competition requires a prudent foreign policy safeguarding Somali national interests and mitigating foreign influence. Regarding Greater Somalia, reinterpreting its vision and adopting a new strategy based on regional integration resolves this case. The third challenge regarding the state-society conflict is that Somali scholars are required to critically analyze the past and develop a stable system of governance for Somalia. The Somali state's failure resulted from bankrupt ideas invented by foreign and Somali intellectuals and implemented by Somali politicians. The following section examines these ideas that, after being internalized by the Somali politicians, caused the state's breakdown within three decades and still place obstacles in its re-instituting.

Background Two: Overview of the Perspectives of Somali Studies

Somali studies have been dominated by narratives rooted in sociocultural anthropology that focus on kinships and social organizations, religion, myths, symbols, values, and the relationship between traditional and modern structures. Some scholars argue that anthropology originated and developed as the study of "other cultures," both in terms of time (ancient times) and space (non-Western societies).30 These scholars' viewpoints consider anthropology as a colonial intellectual tool developed for understanding colonized populations, which enables them to conquer, dominate and administer.31 In addition, colonial

[30] Prem Poddar and David Johnson (eds.), *A Historical Companion to Postcolonial Thought in English* (Colombia University Press, 2007); Also, David Johnson (ed.), *A Historical Companion to Postcolonial Literatures – Continental Europe and its Empires* (Edinburgh University Press, 2008).

[31] Maxwell Owusu, *Colonial and Postcolonial Anthropology of Africa: Scholarship or Sentiment?* (De Gruyter Mouton, 1979).

scholars imbued with racial superiority produced debasing images and distorted descriptions of the colonized nations. These images permeated the various educational means and research methodologies in postcolonial knowledge production. For example, there is a persistent repetition of the clannish image of the Somali people in much of the academic literature, which tends to represent Somalis as exceptional and clannistic while dooming them to be forever fractious and incapable of building a viable state.32 Scholars of anthropology make their assumptions on "the modernization metanarrative, which focuses on the transition from tradition to modernity.

This theory is founded on the belief that traditional societies can be developed with the assistance of the developed countries along the same path taken by the more developed Western countries."33 This theory draws from the ideas of Max Weber (1864–1920) on the role of rationality and irrationality in the transition from traditional to modern society, popularized later by Talcott Parsons (1902–1979). Many modernization theorists often saw traditions as obstacles to economic growth and related democracy with modernization, taking national states as the unit of analysis.34

The above concept was ingrained in the minds of the Somali political elites. As a result, they espoused the idea of peripheralizing the traditional identities of Islam and the clan system. In doing so, they aspired to be modern and developed. The conception of modernity against tradition was the core ideology of Somali nationalism and the state that gained independence in 1960. The damaging impact of this perspective was that it created a rift between the national state and its societal base. In the first nine years of civilian rule (1960–69), the state-society conflict was mild and manageable; however, during the military regime (1969–1991), the ideological gap between the state and society had widened due to the adoption of socialism and ruthless modernization programs of the totalitarian military regime.

The military regime followed, to a certain degree, the footsteps of Kemal Ataturk in adopting his principles, such as secularism, nationalism, statism, populism, and reform.35 However, these principles were camouflaged with the

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[32] Ahmed Samatar. "The Curse of Allah: Civic Disembowelment and the Collapse of the State in Somalia." In Ahmed Samatar (ed.), *The Somali Challenge: From Catastrophe to Renewal?* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994), 110.
[33] Abdullahi, *Revisiting Somali Historiography*, 36.
[34] Dean Tipps, "Modernization Theory and Comparative Study of the Societies: A Critical Perspective." *Comparative Study of Society and History* 15, no. 2 (1973), 199–226.
[35] Seyfettin Aslan, *Historical background and Principles of Kemalism* (NWSA–Social Sciences, 2013).

rhetoric of socialism and expressed in the secularization of the family law, abolishing the Diya system, the execution of scholars of Islam, forming the one-party system, and the persecution of the political opposition.36 Somali studies reacted to the military regimes' policies and adoption of socialism with the emergence of the Marxist perspective.

This perspective is founded on class analysis and historical materialism.37 The Marxist analysis of the Somali studies criticized anthropological and modernization theories. Nonetheless, the military regime had been hybridizing the concepts of sociocultural anthropology and the ideology of socialism. Both perspectives shared a secular worldview and enmity toward the traditions of the societies. The oppressive nature of the military regime and its harsh policies against traditional values were confronted with the radicalization of clans and the emergence of armed oppositions by the end of the 1970s. Moreover, the phenomenon of Islamism that appeared in the 1960s as part of the global rise of Islamist movements became more structured, and various organizations were instituted.38 Indeed, during this period, the seeds of extremism in the name of Islam surfaced in reaction to the execution of the Ulama in 1975, who opposed secular family law.39

The negative impact of the marginalized Somali traditions paved the way for extreme state-society conflict, which gradually triggered a total breakdown of the state in 1991. With the end of the Cold War, the demise of the Soviet Union, and the collapse of the Somali state, the Marxist perspective reached a dead end, even though the theory of class analysis was sustained. Thus, proponents of the Marxist perspective reverted to accepting the need to reconcile modernity and traditions. This transformation was more evident in the thesis of Ahmed Samatar, who proposed the synthesis of modernity and tradition (clan [tol], customary law [Xeer], and Islamic law [Qanoon]).40 However, the

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[36] Ozlem Demirtas Bagdons, *A Poststructuralist Approach to Ideology and Foreign Policy: Kemalism in the Turkish Foreign Policy Discourse* (Ph.D. thesis, Central European University, Hungary, 2008), 26–29. Available from file:///C:/Users/Dr.%20Baadiyow/Downloads/iphdeo01.pdf (accessed on 25 April 2023).

[37] Erik Wright, *Approaches to Class Analysis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

[38] Abdurahman Abdullahi, *The Islamic Movement in Somalia: A Case Study of Islah Movement (1950-2000)* (London: Adonis & Abbey, 2015), 141-170.

[39] Abdurahman Abdullahi, "Women, Islamists, and Military Regime in Somalia: The New Family Law and Its Implications." In M.V. Hoehne, and V. Luling (eds.), *Milk and Peace, Drought, and War: Somali Culture and Politics* (London: Hurst, 2010), 137–60. The first radical reaction was Takfir group that emerged at the end of the 1970s, and the current al-Shabaab and Daish are rooted in the same ideology but reformed to adopt a violent approach.

[40] Ahmed Samatar, "The Curse of Allah: Civic Disembowelment and the Collapse of the State in Somalia," 95–133, 138.

practical integration of modernity and tradition remains the most significant unsolved challenge in Somalia and all Muslim states.

The collapsed state of Somalia in 1991 posed an unprecedented challenge to state-building. Professor Hassan Kaynan said, "Somalia has not been the only country to experience state failure, but the scale, magnitude, duration, and consequences of state disintegration have earned it the infamy of being the first and most enduring failed state."41 During this long and traumatic period, a perspective of revisionism emerged strongly, expressing the historical marginalization of the southern semi-pastoral regions versus the northern and central nomadic areas of Somalia in "a more epistemologically holistic and pluralistic way of articulating Somali society."42 Proponents of the revisionist perspective criticized the two other perspectives cited above for accepting the constructed myths and utilizing the official narratives that contributed to the conceptualization of Somalia.

Scholars who adopted this new perspective demystified the conventional image of Somaliness as one constructed by idealistic Somali nationalists, colonial historiographers, and post-colonial political hegemonic clannists. Moreover, these scholars criticized made history as chauvinistic, focusing on northern pastoralists and excluding the southern agrarian population. The revisionists have re-examined conventional national symbols and myths such as racial homogeneity, linguistic unity, and shared historical experience. They advocated for comprehensive Somali Studies that do not exclude sociological minorities and marginalized communities. However, the revisionist perspective does not disagree with the anthropological and Marxist perspectives on the secular view. Indeed, their difference is confined to criticizing the marriage of power and knowledge that nomadic-rooted and camel culture national leaders promoted.43 The objectives of the revisionist scholars have been partially achieved in the development of the constitutional provisions, which recognized linguistic diversity and minority rights, and the adoption of a federal system demanded by the Hizbia Dastur Mustaqil al-Somalia (HDMS) party, which

[41] Notes of Professor Hassan Kaynan on the Concept Note of the Workshop on the Somali Equation Framework to be held in June 2023.
[42] Abdullahi, *Revisiting Somali Historiography*, 42. Interview with Professor Abdi Kusow, one of the prominent scholars from the revisionist perspective, in 2018.
[43] It is noteworthy that all presidents and Prime Ministers of Somalia since the independence in 1960 were rooted in the pastoral nomadic regions. As a result, the nomadic culture became dominant in Somali studies, educational curricula, and mass media.

represented the south/western clans of Digil and Mirifle, before the Somali independence in 1960.44

The three above-stated perspectives are just two sides of the same coin regarding their belonging to secular philosophy and overlapping understanding of Somali society and its relationship with the modern state. Indeed, the ideology of the postcolonial Somali state in its two phases, civilian and military, was founded on the hybridization of anthropological, liberalism, and Marxist perspectives, which suffered failure as an intellectual framework for Somali state-building. The three above-stated perspectives are just two sides of the same coin and belong to secular philosophy. Nevertheless, they have an overlapping understanding of Somali society and its relationship with the modern state. Indeed, the ideology of the postcolonial Somali state in its two phases, civilian and military, was founded on the hybridization of anthropological, liberalism, and Marxist perspectives, which suffered abysmal failure as an intellectual framework for Somali state-building. On the other hand, the revisionist perspective contributed to addressing internal grievances among Somalis and criticizing the propensity of Somali studies to specific regions. Therefore, their central thesis was confined to demanding an inclusive approach to Somali studies. As a result, these three perspectives were criticized by this author, who proposed the 'Comprehensive Perspective' (CP) of Somali studies.



Figure 4. The three perspectives with overlapping secular views

[44] Digil & Mirifle clan family is one of Somalia's prominent four clan families, which were given equal quota with Hawiye, Darood, and Dir in the 4.5 clan power-sharing. This clan family is concentrated in the South/Western state of Somalia. See Somali Provisional Constitution, Article (31:3) states, "The state shall promote the cultural practices and local dialects of minorities." Also, see Elmi, Afyare. *Decentralization options for Somalia: Paper for the Heritage Institute for Policy Studies* (2014). http://www.heritageinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Decentralization_Options_for_Somalia-ENGLISH.pdf (accessed on May 10, 2023)

The Comprehensive Perspective of Somali Studies

The comprehensive perspective (CP) was founded to explore Somali studies since ancient times, periods of strength and weakness, the impact of Islam in framing societal culture and building states, the colonial intrusion and Somali reaction, the introduction of the modern state system, the rise and the fall of the Somali state, the civil war and reconciliations, the recovery of the Somali state in 2000, and all further occurrences from that period on. This perspective refutes four prevalent features of Somali studies: exceptionalization, clannization, secularization, and patriarchization. Historically, the initial idea behind the CP was developed by this author as a critical approach in 1989 while a graduate student at the Islamic Institute at McGill University. Developing this Comprehensive perspective has gradually expanded since then.45 The CP offers an alternative perspective and scholarly foundation for revisiting and reconstructing Somali studies. The CP offers an alternative perspective of Somali studies and provides the road map for resolving the Somali conflict and establishing a stable Somali state at peace with its society. CP does not only offer an alternative perspective of Somali studies but provides the road map for resolving the Somali conflict and establishing a stable Somali state in peace with its society.

The first premise of the CP is criticizing the other three perspectives in their adoption of the secular view in their analysis. In the Somali context, a secular view means that despite accepting Islam as the state religion, the colonially inherited legal system and elite political culture tend to separate religion from state affairs. As a result, the Somali state acquired a mixed legal system in which familial and financial disputes were adjugated in Sharia legal frameworks. At the same time, in other matters, secular laws took precedence. For example, during military rule, even the family laws were secularized, which provoked societal uproar and the execution of opposing Ulama.46 Indeed, these three perspectives share these attributes in following methodologies that divorce Islam in their research or rarely mention the Sufi orders as part of society's

[45] The initial idea was expressed in the MA thesis submitted to the Islamic Institute, McGill University, titled "Tribalism, Nationalism, and Islam: The Crisis of Political Loyalties in Somalia." Since then, this author published four books and several papers and articles in the spirit of this perspective. See https://mogadishuuniversity.academia.edu/AbdurahmanAbdullahibaadiyow (accessed on 16 May 20123)

[46] On 23 January 1975, ten leading scholars of Islam were executed because they opposed secularized family law. See Abdurahman Abdullahi, *Women, Islamists and Military Regime in Somalia*.

presupposed declining traditional culture.47 Conversely, CP calls for the inclusion of the role of Islam, Islamism, and Sufi orders in Somali studies as part of the Somali equation.

The second premise of the CP is to include women in historical research and not to confine the analysis to the patriarchal segment of society. This means that besides reaffirming the early marginalization of women in the decision-making of the pastoral/nomadic communities, contemporary Somali studies should not peripheralize women's crucial societal role and give attention to their rich cultural contributions.48 Moreover, women's social, political, and economic roles should be revised and restored. To do so, women should be liberated from the traditional clan bonds and extreme interpretation of Islam by ultra-conservative groups. Instead, women must be given the role articulated by the moderate scholars of Islam and enshrined in the Provisional National Constitution.49

The third premise of this critique is to avoid the exceptionalization of Somalia and to explore its shared features with African and Middle Eastern studies. Professor Cassanelli rightly said, "Somali Studies, as a collective enterprise, has been too insular, too unwilling to view Somalia as a variant of other societies."50 He further observed that the sense of "Somali exceptionalism" prevents seeing Somalia as resembling other African and

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[47] The academic literature on Islam in English mainly focuses on Sufi Orders. They include Mohamed Mukhtar, "Islam in the Somali History: Fact and Fiction," in Ali Jumale (ed.), *The Invention of Somalia* (Red Sed Sea Press, 1995), 1–29. Mohamed M. Kassim, "Aspects of Banadir Cultural History: The Case of Baravan Ulama," in Ali Jumale (ed.), *The Invention of Somalia* (Red Sea Press, 1995), 29-43. Christine Choi Ahmed, "God, Anti-Colonialism and Drums: Sheikh Uways and the Uwaysiyya"; B.G. Martin, "Shaykh Uways Bin Mouhammad Al-Barawi: A Traditional Somali Sufi." Scott Rees., *Urban Woes and Pious Remedies: Sufism in Nineteenth Century Banaadir (Somalia)* (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1999); Said Samatar, "Sheikh Uways Muhammad of Baraawe, 1847–1909: Mystic and Reformer in East Africa," in Said S. Samatar (ed.), *The Shadows of Conquest: Islam in Colonial Northeast Africa* (Trenton, NJ: The Red Sea Press, 1992), 48–74. After 9/11, western academia began to study modern Islamic movements as part of security studies. Currently, there is an overflow of literature on al-Shabaab.

[48] The literature on Somali women and their role in politics, economics, and civil society has grown, with several noteworthy publications authored by Dr. Hamdi Sheikh Mohamed, a book chapter by Christine Choi Ahmed, Judith Gardner, and Judy El Bushra, and many others.

[49] See Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *The Status of Women in Islam*. Available from https://www.centuryassociation.org/download/marriage_2016/books/The_Status_of_Women_in_Islam__by_Yusuf_al_Qaradawi.pdf (accessed on 17 May 2023); Hiam Salah EI-din Ali el-Gousi, "Women's Rights in Islam and Contemporary Ulama: Limitations and Constraints. (Egypt as Case Study)" (Ph.D. thesis, The University of Leeds, 2010). Available from https://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/15221/1/535101.pdf (accessed on 15 May 2023), 91–103.

[50] Cassanelli, "The Somali Studies International Association: A Brief History," 8.

Muslim societies.51 Moreover, it must be seen through its similarities with African and Middle Eastern Studies. Thus, Somalis share geography, culture, colonial legacy, religion, and postcolonial challenges with African people. African Studies began as part of the colonial project to understand the colonial subjects. On the other hand, Middle Eastern Studies extensively includes Islamic Studies due to the preponderance of the Muslims in the region. Somalia, being a member of the League of Arab States, shares many things with countries in the Middle East, including cultural traits, political culture, and the Islamic faith. Thus, Middle Eastern Studies have influenced Somali Studies, and many of their conclusions may apply to the Somali context.

The fourth premise is the clannization of Somali studies which leads to the clannization of Somali politics and conflict, the prevailing narrative of academic circles, and public perception. For instance, Ahmed Samatar quotes from David Laitin and Said Samatar, "For years, the eminent European anthropologist Enrico Cerulli and I.M. Lewis have been telling us that to understand Somali politics, it is necessary to understand Somali clanship and kinship ties."52 Clannization of the conflict was intended to divert individual responsibilities to the collective responsibility of the clans for crimes committed during the civil war and to offer impunity to the perpetrators of heinous crimes. This premise affirms the political elite's responsibility for the Somali conundrum, state failure, and collapse due to their inability to deal with state-building challenges. This failure resulted from the elite conflict between Islamists and non-Islamists on the nature of the state on the one hand and the conflict among non-Islamist elites on power and prestige on the other.53 The clannization of the conflict led to failed reconciliations and conflict resolution processes and methods during the first ten years of the state collapse. Moreover, in 2000, even the power-sharing among the political elites, based on clan affiliation, failed to produce a functioning Somali state. Although the clan factor could not be utterly disregarded, its precarious practices must be managed and tamed through policies that confine it in its indispensable societal role.

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[51] Ibid., 8.

[52] Samatar, A. I. "Somali Studies: Towards an Alternative Epistemology." *Northeast African Studies* 11, no. 1 (1989): 3–17. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43660258. David Laitin and Said Samatar, *Somalia: In search of a state*. (Boulder, Westview Press), 1987, 198. Also, Ahmed Samatar, Samatar on Lewis: "A Modern History of Somali: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa" H-Africa, 2003. Available from https://networks.h-net.org/node/28765/reviews/32825/samatar-lewis-modern-history-somali-nation-and-state-horn-africa (Accessed on 22 May 2023)

[53] Due to elite conflict for power, specific clans were mobilized to support the regime, while others supported their opposition political elites. In the process, Somali society was polarized in line with clan belonging.

Thus, understanding the dynamics of the four factors: exceptionalization, clannization, secularization, and patriarchization of Somali studies is crucial to deciphering Somali chronic state failure. Moreover, it enables us to develop new perspectives that offer a microscopic view of the root conflicts and fault lines underlying state-society relations, elite political conflict, the politicization of clan structures, the radicalization of national politics, and the misuse of Islam as a vehicle of violent extremism. Finally, the CP is not just a theoretical framework, but it also suggests an inclusive reconciliation framework.

To simplify, the explanation of the basic premises of the CP will refer to the theory of mind in psychology, which refers to understanding thoughts in people's minds (mental states).54 I will analyze the state of mind of Somali individuals by illustrating the six possible scenarios of the state of mind represented in the following six circles that show hierarchies of loyalties to clan, Islam, and nationalism. The objective of analyzing the minds of Somali individuals is to realize the appropriate hierarchy of loyalties at the individual level. This is the first step towards Inclusive Reconciliation. Let us imagine dissecting the mind of the various Somali individuals horizontally to watch their belief system and the hierarchies of their loyalties to the Somali equation: clan system, Islam, and modern state. Eventually, we will see the reconfiguration of the individual's state of mind in one of the following six figures (see Figure 5).

Fig.1 shows the map of the mind of extreme clannists, in which Islam comes the lowest in the hierarchy of loyalties while nationalism comes second after clannism. Fig. 2 shows the map of a traditionalist where clan comes first, the traditional conception of Islam (Sufism) comes second, and nationalism acquires the smallest loyalty. This type of mind is prevalent in most Somali populations who practice general Islamic obligations but are mainly apolitical. Fig. 3 demonstrates the mind of an extreme secular nationalist who first gives his loyalty to nationalism, followed by his clan, with Islam being the smallest in his hierarchy of loyalties. This form of mind tolerates clannism but opposes and oppresses activists aspiring to apply sharia. It is the mind of the secular absolutists experienced in Somalia during the military rule. Fig. 4 demonstrates the mind of moderate nationalists, where the hierarchy of loyalty to nationalism comes first, with Islam to follow and clannism of the lowest priority. Fig. 5 shows the properly organized mind of a Muslim individual in whom loyalty to Islam comes first, nationalism second, and clannism the lowest rank.

[54] Ian A. Apperly and Butterfill, Stephen A. "Do humans have two systems to track beliefs and belief-like states?". *Psychological Review*. 116 (4), 2009, 953–970.

However, the realization of this model based on the inclusivity and prioritization of three elements of the Somali equation is yet to be developed. This form of mind belongs to the moderate Islamists who aspire to transform their society through peaceful and democratic means while advocating Islamic principles and values in the state and society.[55] Fig. 6 shows the mind of an extreme Islamist who does not recognize the modern state system and nationalism. Instead, he aspires to realize international order based on the historical Muslim state (Caliphate) through violence.[56] This mind hardly swings to another ideology like the other five mindsets. This extremism in the name of Islam is apparent in Al-Shabab, Daish, and similar organizations.

These six types of minds among Somali individuals are extreme clannists, moderate clannists, extreme secular nationalists, moderate nationalists, moderate Islamists, and extreme Islamists. The three extreme loyalties do not tolerate each other and believe in the total exclusion of the others: a zero-sum game. On the other hand, moderates are tolerant of each other and open to mutual interactions, dialogue, and peaceful conflict resolutions. Indeed, the biggest challenge of Somali cosmology is fluctuating the hierarchy of loyalties to the Somali equation and the delusions of each element. Accordingly, it is common to see an individual offering his loyalty to Islam in one circumstance, his clan on another occasion, and his nation in another period. It is all circumstantial, and even concurrent loyalties may occur occasionally. Fluctuating loyalties pose the biggest obstacle to developing a strategy to deal with the crisis of loyalties and creating an environment of reconciliation. Fluctuating loyalties is like a civil war taking place in the minds of every individual, where various loyalties contest each other for dominance. Unquestionably, this continuous contestation of loyalties generates traumatic syndrome, identity crises, and disordered thinking and delusions. An adequately organized hierarchy of loyalties of the individuals in putting Islam first and nationalism second while clannism takes third space is the goal of the inclusive reconciliation framework of Somalia. In this approach, the position of Islam supersedes nationalism, contrary to the current secular Muslim regimes. Indeed, secular nationalism has failed in most Muslim countries and cannot sustain in the foreseeable future.

[55] Organized moderate Islamists generally belong to the Muslim Brotherhood persuasions organizationally or ideologically. In Somalia, Muslim Brotherhood persuasion includes the Islah Movement, Aala-Sheikh, and other smaller entities.

[56] Dan Josef and Harun Maruf, Inside Al-Shabaab: The Secret History of al-Qaida's Most Powerful Ally. Indiana University Press, 2021. Also, Abdi said M.A. The Al-Shabaab Al-Mujahidiin: A Profile of the First Somali Terrorist Organisation. Available from https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/55851/AlShabaab.pdf (accessed on 25 April 2023), 3.



Figure 5. The Six Types of Minds Showing Their Process of Fluctuations.

The second illustration of the basic premise of the CP is to examine the reconfiguration of the structure and relations of the Somali elite. This analysis aims to understand the elite conflict needed to develop an inclusive

reconciliation framework. It is an appropriate tool for analyzing state-society relations. The elitist analysis method is applicable in the political analysis of Muslim countries where the impact of kinship in politics is still dominant. Figure 5 shows the four main categories of the Somali elites, divided into traditional elites (traditional Ulama and traditional clan elders) belonging to the micro-level analysis and modern elites (Islamists and non-Islamists) belonging to the macro-level analysis.57 We use the term "non-Islamist" to mean a Muslim who practices Islam and does not deny its principles but does not advocate its application as an Islamist does. Most people belong to this category. These four elite categories are illustrated in Figure 6.



Figure 6. The Somali Elite Structure and Their Relations

Here, we will examine these four elite categories' horizontal and vertical relations. The relationship between clan elders and traditional ulama is complementary because their community authorities are well divided. Clan elders have the power to manage the day-to-day affairs of the clan and make peace and war. At the same time, the role of Ulama is mainly confined to religious activities and reconciliation.58 Their relations are generally courteous and friendly, creating an environment of stability and solidarity in their community.59 Often, they became relatives through family marriages, which even solidified their affinities and cooperation. Contrary to the traditional elites, relations between the modern elites are confrontational because of their different political views and agenda. They disagree on the nature and ideology of the state. Whereas moderate Islamists aspire to transform the modern state into one that

[57] This model was developed in 1991 during my MA program at the Islamic Institute, McGill University. See Abdullahi, Tribalism, Nationalism and Islam, 92.
[58] Abdurahman Abdullahi, *The Islamic Movement in Somalia*.
[59] Ibid.

applies Islamic laws and follows principles and values, non-Islamist elites cling to the form of the state inherited from the colonial powers. The postcolonial state was generally secular in its legal, economic, and cultural values.

On the other hand, the relations between the traditional Ulama and the modern Islamists are somehow suspicious because Islamists aspire to a political agenda, whereas most traditional Ulama are apolitical. Moreover, modern Islamists compete with traditional Ulama on the religious authority in society. Indeed, different groups of modern Islamists deal with traditional Ulama differently. For example, Salafia groups' relations with traditional Ulama are more intolerant than the Muslim Brotherhood's persuasions.60 Moreover, the relationship between traditional clan elders and non-Islamist elites is courteous and primarily rooted in next-of-kin empathy. In addition, traditional clan elders and modern elites are, to a certain degree, linked to each other through relative networks. Indeed, the role of clan elders changed significantly after the adoption of clan-power sharing in 2000 and since their empowerment to select members of the parliament. In this circumstance, all politicians must cultivate closer relations with their clan elders. Finally, the relations between Islamists and traditional clan elders and between non-Islamists and traditional Ulama are generally courteous and based on respect.

The Comprehensive Perspective and the Inclusive Reconciliation Framework (IRF)

The comprehensive critical perspective aims to explore and offer a new interpretation for Somali studies and suggests a framework for resolving the Somali crisis. Having seen the configuration of the Somali mind and elite structure and their relations, we understood the nature and hierarchies of the Somali conflicts at individual and collective levels. As such, this perspective is called the 'inclusive reconciliation framework' (IRF). The IRF aims to set a new direction in resolving the four levels of Somali conflicts: the modern state and traditional Somali society, the elite political conflict for power, the politicized and clannized armed conflict, and internal conflicts among traditional elites and conflicts in the name of Islam. These conflicts exclude traditional clan conflicts for pasture, land, water, and other factors, which are quickly resolved through

[60] Abdurahman Abdullahi, "The Conception of Islam in Somalia: Consensus and Controversy," *Bildhaan* 21 (2023), 79–98, 87–90. Available from https://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1240&context=bildhaan (accessed on 25 April 2023)

traditional conflict resolution mechanisms. These four levels of conflict are shown in Figure 6 below.

Having grasped the four levels of conflict, let us begin to address their reconciliation. The first level of IRF is the state-society conflict, the root cause, and the father and mother of all other conflicts. However, before proceeding further, we must grasp the historical approaches to state-building and their relationship with the traditional system. There were initially two models of Somali state-building with divergent state-society relations. The first approach was exercised during the two phases of the state-building approaches: the democratic system (1960–69) and the military dictatorship (1969–91).



Figure7. The four layers of Somali conflicts

In this approach, the state-building process was based on Westernization, secularization, and despising traditions. Its concept was based on moving society to the Western system of governance by indoctrinating society to accept and adopt this system. However, this system failed to sustain itself because of

suppressing traditions on which oppositions organized their armed supporters and toppled the regime and the state in 1991. To exemplify this process, let us consider the state as a house where people compete to enter because their livelihood depends on it. However, the design of the house is not fit to accommodate these people's features and way of life. As a result, the people were overcrowded outside of the house and forcefully rushed at once to enter it. No guides or supervisory bodies showed the people the systematic way in which each had a chance to enter the house, nor the culture of a queueing system or "first come, first served." Through this process, the house falls apart, and the people are either killed or injured, with only some of them able to save themselves by escaping the collapsing house. This phenomenon is precisely what happened in Somalia in 1991.

The second approach was developed during the Somali Peace and Reconciliation Conference in Djibouti in 2000, which was based on indigenization while keeping features of the Western structure of the state.[61] Indigenization was the power-sharing based on clan quotas of 4.5 and giving clan elders the authority to select and nominate members of the parliament from their clans. In addition, Islam was accepted as the ultimate reference of all laws, and since then, this provision has been included in the Provisional Constitution. On the other hand, the established state system kept the features of the Western system of governance, such as the design of governance inherited from the colonial powers in 1960.[62] Moreover, the Somali state adopted a federal system of governance in 2004. Both clan power-sharing and federalism were necessary decisions to recover the state. Nonetheless, these new approaches were abused by the political elites who were infused with a toxic elite political culture.[63] Nevertheless, this approach failed to produce a functioning Somali state for over two decades. This approach was founded on moving the state to the society and building the state on the traditional structure. Both approaches were extremes in employing either Westernization or indigenization. Therefore, the IRF suggests moving the state and society towards each other at the middle ground where the state and society's main features are preserved. Of course, this requires re-engineering the system of governance in Somalia and reorganizing the design of traditional authority damaged during the civil war.

[61] The system was built on clan power-sharing and selecting members of the parliament by the clan elders. However, the outcome of the process was the structure of the modern state system constituting a legislative assembly, executive branch, judiciary branch, and the presidency.
[62] The system was a parliamentarian who was alike to the Somali governance system of 1960.
[63] Abdurahman Abdullahi, The Somali Elite Political Culture: Conceptions, Structures, and Historical Evolution. Somali Studies: A Peer-Reviewed Academic Journal for Somali Studies, Volume 5, 2020, 30-92.



Figure 8. The process of the ideal model of reconciling state and society in Somalia.

The second level of the IRF is elite political reconciliation. There are two approaches to completing this phase. The first is the reconciliation process between Islamists and non-Islamists on the nature of the state.[64] This phase was reached through the Transitional Charter of 2000 and its subsequent constitutional provisions. For instance, the Somali Provisional Constitution stipulates that Islam is the ultimate reference of all state laws. Article 3.1 states, "The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Somalia is based on the foundations of the Holy Quran and the Sunna of our prophet Mohamed (PBUH) and protects the higher objectives of sharia and social justice." Moreover, Article 2.3 states, "No law can be enacted that is not compliant with the general principles and objectives of Sharia." This phase of the IRF was achieved generally. The second approach to elite reconciliation entails creating an inclusive political system, not only one that is democratic but also sensitive enough to accommodate all segments of society, including women and minorities. The inclusion of women is well articulated in the Somali Provisional Constitution. Article 3:5 states, "Women must be included, effectively, in all national institutions, in particular all elected and appointed positions across the three branches of government and in independent national commissions." In traditional societies, political processes based on winners and losers or a majoritarian system breed sectarianism, exclusions, and conflict. Therefore, developing an appropriate

[64] Islamists are individuals and groups who advocate the application of Sharia in society and the state. They are activists and organizers. On the other hand, non-Islamists are most Muslims who, though they believe in the supremacy of Allah's laws, do not advocate for its application.

political system, election model, and effective public institutions are all necessary preconditions for a successful elite reconciliation.

The best example of creating consensus and cohesion in a clannish society was the story of the Black Stone when the Quraish sub-clans disputed who would position the Black Stone in its place after reconstructing the Ka'ba. They agreed to accept the judgment of the first person who entered the house of Ka'ba, and the person was young Muhammad (the Prophet). He placed the Black stone on a sheet and requested all the leaders of the tribes to hold the sheet and lift the stone together to the Ka'ba. This story shows that clan prestige is critical; therefore, creating collective leadership and a sense of shared ownership is vital for the stability of the state.65

The third level of the IRF deals with the politicized and clannized conflict. This entails addressing past grievances and gross human rights violations by adopting transitional justice mechanisms that suit Somali culture and religion. Islam and traditional culture have crafted the tools to resolve prolonged human rights violations after the civil war. For example, the practical transitional justice approach and tool in Islam could be derived from the conquering of Mecca by the Muslims after eight years of their forced migration to Medina and 13 years of subjugation in Mecca.66 On the other hand, some grievances of the politicized clan conflict could be resolved through traditional means. Clannization of the Somali conflict deflects individual responsibility for the committed crimes and depicts it as the collective culpability of a clan. Transitional justice in Somalia is a neglected field that the CRF strongly advocates for.67

The fourth level of IRF calls for reorganizing traditional authorities, which have been corrupted and lost their authoritative powers. Traditional institutions of clan elders and the Ulama religious authority have drastically deteriorated. Therefore, it is necessary to revise the structures of the clan elders who have been chaotically divided and ruined their authorities' inter-clan cohesion and hierarchy.68 The fragmentation of clan elders took a high stake since the

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[65] Muhammad Husayn Haykal, Life of Muhammad, translated by Isma'il Al-Faruqi. Available from https://muqith.files.wordpress.com/2010/10/muhammadbyhaykal.pdf (accessed on 17 May 2023),128.

[66] Abdurahman Abdullahi, *Recovering the Somali state: The Role of Islam, Islamism, and Transitional Justice* (Adonis and Abbey Publishers, 2017), 123.

[67] Abdurahman Abdullahi, "Conceptions of Transitional Justice in Somalia: Findings of Field Research in Mogadishu," *North African Studies, Michigan State University Press* 14, no. 2 (2014), 7–43.

[68] Abdurahman Abdullahi and Ibrahim Farah, *Reconciling the State, and Society: Reordering the Islamic work and Clan System*. Available from

collapse of the state in 1991, during the civil war, and the empowerment of clan elders as custodians of authority to select members of the parliament. The politicization of the clan elders ruined clan cohesion and stability of clans. On the other hand, the IRF advocates for establishing a unified system of meaning of Islam agreed upon by the prominent Ulama and officially accepted by the state. This approach creates an environment of minimizing conflicts on the issues of Islam. Currently, the Ulama are highly fragmented, and various groups adhere to their different interpretations. Establishing a commission of Ulama belonging to the multiple persuasions should be the first step towards the practical unification of understanding Islam in Somali society. The following figure shows the reconciled modern political elite and properly reorganized traditional elders and Ulama.



Figure 9. Comprehensive Reconciliation Framework Triangle

Realizing the state-society and elite conflicts (modern and traditional elite), as demonstrated in the two diagrams 8&9, will eventually resolve the other conflicts (clannized political conflict, internal conflicts among clan elders, or conflict in the name of Islam.

The Comprehensive Perspective and Stability Model of the Somali State

Adopting the triangle of the IRF is enough to create an environment of stability in Somalia. Since the collapse of the state, Somali civil society (CS) emerged strongly. The traditional elders, Ulama, and modern civil society organizations filled the vacuum of the state. These organizations were engaged in the public service provision in education, the health sector, charities, peace,

https://www.scribd.com/document/15327358/Reconciling-the-State-and-Society-in-Somalia# (accessed on 26 April 2023)

and reconciliation and networked with international organizations. These CS organizations are networked nationally and are becoming more organized. In addition, the business community is also robust and plays an essential role in all development sectors. Business personalities are very crucial in making peace and war among clans. The stability of the state necessarily entails cooperating with non-state actors, including the CS and business communities.

There are six scenarios of civil society/state relations. These are CS, apart from the state (mosque committees, sports clubs); politicized CS in opposition to the state (civil society toppling dictatorial regimes through peaceful means); CS in continuous dialogue with the state (criticizing when the state deviates from the public good and support when they do good); CS in support of the state (the supports civil society and promotes its ideals); CS in a partnership or substitute to the state (in case the state is weak like Somalia, civil society substitutes the state); and CS beyond the state as a global phenomenon (international NGOs advocating for global issues).[69]



Figure 10. Stability Model of Somali State-building

The role of the Somali CS in rebuilding the state must be to engage in continuous dialogue with the state and avoid its politicization. They must

[69] See Abdurahman Abdullahi, Making Sense of Somali History, vol. 2, Adonis & Abbey, 2018, 67–70.

criticize and dialogue with the state when it deviates from the constitution and undertakes policies not in the public's interest. They also have to support the policies and programs of the state when the state is doing beneficial programs such as promoting public education, improving human rights, fighting Al-Shabab, and so on. This concept agrees with the Islamic notion of rejecting the mischievous (Munkar) and supporting the virtuous (Macruuf).[70] The organized nationwide civil society, including all sectors, is the agent of stability of the state and an element of a new re-engineering of the stability model of Somalia.

Conclusion

This essay has exposed the challenges posed to the Somali state-building process and depicted modern state relations with the traditional Somali society as one of the main challenges that Somali studies still need to address. After criticizing three main perspectives: Anthropological, Marxist, and Revisionist, this author suggested an alternative perspective named the "Comprehensive Perspective." This perspective refutes Somali studies' exceptionalization, clannization, secularization, and patriarchization. It offers an inclusive approach that combines all elements of the Somali equation into Somali studies. To simplify the concept of the CP, the six scenarios of a Somali mind were illustrated in which the rightly organized mind places Islam first, nationalism second, and clan third. However, it was discovered that these loyalties fluctuate with the changing situations that exhibit significant challenges to the Somali state-building process. Moreover, the classification of the Somali elites into traditional and modern and their relations were also exposed and examined. CP is an alternative perspective for Somali studies and a solution for the inclusive reconciliation framework (IRF).

The inclusive reconciliation framework is based on understanding the four levels of Somali conflict: the state-society conflict, elite political conflict, clannized political conflict, internal conflicts within traditional elites, and conflicts in the name of Islam. It also hinges on understanding the two previously used approaches to state-society relations. The first approach was Westernization, which was based on moving the people to accept the inherited state model from the colonial powers. The second approach was indigenization, founded on moving the state model to the people through clan power-sharing. Thus, the first IRF reconciles the state and society by moving them to a middle

[70] See "Let there arise out of you a group of people inviting to all that is good, enjoying al-Ma'roof and forbidding al-Munkar." Quranic verse, "(al-Imran, 3: 104). Also, see the verse, "You are the best of peoples ever raised up for mankind; you enjoin al-Ma'roof and forbid Al-Munkar, and you believe in Allah (Aal Imran, 3: 110).

space that recognizes the separate spaces and roles of the state and society. The second IRF concerns reconciling the political elites on the nature of the state and practicing democratic values sensitive to the Somali culture and belief system. The third IRF calls to address the human rights violation of the clannized political conflict during the civil war through transitional justice mechanisms rooted in Somali culture and Islam. Finally, the fourth IRF involves reorganizing the fragmented traditional institutions during the civil war, politicizing the clans, and elimination of extremism in the name of Islam.

Finally, reconciling state and society entails reconciling political elites, reorganizing traditional institutions, addressing previous grievances, and laying the foundation for a shared future is the only way to institute a viable Somali state. Reorganizing and reconciling Somali society should be expressed through constitutional provisions and legal frameworks. Moreover, non-state actors, such as civil society organizations and business communities, must be given cooperative roles in the Somali state-building to bolster this new structure. Assigning a role to the non-state actors offers the final design that produces the "stability model for Somali state-building."

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Challenges of Somali State Building

Hassan Haji Mahmoud Abdullahi

Abstract

The Somali state encountered tremendous challenges that overwhelmed its capacity as a state under formation. The multifaceted challenges, including political and socio-economic issues, have hindered the state-building endeavors and formed a strong barrier to the progress and development of the state's growth. The division of the Somali political elite horizontally (tribally) and their inability to manage political competition and demonstrate behaviours that correspond to the values of the modern state have led to the loss of priorities in national issues and the spread of corruption in all state apparatus, which paralyzed the entire state's movement. Political tribalism is manifested in its clearest form in the dilemma of reconciling political party necessities and tribal representation, a culture which prevails until today. The hollow discourse that failed to find a way of reconciling national slogans with the requirements of tribalism represented a big dilemma. The contradiction emerged during and after elections; politicians utilized national discourse during election campaigns, while tribalism came to the surface after the elections ended, particularly in times of power and resource sharing. Also, regional conflicts represented a challenge to the nascent institutions as the country engaged in armed conflict which was beyond its military and economic capacity. One factor that prompted the regional conflict was the Cold War and the superpowers' scramble for influence in the region.

Keywords**:** *state building, encountered apparatus, Cold War, developing countries, discourse, political, tribalism, socio-economic.*

Introduction

The emergence of the Somali state was linked to special circumstances and political, economic and social factors, which produced a special kind of state that does not enjoy full land and a divided people and it has no recognized international borders. After thirty years of independence and two successive regimes (civilian 1960-1969) and military (1969-1991), the Somali state collapsed completely, sparking widespread debate among Somali and non-Somali intellectuals about the causes of the collapse. Despite the diversity of opinions and ideas about the causes of the resounding fall of the Somali state, many of them ignored or did not at least mention the structural imbalance of the Somali state and its establishment, which did not grow and develop naturally, and the nature of the Somali leadership that took power after the departure of colonialism. The institutions that colonialism left and handed over to the Somalis did not take the evolutionary trend, but rather fell into decline and stagnation.

While the West established the features of the national state in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, African countries began to establish the state only after independence, which contributed to the establishment of problems in building and forming the state. In addition, despite the development of the functions of the state in the world, as it moved from the guardian state in security and stability to the servant state that provides health, educational and economic services to society, the post-colonial state in Africa, including the Somali state, is no longer a guardian or servant of society. Amidst many challenges, that includes; abnormal birth and exposure to international tensions from west to east, preoccupation of the Somali leadership with issues that it does not have the ability to solve (Greater Somalia), the difficulties faced by the nascent state in achieving national integration between the two regions that formed the Somali state (north and south), lack of economic resources to cover its needs, being surrounded with hostile countries (Ethiopia, France and Britain) during independence, the Somali leadership, chose to struggle with the great powers.

Achieving the unity of Greater Somalia was a legitimate dream of Somali leaders and people, but at the same time it was a distant dream because of the rules and systems surrounding it, and it was not associated with deliberate projects and long-term planning, but rather its wisdom with passion and miscalculation. In addition, the Somali ambition to restore the lost lands contributed to leading the state towards falling into the trap of the Cold War, making it one of its largest bloody theaters.

As a result, this situation has had negative repercussions on the Somali state at the internal and regional levels, and the inability of Somali political leaders to build a real state has emerged. In the light of the failure to confront these challenges, tribal conflicts erupted and later armed fronts supported from abroad developed, deteriorating economic performance, lack of political stability, widespread corruption and the accumulation of problems, which forced the Somali state to fall into more political, economic and social challenges. The fall of the Somali state in the abyss in which it fell was the beginning of the warp that coincided with independence, and the state is affected in its construction by the society from which it is born and also expresses the level of elites and civilizes the behavior of the citizen. The Somali state was affected in its construction by two legacies, one of which is the Somali tribal pastoral society and the consequences of the colonial state. In the end, the ceiling has collapsed on everyone and the Somali people, during thirty years of civil war and instability, are still struggling to restore their state with sound foundations that are able to withstand changes, and to establish a social contract for the nation and constitutions governing the new state.

On this basis, the researcher aims through the paper to track the challenges faced by the Somali state-building process. 1960 is the year of exploitation and it is also the year of zero, the year everything will start all over again, everything must be done," says the Italian Journalist who accompanied Exploitation Day.

Did the Somali political elite understand what the Italian Journalist understood?

Challenges of Somali State Building

This research was part of a master's thesis submitted by the researcher to obtain a master's degree at the University of Mogadishu and received the first degree of excellence with the title "the Somali State-Factors of construction and collapse). This chapter deals with the challenges faced in the process of building of the Somali state during the three decades, the management of the rule, and the burden of the new and fragile state whose return was not strong. These challenges are divided into political, economic and social challenges, and internal and external challenges, some of which emerged in the search for the state itself or were born with the state and have roots in the colonial era that lasted for nearly a century, and others that arose after the establishment of the state and were linked to the conditions of management of the state affairs and the Somali state's dealings with international parties.

The chapter is divided into three sections

The first section deals with political challenges, which in turn are divided into internal political challenges that arose from the practice of the ruling elite of internal politics and its interaction with the internal component that arises from the interaction of the elite among themselves and between them and the Somali people, and external challenges that arose in the political interaction between the Somali state and the international community. These include internal challenges related to the administration of the state and the divisions of the political elite and their failure to manage political competition among themselves peacefully and on sound bases, and the failure to establish a correct order of priorities for national issues and reform of the administrative apparatus of the state, and political tribalism. As for the external challenges, the most important of them are: the regional conflict with neighboring countries over the lost territories, the identification in the Cold War, and the miscalculation and understanding of international politics.

The second topic deals with economic challenges, which in turn emerged with the emergence of the state, where the most prominent talk since the emergence of the idea of independence for Somalia was how to solve the economic dilemma, and the most prominent question for that period was: the possibility of adequate and permanent financial resources for the Somali state in the event of independence. These challenges include all economic areas, including the development and implementation of economic development plans, the permanent deficit in the public budget, the inability of the state to pay salaries, the deficit in the trade balance, the diversification of the economy's sources, and dependence on foreign aid, in addition to the periodic natural disasters that were destroying the fragile Somali economy, including the repeated droughts that caused the death of animals, the destruction of the agricultural crop, and then the famine that hit the majority of Somalia's nomadic population dependent on grazing in the country, and floods in the rainy seasons.

The third and final topic reviews the **social challenges** that faced Somali society after gaining independence and establishing the state. Among those challenges that the Somali people suffered from and affected their unity and state-building are: tribal conflict, identity problems, the challenge of national integration, and large waves of migration from the countryside to the capital and major cities. These challenges include problems related to the community's relationship with the state, others related to interrelationships in Somali society, and a third related to the relationship of Somali society with the Arab and African regional environment.

Together, these political, economic and social challenges hampered the building of Somali society, the building of the state, the development of the relationship of society with the state itself, and the relationship of the Somali state and society with the regional and international environment. The ruling elite failed to understand these challenges and understand the nature of the state and Somali society and then limit the effects of these challenges on the short march of the state, which was unable to overcome its third decade since the Somalis took control of the state in their state in 1960 until the beginning of 1991.

The first topic - Political Challenges

The political challenges faced by the Somali state during its three decades of existence, and the inability of the Somali leadership to overcome them - are among the biggest factors that led to its collapse. These political challenges are divided into internal and external challenges. Internal challenges include: the challenge of state administration represented in the division of the political elite and its failure to manage political competition among themselves peacefully and on sound bases, failure to establish a correct order of priorities for national issues, failure to reform the administrative apparatus of the state, and political tribalism. As for the external challenges, the most important of them are: the regional conflict with neighboring countries over the lost territories, the identification in the Cold War, and the miscalculation and understanding of international politics.

Internal challenges

Among those challenges and problems associated with the administration of the Somali state, especially during the civilian rule (1960-1969), are the following:

(a) Division of the Somali political elite

Emerging from the emergence of the modern Somali national movement in the early 1940s, its roots deepened during the international tutelage phase when the country was being prepared for independence. The traditional leadership of the Somali people in the pre-colonial period was led by tribal Sheikhs and Sharia scholars. But after nearly a century of colonization, a modern elite emerged, as a result of the modern education brought by colonialism and the employment opportunities in the administrative and military apparatus of the colonial authorities. In addition to the graduates of modern education established by Egyptian charities and schools established since the early 1950s, a new elite emerged that took the leadership position of the Somali national movement and

the state later. Four other types of elites emerged, represented by traditional elites consisting of tribal sheikhs and traditional Sharia scholars, and modern elites consisting of non-Islamists influenced by the West and Islamists.

The Somali orientation towards the Soviet Union and the sending of thousands of military personnel and civilians on educational missions to it added a radical dimension in the midst of the modern Western-cultured elite. Al-Khubba's interests were linked to provoking tribal conflicts in order to punish, weaken, or maneuver a rival.71Mobilizing the tribe and effectively manipulating its sentiments is one of the tools of the Somali political elite. The fabrication of conflicts between the state and the tribe at times and between Islam and the state at other times was one of the tools of the political elite to control the rule.

The interactions of Islam, the tribes, and the state were among the issues that most hindered the unity of Somali leadership, and their repercussions continue today72.

(b) Managing the political competition among the elite

In addition to the cultural division that hindered the growth of a unified nationalist orientation of the elite in the state administration, the political elite failed to manage the political competition among themselves. Political parties were polarized on the street during the elections and on national issues. In many of their political positions, the elite crossed red lines and continued to enter the electoral battle as if it were a battle of life and death. There were also behaviors of disrespecting the constitution, laws and mechanisms of the democratic game that were new to the Somalis, especially after the responsibility of managing the state came in the hands of the Somalis without the presence of Italy, Great Britain or the United Nations. It was not surprising that such behaviors occurred in a country that was new to freedoms and suffered a lot from enslavement and tyranny under various colonial regimes, including the Italian fascist regime. Former Somali President Adam Abdullahi Othman was one of the prominent figures who were famous for wisdom and guidance of the political elite and the general public, and he said in this regard that "strengthening our country's democracy means that everyone respects the system and laws we have set for ourselves, that we love each other, and that we resolve our differences in a peaceful and friendly manner73."

[71]-Kenmankhous, Elitebargainsand Political Deals project Somalia, case study, page 11
[72]() AbdurahmanAbdullahi (Baadiyow), Op. Cit. P. 82.
[73]() Abdi Ismail Samater, Africa's First democrats, Op. Cit. P. 96.

One of the most prominent examples in which these behaviors emerged was the referendum on the constitution that took place in 1961, where some prominent figures sought to persuade voters to vote, not because they objected to the provisions of the constitution, but rather their rejection of the government that was formed and that conducted the constitution process, hoping that the rejection of the constitution would lead to the overthrow of the government and the formation of a new government. The elite also showed abnormal behaviors, including lack of complacency in the policies and principles of the parties to which they belong, the transformation of the loyalties of members of parliament motivated by the tribe or greed to obtain a political position from the government, (74)the use of party affiliation as a means of winning and obtaining the seat and joining the majority party after guaranteeing the seat, and the difference of voting for one deputy in one case when the type of voting varies from public to secret ballot or vice versa (75).

Among the difficulties and challenges associated with the administration of the Somali state, which emerged from the very beginning of the birth of the Somali state, is the obstruction of the granting of confidence to the government in the parliament, due to the desire of various parliamentary groups that the government - despite the limited ministerial portfolios - reflect the political spectrum of the party, including the opposition parties, and the quest of prominent figures belonging to various parties to assume a position in the government, and the adoption of the right to grant confidence to the government in the parliament as a means of pressuring the President and the majority party to obtain positions in it. This problem was faced by the first and second governments of Abdul Rashid and the first and second governments of Abdul Razzaq76.

The opposition to the formation of successive governments during civilian rule and the lack of confidence in them was not only specific to the opposition parties, but the ruling party itself had difficulty convincing its members to vote for the government formed by the party itself, unless the member guaranteed his position from the government in advance, and the members of the parties had no real value or loyalty to the party to which they belonged as much as they were interested in the position they held in the government.

[74]() Mukhtar, Mohammed Haji: the Emergence and Role of Political Parties in the Inter-River Region of Somalia, Op. Cit. P. 84.
[75]() Abdi Ismail Samater, Africa's First democrats, Op. Cit. P. 171.
[76] Hamdi Al-Sayed Salem, op. Cit., P.

This problem still affects the course of the Somali state. Do the tribes take their shares in tribal quotas or in political parties? How can they be reconciled?

(C) Administrative integration between the British and Italian systems:

This is one of the biggest challenges faced by the Somali state after the independence of the British Northern Territories on June 26, 1960 and the Italian Southern Territory on July 1, 1960. Integration of the two territories after more than 70 years of living under two different colonial administrations was very challenging. It was a thorny issue that preoccupied the political elite in the early years of the Republic, because this issue required the unification of different laws, legislation and regulations, the integration of state institutions at different levels into the new constitution prepared in the first year after independence, and the translation of the integration process into reality after that.

The biggest challenge lay in the length of the different colonial era in which the two regions lived with two different systems. These included the difference in culture, the language of administration, education, institutions, laws, and even in the thinking and orientations of the political elites, with the northern region not having a sufficient period of preparation for independence and unity as compared to what happened in the south. (77) The lack of financial capabilities and technical expertise of the young state, and the weak infrastructure in transportation and communications that links the state center in the capital with the remote governorates, including the capital of the northern region, which is about one thousand and five hundred kilometers away from the center, slowed the pace of integration and hindered the process of interaction with the new state, in addition to the administrative centralization adopted by the new state, which made citizens feel the shadow of the state - especially in the remote northern governorates - dim.

The issue of integration between the two regions was the most important issue after independence, and it was a time bomb left by colonialism after the issue of disputed borders and lost lands. The United Nations formed an international body headed by United Nations expert Paolo Contini in 1960 to prepare the gradual integration and reconcile the disparities that hinder unity78, but it did not succeed in its work.

[77]() At the London Conference on March 2-12, 1960, it was announced that the independence of northern Somalia would be June 26, 1960, two months before independence.
[78] Harold D. Nelson, Somalia, A country Study, P. 53

(d) **Appropriate prioritization of national issues**

The Somali political elite in general - both in the civil and military era - failed to understand the hierarchy of priorities for the pressing national issues that awaited the emerging government, which was burdened with the serious challenges that were born with it, to be an effective and viable government and to achieve the most basic needs of Somali citizens whose expectations of statehood were high. It is the successful leadership of states that sets the right priorities[79] for national issues. Among those pressing issues for building the Somali state at the internal level were the completion of the building of state institutions, unifying the Somali people, completing administrative, cultural and political integration between the northern and southern regions, achieving economic development, providing job opportunities, reducing dependence on foreign aid, and developing the country's infrastructure, where the state's area is large, density is low and roads are non-existent. The state was finding it difficult to reach the provinces, and the travel from Hargeisa, the capital of the northern region, to Mogadishu took a week.

Instead of focusing on the process of building a state capable of carrying out its main function of providing security, providing services and establishing infrastructure, the political elite made it a priority to wage conflict with neighboring countries to recover lost lands, seek foreign aid, especially for weapons from the east and the west, and build the army, which carried more political and economic burdens on the young state. During the civilian rule that continued in the first decade after independence, the political elite was preoccupied with side issues and was preoccupied with the intense competition among them. History records some strange incidents that were fought over from the early age of the state, including the issue of the conflict between President Adam Abdullah Osman and members of parliament over a draft law to increase the salaries of deputies.

The president opposed this while deputy supported and took the approval of this law as a condition for the passage of the government of Abdul Razzaq in Parliament. Deputies were able to pass the draft by a simple majority, but the President used the veto to prevent the passage of the law, and returned the draft to the Parliament, which needed a two-thirds majority to bypass the president's veto, which he could not. The President finally won over the deputies, and it was

[79]There was no Somali doctor, pharmacist, engineer or secondary teacher in Somalia at the time. See History of Somalia, p. 247.

based on his rejection of the idea of the economic situation of the country and the floods that swept the southern governorates[80] in that period.

In the early years of the government, the military regime led by Siad Barre made attempts to rearrange the ladder of priorities. Despite its focus on building military power and relying on the Soviet Union, it made attempts to achieve some of the main functions of the state, including providing job opportunities, improving education services (writing the Somali language) and health, to respond to the aspirations of the people that were not achieved in the hands of the civilian elite, in order to gain the legitimacy and support it needed, and consolidate its feet as the government. But the political tension that began after the execution of some political leaders on charges of plotting the coup, as well as the religious leaders who objected to the personal status laws that were contrary to the provisions of the Qur'an, and then the repercussions of Somalia's defeat in the war with Ethiopia and the striking of civil peace among the Somali people, all these developments have put those attempts in the wind.

(e) Reform of the administrative apparatus of the State

It is one of the internal challenges associated with the administration of the Somali state. The administrative apparatus of the colonial era performed the simple functions that the colonial administration needed, and they were translators, soldiers, clerks, judges, and tribal elders. The modern Somali administrative apparatus was established during the period of international trusteeship in the period between 1950-1960, in the south, especially after the launch of the policy of Somalization in 1954. This policy, which was implemented by the Italian administration, was accompanied by a number of problems, including: the lack of necessary training for the members of the apparatus due to the lack of a budget allocated for this, the financial corruption carried out by the administration, the limited time period for preparation, and the urgency with which the process was carried out, which was in a race against time to complete the program before the date of independence. In the north, similar opportunities to prepare for independence were not available.

At the moment of its independence, the Somali state inherited an administrative apparatus that suffered from those problems mentioned earlier, which required radical reform and qualitative development. But instead, national civilian governments continued to expand the size of the apparatus in the first years after independence beyond its absorptive capacity, by employing large

[80] Abdi Ismail Samater, Africa's First democrats, Op. Cit. P. 108-109.

numbers of citizens in it, without regard to the need for work or qualification and the position occupied by the employee, and without providing new jobs, but things happened for recruitment only. Because of the pressure of tribe and prominent leaders, this led to doubling the size of the apparatus, and then suffered from the overcrowding of workers and employees who were not qualified for the job they occupied. The state apparatus also suffered from instability due to the movement of employees and workers from one ministry to another, so that the issue became linked to the change of governments and ministers81.

The issue of administrative reform of the Somali state apparatus has become an urgent issue a few years after independence, and the attempt of Prime Minister Abdul Razzaq Haj Hussein (1964-1967) was the most prominent effort towards reforming the apparatus in that period, as he made that issue one of the most important priorities in his government's program, despite the difficulties and sensitivity of the issue, and the pressures he faced from influential people in parliament and the government. Indeed, Abdul Razzaq formed a committee headed by a Canadian expert who prepared a comprehensive study on the matter. As a result of the study, the Prime Minister dismissed hundreds of employees who were hired through nepotism and without regard for efficiency, and corrected the situation of many. Among those dismissed from the service was the Prime Minister's own brother, which gave the reform process a great deal of credibility with the Somali public at the time82.

The military regime made a radical change in the nature of the Somali state, and removed the civilian political elite that led the country towards independence during the first decade after independence, and instead adopted the employees in the administrative apparatus in managing the affairs of the state, and showed great interest to the members of the apparatus in the early years of the coup, as stated in a speech to Siyad Barre addressed to civil servants, " You are the backbone of the nation, and you have a major role in managing the country regardless of who is in power. Governments come and go but civil servants remain in service”83. The apparatus expanded in number, as more imposition was created in the first period of military rule due to the financial abundance that came as a result of the control of embezzlement and financial corruption that prevailed in the civil era, and the external financial support provided by the

[81]() There are famous stories passed down from generation to generation about the dramatic events that took place in that period, which express the Somalis' problem with the state.
[82]() For more see: Abdi Ismail Samater, Africa's First democrats, Op. Cit. P. 127-186
[83]() Somali Democratic Republic, Ministry of Information and National Guidance, My country and my people, speeches and statements of President Siad Barre, p. 92.

Soviet Union at the time. But the problem became worse than it was after the defeat of Somalia in the war against Ethiopia in 1978.

It had political and economic repercussions on the country, as the Somali economy deteriorated in the 1980s, and the exchange rate of the Somali shilling fell. In addition, inflation in living and corruption engulfed the entire joints of the country, and Somali artists crossed this rampant corruption in the cadres of the state with the play" Land cruzergadosobarigalay", which means "Own a Land Cruise car and live on the wheat aid provided to you by the world. “This made the issue of reform in the state apparatus, including the administrative apparatus, a distant one. Indeed, there were signs of the collapse of the state at the end of the 1980s.

(f) Political Tribalism

Tribalism represents the social structure of the Somali people, which consists of tribes, sub-tribes, and sub-tribes. Before the establishment of the complex modern central state, tribes were an independent social and political entity. European colonialism exploited the power of the political tribe and made it part of the colonial administration. When the national movement came and adopted the idea of nationalism and patriotism, it took an extremist stance towards tribes as a factor dividing the Somali people against patriotism and pan-nationalism. Some believe that it is one of the political mistakes of the Somali National Movement, especially the Youth Unity Party, to ignore and deny the tribal differences among Somalis, instead of dealing with them and trying to address them84.

Supporters of the Somali National Movement (SYL) were persecuted by Italy in the first three years of guardianship, and anyone who walked at night was stopped and asked his tribe and then he was released. If he refused to mention his tribe, he was arrested because he was a member of the Somali National Movement. One night a young man was arrested and asked from which tribe are you (Chetue Cabila)? He said, "Tonight I am Abjal," but they 85 did not understand his intention, so he was released.

However, since the period of international tutelage (1950-1960) to prepare southern Somalia for independence, the need to represent the people and obtain votes in elections has led to the exploitation of tribalism by political parties, so the recognition of tribalism has become a reality and necessary to maintain

[84]() Mohamed Turunji, Op.Cit. P. 426.
[85](2) Jamac Maxamed Qaalib, Taariikhda Somaaliya, page 95

popular circumvention of power, as well as for governments and parties to reflect the tribe spectrum, and thus the tribal quotas have become one of the foundations of the Somali86 state since independence.

One of the most important pillars of tribe politics is that each tribe has been stationed in its own geographical area throughout the ages and acts as a state within the state, defending its borders from other tribes and complicating reconciliation and alliance with other tribes. The political leadership had to employ these pillars for the benefit of the Somali state, creating integration between different neighboring tribes and creating common interests for these tribes. The challenge of political tribalism, which was faced by the political elite in its occurrence, was manifested in the political duplicity that arose around the dilemma of reconciling party representation and tribe representation (the politician belongs to a tribe and a party at the same time), between the nationalist discourse that glorifies patriotism and the popular discourse directed at the tribe, and between the interests and demands of the tribe and the supreme interests of the country. The political elite faced the well-established idea of the tribe where its satisfaction with the government and its support for the party stops with the extent to which politicians and representatives of the party respond to its demands, as well as the extent to which there are individuals belonging to the tribe in the government. The repercussions of this dire point emerged in the competition for jobs between tribes and their vision of the official and the position that the official assumes as representing the tribe but does not represent the party or the general people, and therefore "tribal conflicts are seen as the prominent element in Somali politics and in the formation of the state and its fall (87).

To confront this phenomenon, the civilian political elite adopted a strategy of continuing the nationalist discourse that glorifies and rebukes tribalism through events, radio, and by writing dozens of songs, with the continuation of political duplicity in dealing with the tribe. The military regime took more radical and violent means, including - in addition to the previous nationalist discourse - the attempt to abolish the positions and titles of tribal leaders and the issuance of the law criminalizing tribalism. However, the dilemma has become more prominent after three decades of adopting the fight against it, and the Somali state has collapsed and the tribes have remained in existence, and the Somalis are still stuck with the problem of the vast distance between the expatriate national principles that whip the tribes and always call for their

[86]() For more on this meaning, see the second section in Chapter Three, which deals with the foundations of Somali state-building.
[87]() Dr. Madubi Ali, op. Cit., P. 313.

rejection and criminalize even the mere pronunciation of the tribe's name, and the reality that is based on loyalty to the tribes with deep roots in Somali culture, and there is still no approach between the two ideas to find a middle way to bring the state and society together, between tribalism and patriotism , and between the expatriate and the inherited.

External challenges

Just as the Somali state faced serious internal challenges, there were greater external challenges with regard to the political interaction between the Somali state and the international community., This contributed along with internal challenges, to the Somali state's deadlock after three decades of existence. As for the external challenges, the most important of them are: the regional conflict with neighboring countries over the lost territories, the identification in the Cold War, and the miscalculation and understanding of international politics.

(a) Regional conflict with neighboring countries over lost territory

One of the biggest external challenges that the Somali state has faced since its inception until now is the challenge of the conflict with the African neighboring countries of Ethiopia and Kenya over the Anfdi and Western Somalia (Ogaden) regions. The two countries' borders cover more than 90% of Somalia's international borders, and represent a fence that blocks Somalia from the African ocean. The conflict between Somalia and its neighbors dates back to the era of European scramble for Somali territory in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, which resulted in the division of the Somali people into five colonies under the administration of three European countries, Italy, Britain and France, in addition to Abyssinia. Since its inception in the early 1940s, the Somali National Liberation Movement has embraced the cause of the liberation of Greater Somalia, which includes the five Somali regions and their unification under one Somali state. The National Movement established branches in those regions that participated with the Mother Movement in the struggle for freedom and unity.

After the independence of the northern and southern regions and the establishment of the Somali Republic on July 1, 1960, the state adopted the issue of liberating the lost lands, and the Somali flag expressed this dream and a white star with five heads was placed in its center symbolizing the five Somali regions. In the constitution of unity and independence, which was voted at the referendum in 1961, the state put articles specializing in the issue, and the successive Somali civilian and military governments put the issue in mind during the independence phase, and made it top of their priorities in their foreign policy and in their

internal political program. The issue was not only a matter for governments, but in its various stages, it was an issue of Somali public opinion that governments cannot waive, as the government of Prime Minister Muhammad Ibrahim 'Uqal (1967-1969) was faced with a wave of accusations and betrayal by public opinion after concluding a truce agreement with the Kenyan government in 1967.

Because of Somalia's adoption of the issue of lost territories, the Somali state entered a political and diplomatic battle at the international and regional levels. Britain faced resistance because of its annexation of Anfadi territory to Kenya. After holding the referendum for the territory, the resulted was strong support for joining Somalia in 1963. The Somali state severed its relations with Britain, before being returned after four years of estrangement. It also faced France, which was occupying the French Somali region (Djibouti later) until the region gained its independence in 1977, as the Somali state paid a high price for that confrontation.

The two countries are traditional European colonial powers and the victorious Allied Powers in the Second World War, and they enjoy permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council. At the regional level, Somalia has engaged in a confrontation no less dangerous than its international battle with two major regional powers in Africa: Ethiopia and Kenya, which are among the countries with population size in the region, and among the influential countries in the Organization of African Unity, and Ethiopia hosts the headquarters of the African Organization.

Within the framework of its diplomatic and political confrontation with the two neighbors in the corridors of the African Organization, Somalia adopted the principle of the right of self-determination of the Somali people in the two regions. Ethiopia and Kenya on the other hand relied on the principles contained in the Charter of the Organization when it was founded. These are non-interference in the internal affairs of member states, respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and its inalienable right to the independence of its entity, and the peaceful settlement of disputes through negotiation, mediation,[88] conciliation and arbitration. It also relied on the decision to keep the African borders as they are at the time of independence, which was taken at the second Cairo Conference of the Organization in 1964. In light of the legal basis provided by the African Organization, the two countries set out to

[88]These principles are set out in Article III of the OAU Charter.

coordinate their positions and tighten the noose on Somalia, and concluded the mutual defense agreement between them against Somalia in 1964.

The confrontation between the two parties included the use of all available mechanisms, including the military confrontation that took place between Somalia and Ethiopia in 1964 and 1977. The young Somali state suffered from the repercussions of these confrontations, which were the arms race in the region, the large spending on the army, the militarization of Somali society, the imposition of military service, and participation in the battle, which played a major role in the emergence of Somali armed opposition fronts, the ignition of the Somali civil war, and the subsequent[89] collapse of the state.

(C) Identification in the Cold War

Among the external challenges that arose with the independence of the Somali state was the Cold War, which had reached its peak at the time, the international polarization of the newly independent states, and Somalia's strategic location, which attracted the attention of the great powers, in addition to the intensity of the Arab-Israeli conflict in that period and its repercussions on Somalia. In the midst of the waves of the Cold War, the principle of positive neutrality taken by Somalia as an approach to its foreign policy did not work. Rather, its severe need for economic aid, military support and building its army to regain the lost lands prompted it to knock on all doors and try to participate on the tables of the two camps at the same time. This dual policy of the Somali state and the attempt to obtain the support of both camps was manifested during civilian rule when Somalia was receiving foreign aid from the West through the Italian gate, and at the same time it was seeking the assistance of the Soviet Union.

This policy began with the conclusion of the Cooperation Agreement with the Soviets in 1961. It is remarkable that Italy, the colonial power of Somalia and its international patron, itself pursued the same political duality and tried in the period of the years - despite its close association with the United States - to establish relations with the eastern countries, and to have open options with the eastern countries[90]. As a result, the Somali state faced political pressure from

[89]() For more results of the 1977/1978 war, see Mohamed Ibrahim Abdi, The Problem of Western Somalia, op. Cit., P. 99-106.
[90]() Paolo Tripodi, Italy and Somalia: a Singular Relationship, International Relations, Published by sage 1998, P. 63

both camps, as this was not acceptable to them, due to the principles of non-alignment and friendship with all that Somalia tried to uphold [91].

Despite the identification of Somalia and its involvement in the cold war in the period of civilian rule, the degree of identification was less compared to the military regime that came to power in 1969. This ended the policy of duality in Somalia's relationship with the great powers and tried to obtain the aid of the two camps, as the military regime put its full weight on the eastern camp, turning its back to the West, while maintaining strong and exceptional relations with Italy., Somalia received as a result of that step significant military and economic assistance from the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc countries, as the Somali port of Berbera became the largest Soviet military base outside Eastern Europe.

Given the Western refusal to provide Somalia with weapons to confront its Ethiopian opponent is one of the most important reasons that prompted it to join the eastern camp. Somalia faced again after six years of joining the eastern camp the dilemma of turning Ethiopia, led by Mengistu, towards the eastern bloc.

This brought Somalia into a political impasse, so that the common Somali and Soviet interests to confront pro-Western Ethiopia were no longer valid, after Ethiopia's new leaders embraced the communist ideology and joined the camp that also includes Somalia. Somalia tried to break the impasse by waging war on socialist Ethiopia in 1977, putting the Soviets in front of the fait accompli. Somalia paid a high price as a result of that reckless step, after the eastern camp stood with its full weight with Ethiopia and defeated Somalia. Hence the sudden shift of Somali position from the Cold War and returning to the arms of the western camp. Berbera therefore turned after a few years of being the largest Soviet base in the region into the largest American base in the Horn of Africa in 1978.

Thus, Somalia's changing position from the two rival blocs in the Cold War three times during the two decades following independence, the identification in the Cold War as well as the radical and rapid transformation of its international alliances represented a major challenge to its foreign policy. This brought it into a political impasse that had negative effects and consequences that exceeded the absorption of the Somali state and its ability to withstand these transformations.

On the other hand, the two superpowers withdrew their support for the Somali state and classified the Somali President as discolored and unreliable in his dealings with major countries.

[91]() Abdi Ismail Samater, Africa's First democrats, Op. Cit. P. 167.

(b) Miscalculation and misunderstanding of international policy

The failure of the Somali leadership to understand and read international politics correctly and realistically, its miscalculation of its positions on international issues, its defiance of major countries many times, and its use of coarse and tactless diplomacy with friends, international competitors, and adversaries are among the biggest external challenges facing the Somali state. This dilemma began with the commencement of the modern national movement in the 1940s, through the stage of the international guardianship of southern Somalia (1950-1960) and ending with the stage of national independence during the three decades in which the Somali state lived before its collapse altogether in 1991. One of the most prominent examples is the demand of the leaders of the Somali National Movement, represented by the Somali Youth League Party, for the collective tutelage of the four victorious Allied powers in the war, instead of the British tutelage that Britain wanted, which could have contributed to the unification of the Somali regions that were under British administration.

One of those positions that foretells a miscalculation that is political, is the issue of the clash with Italy after the declaration of international guardianship over Somalia, due to the fears of the Youth Unity Party of prolonging the UN guardianship. Despite the Italian assurances and despite the difficulty of this possibility for Italy, which is bound by the UN resolution. The matter was not specific to the Youth Unity Party, but included other parties, as the opposition parties such as Dujail and Marfali were busy searching in that period for opportunities to prolong international guardianship. The Somalis mistakenly believed that they or Italy could act with such ease and simplicity in the fate of the region after the UN decided on the status[92] of the region. The issue of urgency and the provision of independence six months before the scheduled date in December 1960 was one of the things that indicated inexperience, despite the essentially short period of time and its insufficiency in completing the work and tasks that were required by the Somali state-building process and preparing Somalis to take over the leadership of their country and the administration of the state.

The failure of the Somali leadership in the foreign policy file and dealing with the international community since the early period of preparing the Somalis to hand over the Somali state is due to several factors. These include: Italy's monopoly on defense and foreign policy during the guardianship stage, the failure to prepare the Somali national leaders to assume that responsibility by

[92]() For more on this topic, see: Mohamed Turunji, Op.Cit. P. 243-246.

not involving them in foreign policy decision-making, and postponing this until independence. Another reason was the inexperience of the leadership and its young age, as the majority of the party leadership after independence, for example, was in their thirties. When the Constitution was drafted in 1961 and then the age of candidacy for the post of President of the Republic was set at forty years, many prominent members of the main parties in the north and south were unable to run because of this condition, including Abdullah Issa, and all ministers from the Northern Territory in the government at the time were under the legal age to be candidates[93]for the office.

The dilemma of misunderstanding between Somalia and the international community and the clash with major powers continued during the period of civilian rule, despite the adoption of the principle of positive neutrality in Somali foreign policy and Somalia's attempts to win international friends, and establish diplomatic relations with twenty-six countries and international organizations[94]. One of the biggest crises in Somali foreign policy and one of the boldest steps taken by the Somali leadership during civilian rule in the 1960s was the step of severing relations with Britain after the annexation of the region to Kenya in 1963, within the framework of Somalia's policy towards the achievement of Greater Somalia. This step coincided with the intensification of the diplomatic conflict with France to force it to grant the right of self-determination to the French Somali region (Djibouti). Somali-Italian relations were also damaged after Somalia received military assistance from the Soviet Union during the period 1964-1967, before Mohamed Ibrahim Aqal, Prime Minister of Somalia (1967-1969), restored the relations of the two countries to[95]their normal course.

The Somali leadership failed to understand the magnitude of the challenge required to change the borders that African countries inherited from the colonial powers, especially by African countries and the Organization of African Unity itself. This meant that the borders remained as they were at the time of independence, and the magnitude of the cost paid by the emerging Somali state as a result of its challenge with the major European powers represented by Britain and France, the two colonial European countries and the prominent members of the Security Council remained the same.

Somalia's diplomacy with the major powers intensified during the military rule (1969-1991), where the regime's direction witnessed sharp political fluctuations represented in the change of Somalia's position from the major

[93]() Mohamed Turunji, Op.Cit. P. 350.
([94]) Hamdi Al-Sayed Salem, op. Cit., P.: 418
[95]() Paolo Tripodi, Op.Cit. P. 55.

powers twice during one decade (1969-1978). As the regime initially headed towards the Soviet Union with all its weight, and established close relations with it, and the Soviets accordingly provided military and economic assistance to Somalia, things quickly changed after the decision of the war against Ethiopia in 1977., Hence the regime struck off seventeen years of close relations between the two countries in disregard, and rejected the advice of the Eastern Camp countries at the Aden Conference in March 1977. [96]They cut off relations with the Soviets, at a time when all the Somali army had weapons, ammunition and equipment that came from the Soviet Union, so how could it fight a war in this situation? The regime joined the US-led Western camp in April 1978. Thus, the Somali leadership failed again when it made political miscalculations in estimating the size of the reaction of those forces from the sudden Somali transformation, especially when they realized that they were exploited for the benefit of the smaller ally and compromised their pride. The Somali leadership made a mistake when it believed that it could impose its agenda on the major powers, and then change the African borders recognized by the African Organization on its own.

One of the situations that indicates the miscalculation of the Somali leadership and their failure to study their decisions is that West Germany had been providing support to the Somali police since the exploitation of weapons, equipment and cars, but West Germany cut off its assistance to the Somali police after the military regime recognized East Germany. What did East Germany provide to Somalia to build the worst prison in Somalia for Batangro (labatanjirow)? The Somali government replaced the police assistance program to build only a prison.[97]

In light of the drought and seasonal floods, "the European Union built weather forecasting stations to know the dry and rainy seasons to confront them before they occur, but it was surprised that the Somali state could not afford fuel costs." [98] However, it is fighting battles and confronting major countries.

Needless to say, one of the biggest external political challenges faced by the Somali state was the attempt of the Somali leadership to play a political role greater than its size, and to break the pride of the major powers, without appreciating the cost of that role and the damage it will cause to Somalia's strategic interests, its international and regional status, and its balance with its

[96]() For more on the Aden Conference and its decisions, see: Mohamed Ibrahim Abdi, The Problem of Western Somalia and Its Impact on Arab-African Relations, op. Cit., P.88-94.
[97]-Peter Bridge, Safiir, page 88-89, waa safiirka maraykanka ee Somaliya 1984-1986.
[98]-Peter, page 77

allies, which is one of the factors that ultimately contributed to the restriction of the Somali state and its subsequent collapse.

The second issue - Economic challenges

The economic challenges are one of the biggest challenges faced by the Somali state since the beginning of talk about its independence and before the southern region was placed under international trusteeship in 1950. The most prominent question among the international parties concerned for that period was: about the possibility of providing sufficient and permanent economic resources to the Somali state in the event that it was granted independence. The problem was not the lack of resources and their unavailability, but the dilemma was how to exploit and invest those resources (the country was not poor but there is a failed state). On this basis, the southern and northern Somali regions that formed the Somali Republic after independence from the colonial countries, Britain and Italy, did not inherit a significant economic structure during their colonization of the country.

The colonial countries, Britain and Italy, failed to achieve a degree of economic development in the two regions that would later enable the Somali state to survive economically and provide an opportunity to exploit the natural resources owned by Somalia. Written colonial literature dealing with the history of Somalia in that period underestimates the importance of the economic factor in the colonization of the region, and places the responsibility for economic underdevelopment on the citizens of the region[99].

The dilemma of economic underdevelopment became an urgent issue after the placing of Italian Somalia under international trusteeship (1950-1960).

The United Nations assumed responsibility for providing the budget of the region and entrusting Italy with the task of developing the resources of the region during the trusteeship period, so that the Somali state after the end of the trusteeship period could rely on itself. However, Italy did not succeed in carrying out that task entrusted to it and developing the[100]economic resources of the region. The period of international trusteeship ended without achieving the objectives of the economic development of the region. Therefore, it became imperative for the United Nations to continue economic support for the nascent state in the hope of achieving the Somali national leadership after independence; what the European powers were unable to achieve.

[99]() Bernard Braine, Op. Cit. P. 195.
[100]() For more on this subject, see the second topic in Chapter Three regarding the foundations of building the Somali state.

The situation in the British protectorate in the north was not better than the south, but it was worse than it economically, as it did not get the opportunity to prepare for independence as compared to what happened in the south. Britain decided at the end of the fifties in the twentieth century to grant the northern region freedom to independence. As the northern region joined the southern region, it was in a worse economic situation than the south, which increased the burden of the crisis of economic underdevelopment suffered by the emerging Somali state consisting of the two regions.

On this basis, the Somali state emerged in the womb of the economic dilemma that surrounded and suffocated it. The challenges included all economic fields, including the development and implementation of economic development plans, the permanent deficit in the public budget, the deficit in the trade balance, the failure to diversify the sources of the economy, and dependence on foreign aid, in addition to the natural disasters that periodically destroyed the fragile Somali economy, including the repeated droughts that caused the death of animals, and the destruction of the agricultural crop that depends on rain. The floods were destroying the lives of the inhabitants of the banks of the Shabelle and Juba rivers in the south. They caused the spread of famine that was striking the majority of Somalia's nomadic population that was dependent on grazing in the country, so the Somali state lived between the failure of economic development and natural disasters.

In the midst of attempts to answer the question of how to find sufficient economic resources to manage the Somali state that has emerged since the international tutelage (1950-1960), one of the available alternatives that was raised, was the issue of the possibility of discovering oil in the country, as American companies had been drilling oil in Somalia since the era of international tutelage. One British writer pointed out those questions and fears about the economic fate of the Somali state after independence when he said, "Somalia is unlikely to be economically viable. There is a feverish search for oil going on but nothing has been found. Significant difficulties will arise at the outset if the Italians withdraw before settling the issue of foreign aid "[(101)]. Despite the existence of this alternative, Somali leaders did not prioritize the state administration after taking over the economic dilemma and did not invest their efforts towards focusing on those alternatives. On the other hand, due to the political instability of the Somali state and its movement between the Cold War camps, this unfavorable atmosphere did not encourage America and its oil companies to continue the issue of searching for oil and investing in this field.

[101]() Bernard Braine, The Somali Question, Op. Cit. P. 192.

Due to this, the Somali state was established in 1960 and ranked among the 20 poorest countries in the world at the time, where three quarters of the population lived below the poverty line and it[102]was a very high percentage. The growth of the Somali economy in the senate decade was slow, reaching 1.3%, which is less than the annual population growth rate, which reached 2.6%[103]. The country was heavily dependent on foreign aid, accounting for more than 70% of its overall state budget[104]. Despite this tragic situation, the country's leaders were not up to that challenge, and during the independence period they did not worry about the magnitude of the economic problem[105] awaiting them, nor about the scarce state resources or economic development plans that did not materialize, and they treated the issue of aid as if it had been a permanent resource that will not run out, but continue indefinitely.

Instead of focusing on the economic dilemma, and searching for ways to make the state viable and sustainable, the political elite turned its attention to political competition and the issue of lost lands. Rather, it went to corruption and the plundering of public funds, as the state seemed to work for the benefit of the ruling elite alone. This is a general feature of African countries, as "the state in Africa accounted for its surplus and the revenues of agricultural exports, especially through marketing bodies, excessive valuation of the national currency, and the distribution of public expenditures. The extent of those developments and the patterns of their institutions and the social groups that have benefited from them may vary from country to country. However, a small number of systems formed only an exception to the general rule. "(106)

The dealing of the ruling military elite (1969-1991) with the economic dilemma did not change much from its civilian counterpart during the civil era (1960-1969), despite the attempts made by the military in the early years of their rule. The military government began with serious attempts to deal with the economic crisis, and realized that the solution to that crisis was linked to the extent to which it obtained the legitimacy that the civilian elite lost after its failure to achieve economic demands. In a speech to President Mohamed Siad

[102]() Iraqi Abdulaziz Mustafa, Key Features and Problems of Economic Performance in Somalia, Comprehensive Survey of the Somali Democratic Republic, Arab Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization, Institute of Arab Research and Studies, Baghdad 1982, p. 354.
[103]() Jamil Abdalla Mubarak, From Bad Policy to Chaos in Somalia- How an Economy Fell Apart, Praegar Publishers, USA, 1996, P. 11.
[104]() World Development Report 1981, Op, cit. p.56
[105]() Mohammed Sheikh Othman.
[106]() Jean-François Bayard, The Politics of Filling the Bellies - The Sociology of the African State, translated by Halim Tunson, Third World House - Cairo, First Edition 1992, p. 86.

Barre on the occasion of Independence Day Somalia on July 1, 1970, almost a year after his rule, he said, "We understand well that we will be judged by our economic policy and according to the success or failure we record in[107] this field."

The military government obtained a financial surplus in the early years of its rule, especially from the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc, and benefited from drying up the sources by the corruption practiced by the civilian elite and returning them to the state treasury, which created a sense of satisfaction and optimism among the general public in the early years of military rule.

On this basis, the military regime took a number of steps and measures in the 1970s aimed at reviving the national economy, including the development of three economic development plans (1971-1974, 1975-1978, 1979-1981). The regime also made[108] attempts to diversify the Somali economy by taking advantage of the promising uninvested sectors in the country, including the fisheries sector, where the Ministry of Fish was established in 1973, and a budget was set for it in the three-year development plan (1974-1978), and the diversification of Somali agricultural exports, as it relied on the cultivation of bananas only. An attempt was made to cultivate grapes and manufacture these products through the establishment[109]of fruit canning factory. A number of factories were also renovated and developed, including the manufacturers of IsnaiBiassi sugar, spinning and weaving, cigarettes and sulfur,[110]leather and shoes.

These attempts at economic development made by the military government in the 1970s were unsuccessful and economic development plans and projects were not implemented for a number of reasons and internal and external factors. These included the severe drought that hit a number of African regions, including the Horn of Africa, and caused the death of a third of the animals in the country[111], which was the backbone of the Somali economy, and provided 40% of the hard currency of the state.[112] In addition, there was the Somali-Ethiopian war in 1977/1978, and its catastrophic economic and social effects on the

[107]() Somali Democratic Republic, Ministry of Information and National Guidance, President Mohamed Siad's Speech Collection, 1971, p. 98.
[108]. Somali DemocraticRepublic, Ministry of Information and National Guidance, Economic Progress, p. 3.
[109].Ibid, p. 10.
[110]Ibid., pp. 31-32.
[111]() Jamil Abdalla Mubarak, Op. Cit. P. 14.
[112]() Metz, Helen Chapin (editor), Somalia- a Country Study, Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, May 1992, 141-142.

country, and the cessation of technical aid provided by the Soviet Union to support development projects, after the severance of diplomatic relations between the two countries following the Soviets' opposition to the war and standing by Ethiopia. However, settlements were established in the coasts in a number[113] of coastal areas.

Despite the US assistance to Somalia in the 1980s and the government's attempts to restructure the Somali economy, this did not help the Somali economy, but rather exacerbated the political and economic problems, as the Somali economy witnessed a state of stagnation, and then returned to the first stage, and reliance on the outside increased. The general budget deficit in 1981, for example, amounted to 734 million Somali shillings, an increase of 270% in just two years. The Somali government has been resorting to the banking system to cover the deficit, which has increased the government's indebtedness and increased the burden on the system itself[114]. Despite this, the administrative apparatus of the state expanded from eighteen thousand employees before the military coup in 1969, to more than fifty thousand in 1985, and at a time when the apparatus was witnessing steady growth during the 1980s, the trained and skilled labor force was leaking out of the country, due to the crisis political situation, tribal bias, and inflation in living[115].

As a result of the accumulation of crises, the deterioration of government performance the decline of public institutions, and the decrease in foreign and domestic investments and international aid, Somalia began to disappear from the periodic reports of international institutions concerned with the economy since the mid-1980s due to the lack[116]of economic data and statistics. The security situation worsened due to the expansion of military operations between the army and factions opposed to the regime of President Barre. In this period, the Somali army was fighting its people. Western reports indicated the complete collapse of the Somali state and that the state broke like glass, which ultimately led to the collapse of the economy, and then the collapse of the state after the arrival of battles in Mogadishu and the overthrow of President Barre in January 1991.

[113()] Economic Progress, p. 24.

[114]() Mohamed Ibrahim Abdi, The Role of the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development in Support of the Somali Economy, Journal of the University of Mogadishu, Second Issue, 2016, p. 76.

[115]() Jamil Abdalla Mubarak, Op. Cit. P. 62

[116]() Mohamed Ibrahim Abdi, the role of the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development in supporting the Somali economy, op. Cit., P. 76.

The third issue - Social challenges

The social challenges faced by the Somali state after gaining independence are one of the problems and obstacles that have burdened the state, affected the unity of the Somali people, and thus hindered state-building and ultimately contributed to its collapse and the difficulty of rebuilding it. Social challenges can be summarized by the following four factors: tribal conflict, identity problems, the challenge of national integration, and large waves of migration from the countryside to the capital and major cities. These challenges include problems related to the community's relationship with the state, others related to interrelationships in Somali society, and a third group of challenges related to the relationship of Somali society with the Arab and African regional environment.

(1) Tribal conflict: The traditional conflict between Somali tribes over natural resources represented by pastures, water and livestock was one of the factors that led to instability. The conflict between tribes has represented two levels of conflict that must be distinguished. The first is the traditional conflict between tribes in the countryside over natural resources. This type of conflict has existed since ancient times between Somali tribes. The second level of conflict is represented in the conflict between tribes in state institutions and in political influence and positions. This type of conflict prevails in cities, and both types of conflict are led by tribe leaders. As for political tribalism, it is led by the political elite that are struggling to acquire positions and obtain political gains, using the tribe as one of the tools of the conflict. We have talked about it in political challenges. It is not the field of our discussion in this topic, despite the overlap between them and the difficulty of differentiating between them in writing and dealing with it.

On this basis, the tribe was a social entity that performed many functions within and outside the tribe (with other tribes), conducted war and peace, and made peace with other tribes. The tribe is the basis of Somali society, as it is the political, economic and social unit. The Somali tribe is characterized by weak nationalism, because political awareness is constrained by tribe boundaries[117].

The role of the tribe changed after the advent of European colonialism in the Somali territories. On the traditional social and political side, which was played by its leaders, the tribe now plays a new and different political role from the previous one, as the Europeans employed the tribes for their interests, and

[117]() Dr. Ali Hassan Muhammad Ali, Tribalism and the Crisis of Governance in Somalia in 1960-1995, p. 26

benefited from the contradiction of those interests. Tribe elders were also hired and received salaries from the colonizer. Some sources reported that the tribal sheikhs who received salaries in the south from the Italian administration were 950 Sheikhs, while in the north there were 361 Sheikhs who received salaries from the British authorities[118]. This new employment of the tribe resulted in it having a social and political role in the city that it exercises to achieve its interests within the colonial institutions and then the institutions of the Somali state after independence. Britain "gained the loyalty of the tribal sheikhs and made them agents of the colonial administration (119).

On this basis, tribalism molded by political stereotypes penetrated into the structures of the Somali state and its various institutions emerged, so that tribal Sheikhs managed the conflict between the state and the tribe instead of managing the conflict between the tribes, and greed became the master of the situation as each tribe began to seek the greatest number of positions in the state. People saw the President and the Prime Minister not as representing the whole country but as individuals representing their tribes.[120] Successive governments were founded in the name of the tribes (the State of Saad, the State of Mahmoud Suleiman, and the State of Rihan), based on the affiliation of the personality of the President of the country and the Prime Minister.

As it seems, the transformation of the issue of traditional tribal conflict after the advent of European colonialism into a political conflict in the cities over state institutions, positions and sources of income, is no longer an issue specific to the Somali situation, but rather a general phenomenon in Africa, as is the Somali society in that, like most African societies, where Jean-François Bayard asserts that "under the contemporary state, the preferred reference in this regard is likely linked to economic as well as political accumulation. It is more and more recognized that the tribe has become a channel through which competition is achieved in order to obtain wealth, power and status rather than being a political force in itself. Examples are plentiful. The tensions between the Igbo and the non-Igbo in Port-Harcourt, and between the Yoruba and the Hausa in Ibadan, reveal not so much abstract linguistic or cultural contradictions as the conflict over the city and its resources, and the control of the cola and cattle trade in the second case[121]. "

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[118]() Dr. Abdul Rahman Abdullahi (Badio), History of Somalia (Arabic Version), Part I, op. Cit., P. 123.
[119]() Dr. Huda Muhammad Abdi, The Colonial Rivalry between Britain and Italy in the Arab World and East Africa, p. 421
[120]() Mohamed Turunji, Op.Cit. P. 339.
[121]Jean-François Abayard, op.Cit., P. 78.

Despite this great transformation that took place in the nature of the tribe's social and political function in the colonial era, which still exists where conflicts in the past were based on economic resources such as pastures, water, land, and livestock, this type of conflict did not end. At the time when the competition was taking place in the cities between the tribes in the state institutions at the stage of preparing Somalia for independence, the intense conflict between the tribes' areas of influence also continued in the Bawadi. As one writer pointed out that phenomenon at the time, stressing that the interest of the Somali tribes in the borders of the pastures of their animals - during the guardianship period and the intensification of the Italian-Ethiopian dispute - was greater than their interest in the international borders and the conflict with Abysshe, which continued between Somalia and Ethiopia[122]at the regional level. This was in the case of nomadic pastoralism, but in the case of civilization it was accompanied by politics and the economy to serve one another. Some summarized the sources of tribal conflict in Somalia, whether in cities or in the countryside and the desert, into " four basic categories: the manipulation of elites, the struggle for social justice and equality, historical memories, and environmental pressures [123]."

This conflict between Somali tribes in the desert over natural resources, or in their struggle for positions and state resources in cities, posed a social challenge that contributed to social and political instability, whether in the capital, cities or in the desert. This dispersed the state's modest efforts in building political and social unity, building state institutions and gaining the satisfaction of various segments of the Somali people, and also contributed to weakening them in their confrontation with regional and international forces that have been in constant conflict with them since independence. The tribal conflict reached the family level within the same tribe in the Somali political society, as happened to the family of former President Mohamed Siad Barre on the last day of his regime.

(2) The challenge of national integration:

One of the social factors that contribute to the strength of the state is the strength of its social fabric, and the extent to which it is able to achieve national integration among the components of its people. On this basis, just as tribal conflict posed a social challenge to the project of the Somali state, so did the issue of national integration after unity between the north and the south and the

[122]() Rebert L. Hess, Op. Cit. P. 194.
[123]() Dr. Madouni Ali, The Limitations of State-Building Requirements in Africa and their Implications for Security and Stability, PhD Thesis at Mohamed Khudair University, Algeria, 2013-2014, p. 314.

achievement of independence was another social challenge that had a negative impact on national unity. In the same way, despite the existence of the elements of national unity among the components of the Somali people in terms of linguistic, religious and ethnic unity and living in a continuous geographical area, the cultural and political differences that arose from the divergence of the pattern of colonization between the northern and southern regions, from which the Somali state arose, resulted in some disparities that placed the responsibility of the emerging state on addressing these social and cultural disparities between the south and the north. After independence, these disparities were the biggest obstacle to national integration, and the process of removing these obstacles was also one of the biggest social challenges that awaited the Somali National Unity Government.

Indeed, the union between the Northern and Southern Provinces after more than 70 years of living under two modes of colonialism has left behind many important inherited issues, the most important of which are four main issues: the **sharing of power between the two parties**, the **issue of the national language (English and Italian)**, the **unification of administrative systems, and the choice of the capital** [124]." The unification in a hurry of two different regions with such a degree of disparity, and not putting those sensitive issues - the size of the issue of language and power-sharing - in the new constitution more clearly, and leaving it to side understandings and political bargaining, and dealing with them under the tables was very dangerous.

The emerging issue of the expansion of the area of the Republic - Hargeisa is more than 1,500 km from the capital Mogadishu, for example - without the availability of paved roads, telephone lines and flights linking the parts of the Republic, with the modest development allocations to the provinces in general - the northern political and social elite of the region-imposed migration to Mogadishu. Then the sense of marginalization of northern citizens prevailed under the political and administrative centralization of the state at the time, and their sense of distance from the central government prevailed as they used to have deputies and officials close to[125] them in the past. The 1961 coup attempt, in which junior army officers from the north separated the north from the south, was an early indication of a state of political protest among the northerners about their status in the new state after unification.[126] This attempt was also an early threat to the Somali state and was widely seen as a message of protest against the lack of conviction of public opinion in the north about the level of

[124]() Dr. Madouni Ali, op. Cit., P. 134.
[125]() Abdi Ismail Samater, Op. Cit. P. 113.
[126]() Dr. Mudouni Ali, op. Cit., P. 134.

representation of the northerners[127] in the political system, especially the largest northern tribe (Isaaq).

The poets expressed this dissatisfaction, as Abdullah Sultan Ta 'adhi said: Duqaydii Baarlmaanka iyo Dakadii xamar baa leh. He said that everything went to Mogadishu and there was nothing left for Hargeisa and he was alerting the Somali political leadership to review the matter and start resolving it before it escalated.

(3) Somali Identity Problems:

Identity is generally defined as "the ways in which individuals and groups are distinguished in their social relations with other individuals[128] and groups". There is social identity defined by sociologists as how people classify themselves as members of a particular group, such as nation, social class, subculture, race, gender, etc. Cultural identity: is essentially a sense of belonging to a cultural group, a subset of social identity that focuses on cultural components. It is a shared collective cultural memory owned by people who share the same history, ancestry, and ethnicity.[129.] Cultural identity is influenced by many factors, such as religion, language, class, skin color, ancestry, etc. In other words, cultural identity is the cornerstone of a person's being[130].

The traditional Somali social and cultural identity before the restructuring process practiced by the colonial authorities on the Somali people was based on two main axes: Islam and the tribe. However, after the advent of European colonization, the process of reshaping the Somali identity took place as new elements were added, a new culture was created, and this process continued after independence and during national rule. Colonialism dispersed the Somali identity when it made the colonial borders and divided the Somali people in a way that did not happen to any other people on the African continent, and this policy was the first blow to the Somali identity, "and the cultural system was the most targeted and affected by the colonial heritage after the imposition of colonialism its culture and language [131]."

[127]Ibid., p. 136.
[128]() Richard Jenkins, Social Identity (London: Routledge, 1996), P. 282.
[129]() Stuart Hall, "Identity, Community, Culture, Difference." In Cultural Identity and Diaspora, Edited by J. Rutherford (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1990), 17–46
[130]() Dr. Abdul Rahman Abdullahi (Badio), History of Somalia (Arabic Version) Part II, op. Cit., P. 286.
[131]() Dr. Abdurahman Abdullahi (Baadiyow) Making Sense of Somali History, Vol. 2, Op. Cit. P.102.

The social lifestyle imposed by colonialism and the transformation of the social leadership of scholars and tribe leaders into a segment made out of the mantle of colonialism under the name of the political elite is the first transformation and exposure of Somali identity to setbacks when this segment dealt with the elements of Somali identity (Islam, language and history) as the causes of underdevelopment in Somali society, and the presentation of the Western model as an alternative to the value and moral system of society, which led to the emergence of "a great difficulty in reconciling the demands of the modern state, tribal culture and inconsistent Islamic identity, as most of the members of the new political leadership were employed in very modest jobs at the time of colonialism, and graduated in basic schools, and hence the element of function and culture became a bridge linking colonialism to the new system.

Despite the homogeneity of the Somali people in terms of language, traditions, religion and common history, during the colonial era and national rule, a conflict took place in the cultural and intellectual identity and regional development of the Somali people around the pillars of: language, culture, tribalism, Islam, secularism, citizenship, Arabism and Africanism. These conflicts took place at the level of the general public, between the elite themselves, between the city and the desert, and between the state and society. This was part of the social challenges that the process of rebuilding the state and society in Somalia faced.

At the end of the chapter, despite the magnitude of those political, economic and social challenges that were impeding the building of Somali national unity and state-building, the Somali political elite did not give enough attention to solving these problems and dealing with them seriously. Ironically, most of the foundations on which the Somali state was founded, including the foundations of the ethnic state and dependence on foreign aid, have themselves become a challenge and a hindrance to building the state and the nation together. Instead of taking these challenges seriously and addressing the imbalances in the political, economic and social structure of the state, political leaders have taken care to share the pie, to burden the fragile state with more than it can bear, and to target the fragile social fabric, which hasten the collapse of society and the state together, which we will study in the next chapter.

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Revisiting The Causes of the Somali Civil War in The Light of the Protracted Social Conflict Perspective

Hassan Mudane

Abstract

Somalia, like many other African countries, has experienced a state of civil war which has brought a total state collapse and a deep-rooted conflict that fragmented the country, deteriorated the physical security, and caused institutional deformity. The anarchic condition resulted in the halting of the basic social services such as education, healthcare and public security. It also led to a catastrophic condition such as famine and drought. As a result, Somalia became synonymous with failed state, terrorism, warlords, famine, tribal wars and even pirates. The paper utilizes a qualitative approach that undertakes a critical evaluation of the literature on Somalia's civil war to demonstrate the underlying causes of and thereby offer a strong explanation for its outbreak. It aims to investigate the role of the politicized communal content, deterioration of basic needs, state's repressive role and international linkages in the outbreak of the Somali civil war. The investigation revealed that these causal forces are the necessary underlying causes, proven to be sufficient conditions for the ongoing civil war.

Keywords: *The Somali civil war, PSC, Primordialist, Instrumentalist*

Introduction

Following the 1969 bloodless military coup that brought military regime to power, and predominantly after the Ogaden War, Somalia suffered under a cruel dictatorial regime that supported animosity among Somali clan families and used army forces to put down popular protests. By 1991, when the military regime collapsed, the Somali people faced catastrophic conditions such as famine, drought, and destructive civil war. (Ahmed Samatar and Terrence Lyons 1995: P. 8). The nature of the Somali civil war changed over time. In late 1991, the civil war was mainly clan warfare between the Somali clan families in the south and central parts of the country. By early 1992, the responsible forces driving Somalia's civil war led to a new phase, a highly destructive one, in which Daarood and Hawiye tribe-families engaged in deadly civil war (Menkhous 2003).

The end of the cold war had a major influence on the genesis of Somalia's civil war. The ideological rivalry between Russia and USA was one of the battlegrounds on which the Somalis adversaries sought to fight each other. These adversaries had a dynamic of their own. Russia and USA, both are said to have become involved in Somalia's civil war because of each other's opposite interests (Guimarães, F. A. 2000: P. 11). These International influences will be shown to have become expressed in the civil war.

In the 1970s and 1980s, the two major superpowers were seriously involved in supporting patrons in Africa, particularly in the Horn of African countries, notable Somalia and Ethiopia. In the process of pursuing what they considered their own geopolitical and economic interests, the superpowers contributed to hastening of a regional arms race. During this period, Russia and USA, its alliance jockeyed to check each other, while Somalia and Ethiopia outwit one another. As a result of this, was the Ogaden War of 1977-1978. (Joseph K. Nkaisserry 1997: P. 3). Somalia's civil war is one of the armed conflicts that have engulfed Africa in the early 1990s. Some scholars argued that the civil war can be traced back to the legacy of the Ogaden War which ended in 1978.

In the late 1990s when the Soviet Union disintegrated, many scholars expected that peace in a unipolar world would prevail. Instead, several intra-state wars broke out in different parts of the world. Various rebel factions, clan identity groups challenged states' monopoly over domestic security and violence. Consequently, a number of states collapsed and experienced years of civil war. Many African countries such as Somalia, South Sudan, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Congo are examples of states that experienced protracted civil wars. Many scholars often described these civil wars as clan-based conflicts. (Elmi 2006: P. 1).

The Somali Civil War is an ongoing civil war that is taking place in Somalia. It has also proven to be long and devastating to its people. The table below shows the phases of the Somali Civil War which was proven to be long and devastating to its people.



Source: Internal analysis

Somalia's civil war is considered in the work of Edward Azar to examine the role played by deprivation of basic needs, state's repressive role and external linkages. His work understands the nature and implications of social conflicts, and other sadistic internal political transformations, which made them, in their very essence, global events. A theoretical approach to achieve the purpose of this paper has been suggested by Edward Azar. He pointed out that "the genesis component of our model identifies a set of conditions that are responsible for the transformation of non-conflictual situations into conflictual ones." (E. Azar 1990: P. 7).

This paper has adopted this theoretical approach and sets out to systematically analyze the root factors that influenced the outbreak of Somalia's civil war after the collapse of the military regime. This is done by first examining the existing literature on the Somali civil war. The history of post-colonial Somalia, particularly the post-1991 era, has been plagued by deep-rooted conflict. As a result, the country remains a deeply troubled one, and it will take years to reconstruct. The civil war did not suddenly begin with the overthrow of dictatorship regime of Siad Barre, but it was observable in most parts of the country for some time before the leave of traditional institutions that had traditionally secured solidity in the society. The Somali nation-state formation was on the off-beam way since the very beginning. The outbreak of the civil war was, thus, not surprising. (Barbora Rýdlová 2007).

Literature on Somalia's civil war has attracted so many scholars from separate academic disciplines including Political Scientists, Economists, Anthropologists, Sociologists. Two schools of thought have emerged to find out the root causes of the civil war: Primordialists and Intrumentalists. Somalia's

civil war has multiple causal forces. Competition for resources, a repressive state and colonial legacy are regarded as reasons behind the Somali civil war. (Elmi & Barise 2006). In the view of primordialists (traditionalists), the Somali civil war was a product of clan rivalry and age-old hatreds. Another leading school of thought, the Instrumentalist, viewed Somalia's civil war as a result of the economic crisis in the late 1980s, competition for resources and state power, elite manipulation and colonial legacy.

It will be argued that most scholars of Somalia focused only on the genesis of the civil war but they overlooked the role played by the following major factors: Politicized clan identity, deprivation of basic needs, state's depressive role and international linkages. However, this paper will explain the root causes of the Somali civil war. It views Somalia's civil war as a deep-rooted civil war that resulted from a combination of four factors such as politicization of communal content, deprivation of basic needs, state's repressive role and international linkages.

Research Question

This paper focuses on understanding the underlying causes of Somalia's civil war. It is being 32 years now since the outbreak of the civil war, the longest recorded in Africa's post-independence history. It exploded into one of the worst political crisis in the African continent. The civil war in Somalia is not unusual in the overall African scenario. The whole Africa is in fact still torn apart by several cases of armed conflicts and political violence, which obstruct the development of many African regimes. South Sudan, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ethiopia and Eritrea, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Nigeria are merely some examples of the civil unrests that badly affect the continent and make peace and stability unattainable. Since the post-1991 era, there have been many violent conflicts mainly based on clan warfare led by local clan-based warlords who ravaged the south and central part of Somalia. Some scholars of Somalia often described it as a result of a competition for resources and power, colonial legacy, ancient hatreds and clan rivalry among Somali clan families. In this paper, I will attempt to answer this question: What are the underlying causes of the Somali civil war? The research question will mainly focus on the role played by deprivation of basic needs, communal content, state's repressive role and international linkages in the outbreak of Somalia's civil war in 1991.

Purpose of the Study

The main aims of this research study are to explain the underlying causes of Somalia's civil war and to apply the basic concepts from the Edward Azar's theory of Protracted Social Conflict to the Somali civil war.

Problem Statement

Majority of the literature that explains the civil war in Somalia give clan rivalry and genealogical divisions among Somali clan families priority. Specifically, the literature focuses on ancient hatreds and clan differences among Somali clans as the major causal factors. (I. M. Lewis 1961; Kusow 1994). Many scholars of Somalia have questioned the validity of such claims. (Abdi Samatar 1992; Ahmed Samatar; 1988; Abdi Dirshe; 2013; Ssereo 2003; Ingririis 2016; Kapteijns 2004; Osman A. A. 2007; Elmi and Barise 2006; Menkhous 2003).

Although much has been written on the genesis of Somalia's civil war, yet the politicization of clan identity, deprivation of basic needs, state's repressive role and external linkages remains inapprehensible. Moreover, since the civil war broke out in 1991, there have been many scholarly explanations offered by different scholars about the civil war, however, neither of these explanations have an explanatory power.

Therefore, this paper aims to fill the gap in the literature by examining the role of politicized communal content, deprivation of basic needs, state's repressive role and international linkages in Somalia's civil war case. It urges us to adopt fresh perspectives by presenting an alternative explanation.

Significance of the Study

The study is significant in terms of generating a new debate for contemporary Somali studies. The theoretical contribution such as the academic support of Edward Azar's Theory of Protracted Social Conflict used to analyze the civil war in Somalia will contribute theoretically to the existing literature on the Somali civil war.
I think this study is important for several reasons. The study will offer an alternative approach to the Somali civil war. Secondly, the method and the technique of collecting information used in this paper will function as an important base for future research in this area.

Methodology

The research study has two main aims: To explain the underlying aspects of the Somali civil war. To apply the basic concepts from the Edward Azar's Theory of Protracted Social Conflict to the Somali civil war by using mainly secondary sources.
The type of methodology that will be used is based on a qualitative approach. The author will examine the role of politicized communal content, deprivation of basic needs, the state's repressive role and the international linkages in the Somali civil war case through critical evaluation of the available literature on Somalia's civil war.

Literature Review

This paper reviews the available literature on Somalia's civil war. The Somali civil war was an integral part of the political catastrophes that engulfed Africa in the early 1990s. The end of the cold war in the early 1990s, led to the outbreak of new conflict in Africa, tied to ethnicity or tribalism. This new phenomenon occurs within the borders of states as opposed to between states. One of the unique characteristics of the new phenomenon is that, it tends to have a strong underlying component of clan identity. Many scholars have been interested in understanding and explaining this new phenomenon. Kaldor (1999: P. 1) described it as a "new war, "and noted that "During the 1980s and 1990s, a new type of organized violence developed especially in Africa...which is one aspect of the current globalized era. I describe this type of violence as a new war." Furthermore, she claimed that this new war was the product of "intensification of global interconnectedness." Accordingly, the new wars have to be understood in the context of globalization. (Kaldor 1999: P. 3). However, it is not a "new war" but rather it has long existed and dominated the domestic arena, and one might argue that it has come to replace interstate as a primary source of international conflicts in the modern era. This phenomenon of new war does not exist in a continental vacuum; mostly it was hosted by the African countries. As Elbadaw and Sambanis (2000: P. 1) observed: "Over the last 40 years nearly 20 African countries or about 40% of Sub Sahara Africa have experienced at least one period of civil war." Since the late 1990s, the continent has been characterized by a number of armed conflicts tied to ethnicity such as the genocide in Rwanda, the civil war in Sudan, Somalia, Liberia, Sera Leone and many more. These civil wars were very immediate, divisive and destructive for civilians.

It is widely seen as a product of ethnic diversity and ancient hatreds (Weir 2012), security dilemma (Posen 1993), inadequate state authority (Ayoob 1996),

creed or economic opportunities (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Collier 1999), inequality (Curr 1993), grievance (Ellibsen 2000; Azar 1990), failed political institutions and poverty (Sambani and Elbadawi 2000), fear of dominance (Glazer 1986), and elite manipulation (Abdi Samatar 1997; Chandra 2004). The African continent has been a victim for political catastrophes, ethnic violence and experienced more than its fair share. If we look at the size of its population, it is over one billion out of the roughly seven billion people on the planet.

The next sub-sections discus two most influential schools of thought that have rarely dominated the literature of Africa's civil wars, the primordialism and the instrumentalism.

Primordialism

The Primordial tribal explanation of Africa's armed conflicts is rested on genealogical divisions and ancient hatreds (Weir, 2012). These hatreds were old and deeply historically rooted (Esteban et al. 2012). Accordingly, ethnicity can be the primary cause of African's armed conflicts. So Seleka and Anti-balaka conflict in the Central Republic of Africa is essentially defined in terms of religion; the black and white conflict in America is racial, not religious, not linguistic; and the mass violence in South Sudan is tied to clannism not religious nor racial. Thus, all of these are examples of intensity of passion and violence derived by old-aged hatreds. However, this explanation has its critics.

Abdi Samatar (1997: P. 687) argues "ethnic strife is the outcome rather than the cause of social upheavals in the continent." Likewise, Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000: P. 1) claim that "the relatively higher prevalence of war in Africa is not due to the ethno-linguistic fragmentation of its countries, but rather to higher levels of poverty, failed political institutions, and economic dependence on natural resources." Furthermore, they empirically examine whether there is a correlation between ethnicity and the occurrence of civil wars in thirty-two African countries (see figure 1). Accordingly, they came out with a conclusion that was totally against the premises of primordialism in explaining Africa's civil wars.

Figure 1: The relationship between ethnicity and war



Source: Osman 2007: P. 118

If ancient hatreds and genealogical divisions are so deep-rooted, and are the primary causes of Africa's civil wars, the question is then: why do different tribes in Somalia have violent conflicts but those in Tanzania and Botswana do not? Differently, if hatred among Somali clan families was so deeply rooted why have the different tribes in Botswana and Ghana managed to have peace for the last three decades? It does not mean that the genealogical divisions in Tanzania, Botswana and Ghana love each other and those in Somalia hate each other. That is not the reality because there is always some antagonism, but these do not necessarily cause mass violence or civil wars.

Therefore, ethnic variables are significantly related to conflict as long as there are political or economic prices at stake. Can we actually show using theoretical and econometric methods that ethnic differences and ancient hatreds cause violent conflicts in Africa? That is the critical question for the primordialists to think about analytically.

Instrumentalism

This is another leading school of thought, which could be categorized as the instrumentalist approach, that focuses on the place of primordial identities in Africa's civil wars, in their associations with domestic political structures and the role of human agencies. While recognizing the existence of the so-called primordial features such as clannism, ethnic culture and religion, instrumentalists argue that these features on their own do not naturally result in mass violence (Omeje 2015: P. 11). Instrumentalist explanation of Africa's civil wars heavily relies on elite manipulation and economic factors. (Collier 2002;

Colleir & Hoeffler 2004). An instrumentalist follows a line of argument which suggests that the political elites mobilize the ethnic groups for their own political interests. In other words, ethnic-oriented political elites capitalize on the ethnic divisions for their private political gains.

According to this line of argument, innate variables like antagonism or ethnic identity are not the drivers of Africa's civil wars but what drives armed conflicts in Africa is the political or economic use of these variables. In addition, conflicts take place because the political elites strategically manipulate ethnicity for the sake of political or economic interests. (Chandra 2004). Conversely, there is evidence suggesting ethnic identity becomes very dangerous only when these genealogical divisions become associated with grievances among ethnic groups living within a single political system. This can become particularly dangerous, when one ethnic group that gains control of the state power is able to use the state's resources to improve their own position at the expense of other ethnic groups, this adds a very strong motivation for Africa's conflict. (Glazer 1986).

One of the examples where we see these patterns of domination and discrimination leading to civil war is Somalia during the President Siad Barre's regime, where few clans ruled over all other clans. The political elites may find ethnicity or clan identity useful for political mobilization, however, the critical question is why do civilians respond to the elites? It is very difficult to find solid evidence showing the link between the political or economic factors and civil wars in Africa. The instrumentalist explanation has its own weakness. Somalia's civil war has been explained by many Somalia scholars through separate lenses of primordialism and instrumentalism. This chapter critically evaluates literature on Somalia's civil war, as well as presents further evidence in support of its new explanation about the underlying causes of the Somali civil war. The chapter recognizes two major schools of thought which have dominated literature on Somalia's civil war. These two theoretical approaches are summarized in Table 1.

Table 1: Comparison of the Primordialist and Instrumentalist Explanation

Characteristics	Primordialism	Instrumentalism
Unit of Analysis	Clan Identity	Political elites
Motivation	Grievance	Greed
Historical Roots	Old	New
The Main Claims	Clan rivalry, ancient hatreds and clan differences are the underlying causes of the Somali civil war.	Elite manipulation, the economic decline in the 1980s, competition for resources, the Ethio-Somali war and colonial legacy, state building and modernization process are the primary causes of the Somali civil war.

NOTE: Table 1 summarizes two main theoretical approaches to explain the Somali civil war, 1991-2006.

The Somali Civil War and Explanations in Literature

Somalia, like many other African countries, experienced civil war in the early 1990s. There has been a wide range of studies that existed from as far back as the 1980s and these studies offered explanations that attempted to contribute to our understanding of the Somali civil war. These explanations fall into three inter-relating categories: cultural, political and economic. (Kapteijns 2008). Each of these explanations has its basic assumptions that explain the root causes of the civil war. To understand the complexity of the Somali civil war, however, one must put it in the context of historical analysis to get a clear snapshot of violent local actors in the civil war (see Table 2).

Table 2 Contextualizing the Complexity of the Somali Civil War

Violent Local Actors	Description
Armed Factions	Post-1991 era, clan-based political organizations including the Somali Salvation Democratic Front, the Somali National Movement, the United Somali Congress, and the Somali Patriotic Movement.
Subclan Militias	Clan-milias comprising pastoralists, warlord armed gangs, private security guards, armed youths, sharia court security forces.
Islamist Armed Groups	Islamist groups comprising Ras Kamboni Mujahidin, Jabhadda Islaamiga Soomaaliyeed, and the Khalid bin Walid group.

Source: Paul, C., Clarke, C., & Serena, C. 2014: P.157.

Primordialist Explanation

Primordialists argue that Somalia's civil war involved clannism and genealogical divisions among Somali clan families. Moreover, we heard from the media that there has been violent conflict in Somalia because clan X has clashed with clan Y. But the analytical question is why Somalia went into such a destructive civil war? Some scholars of Somalia have argued that the answer has its root in the nature of Somali clannism. As I. M. Lewis (1961) argues, it is presumed that ancient clan rivalries will result in conflict from time to time, as Somalis are inherently clannistic and therefore act in that manner. From this perspective, clannism has long been a social division generating resources, competition and power within and between Somali clan families.

I. M. Lewis (1961) claims that clannism is a part of the organic defining feature of Somali society and the Somali people have been clannistic and organized in clan groups hostile to each other. Said Samatar and David Laitin (1987) have come out with a similar argument and have supported Lewis's explanation about the correlation between the nature of the Somali* political life and the civil war in Somalia. However, the logic of this explanation is flawed and unable to offer a sufficient explanation of the Somali civil war. Conversely, clanship can be both unifying and divisive at the same time depending on how we use it. When the colonial powers have used clanship as a wedge to divide communities, it became a catastrophe, but when Somalis used it in the old way of kinship and families that share a lot of things together, it brought the Somali clan families together. In a positive way, clan in Somalia is a wonderful form of insurance. For example, if someone from Somalia arrives in any country in

Europe or Africa, he will find that his clan's brothers and sisters will look after him.

Although I. M. Lewis explained the Somali civil war through primordialist lens, he failed to account for the historic and linguistic differences among Somali clan families. As Kusow (1994: P. 31) pointed out "Historians, Anthropologists, and successive Somali governments alike have failed to recognize the cultural, socioeconomic, and the ecological differences among the people." In contrast to I. M Lewis's claim of ancient hatred and clan rivalry among Somali clans as responsible factors for the Somali calamities, Kusow points that the historical differences among Somali clans and how they have manipulated their history are the underlying causes of the Somali civil war. Kusow (1994: P. 42) argues that "the civil war in Somalia is a direct result of both the long-suppressed historical, cultural, and ecological differences among the Somali clan families and how they have used history."

However, these explanations offered by Kusow and Lewis are weak because the clan differences and ancient hatreds or clan rivalry themselves do not reflect the cause of serious conflicts in Africa in general and in specific to Somalia. In other words, the cause is not the clan identity or difference, but it is the way that clan-oriented political elites politicize these factors for the sake of their political gains, so the conflict arises not from the clan differences or ancient antagonism but from politicization clan identity instrumentalized for somebody's agenda by political elites. In this context, Somalia's civil war was in response to politicization of clan identity, deprivation of basic needs, state's repressive role and external linkages. Having many clan groups living together within a state does not necessary mean that there must be a civil war, though some research has suggested that in some cases, it makes political violence more likely, particularly if there are antagonistic social relations between different clans that might lead to hostility. This paper argues that the involvement of clan-oriented political elites who try to use clan identity or ethnicity as an instrumental means to mobilize, solidify their own positions of state power.

The Communal Content Factor in Somalia

Clan factor in Somalia has played a strong part in social, economic, and political interactions, and has acted both as a social cohesion and a cause of tribal war. (Ssereo, 2003). For a long time, Somalis have dominated each other using clanship as the basis for advancing their interest in their political system. Every Somali belongs to a particular tribe, clan, sub-clan and household or family. In this context, clan is a dividing force and at the same time is a uniting force. (Osman 2007). Each clan group is responsible for its members and, therefore,

the action of members will have an impact on the whole clan. In addition, belonging to a clan provides protection, access to water, land, and political power, as well as conflict resolution through traditional customary law. Stig J. Hansen, notes that clan groups in Somalia function as a support system for members, for example, during a drought, members rely on the clan for basic needs such as food security. (Hansen, S. J. 2003: P. 57). In addition, Catherine Besteman, points out that "clan membership also provides an identity within Somali society." (Besteman, Catherine 1993: P. 567).

Somali people as a nation share one language, one religion and common history, which makes them a unique ethnic group who inhabit a large area in the horn of Africa. Although Somali people belong to one ethnic group, they also belong to major clans such as: Daarod, Hawiye, Dir and Rahanweyn. Most Somalis belong to clans that are pastoralists and move constantly throughout the year in search of grazing land and water. (Abdullahi M. 2015: P. 2).

When it comes to thinking about the concept of clan in the Somali context, it has been characterized by two theoretical explanations, both of which will be examined below. The first explanation emphasizes clanship as the basic social foundation and the major and enduring code of the socio-political association of Somali society. From its perspective, the principle of clan structure has always been and remains the main determinant. I. M. Lewis introduced this theoretical explanation in the late 1950s, as he updated the structural functionalist approaches to social anthropology (Lewis 1961). As this modified structural-functionalist approach appears to have mostly survived in Somali studies, where I. M. Lewis half a millennium later is still defending it, I will name it the Lewisian approach. (Kapteijns 2004).

The second explanation holds that the Lewisian view over emphasises the importance of clan and that this overemphasis emerged in a very detailed historical context, namely, that of the late-colonial consensus between British rulers and Somali subjects documented by Lewis during his 1955–57 study. According to this second explanation, clanship is therefore not a fundamental and constant organizational and behavioral principle of Somali political life but a central principle of a particular and very influential way of thinking about Somali political life, a way of thinking with an extremely particular history and an evil influence in the present (Kapteijns 2004).

Most of the literature reviewed for this paper recognizes that, these major clan families indicated above, are believed to be family of Samaali. However, this paper argues that clans are not part of the problem, but when it gets politicized by clan-oriented political elites, it cultivates negative competition for

economic resources, zero-sum attitude, security dilemma and clan based civil strife, as we have seen in Somalia. In the past, clan identity has played a unifying role in Somali society. It was a source of solidarity among tribesmen, creating a system of mutual assistance for the solution of daily problems among a clan member. Each clan had its respected leaders and elders, who enjoyed their clan members' trust and were vested with the authority to resolve disputes. The elders were also the representatives of the clan in any dialogue with other clan leaders, and in case of inter-clan conflicts. The clan in Somalia's context was recognition of a person's identity and his genealogical lineage. It is an informal social institution in which actual or notional kinship is based on blood. Moreover, clan is an identity network consisting of an extensive web of horizontal and vertical kin-based relations. During the economic crises in the late 1980s, Siad Barre resorted to tribalistic techniques to maintain power. This method divided his enemies and logically intensified general awareness of clan membership. Siad Barre resorted to encouraging clan warfare in a number of ways - he organized raids; his troops armed the loyal clans and encouraged them to wage war against opposing clans. The harm caused by negative and destructive manipulation of clan identity was reflected in the incapability of the Somali people to rebound when Siad Barre was deprived from power in 1991. (Barbora Rýdlová 2007: P. 46).

Instrumentalist Explanation

Somalia's civil war has not resulted from genealogical divisions, ancient hatreds and clan rivalry among Somali clans, but these variables have been used by political elites to draw lines, to draw allegiance to create political power. Abdi Samatar and Ahmed Samatar are some of the leading scholars of Somalia, and both refused Lewis's explanation of the Somali civil war. That instead they looked at the civil war through instrumentalist lens.

Ahmed Samatar published several studies about the Somali civil war. Ahmed argued that, I. M. Lewis confused clanship relations with clannishness. (Ahmed Samatar 1988). Following Somalia's civil war, there have been many published books and articles which attempted to explain the reasons behind the civil war. The book by Ahmed Samatar and Terrence Lyons (1995: P. 100-104) argued that the underlying factors which are responsible for the Somali civil war are "the disintegration of political institutions and the resulting chaos and insecurity."

According to Abdi Samatar, the primordialist argument leads to the conclusion that Somalia's civil war is the nature of its culture, threaded in the clan system. Moreover, in the view of Abdi Samatar (1992: P. 629), the primordialist approach has four major failings: 1. it confuses kinship with

clannism. 2. It accepts the ideology of clannism as reality. 3. It gives excessive weight to the causal power of clannism. 4. It treats a clan as a static phenomenon. Menkhous (2003: P. 406) came out with a similar summary and noted that: The conventional wisdom on Somalia's crisis offers several explanations. They include charges 1. Somali leaders have been irresponsible and myopic in their quest for power and their stubborn refusal to compromise; 2 collective fear of the re-emergence of a predatory state undermines public support for peace-building; 3 the powerful centrifugal forces of Somali clansmen works against centralised authority, making quests to rebuild a Western-style state a fool's errand; neighbouring states such as Ethiopia conspire to perpetuate [the civil war] in Somalia for their own reasons; 4 external diplomacy has been consistently misinformed and incompetent in its mediation efforts.

The civil war in Somalia was widely caused by elite manipulation. As Abdi Samatar (1997: P. 688) argues that "The central actors responsible for the destruction of the Somali world order are the dominant elites." Accordingly, these dominant elites have been using clannishness as a tool of exploitation to advance their political interests.

Abdi Samatar blames the state elites for the destruction of the Somali world order for two reasons: First, the ruled elites had never tried to rationalize public sector management through what he called "the reinvention of the civil service commission." Secondly, President Siad Barre, who was the leader of the ruled elites, was the only decision maker of all vital decisions in public management. Furthermore, Abdi Samatar (1997: P. 705) argued that "...The Somali nightmare is not the result of genealogical divisions among the population but of the narrow accumulation strategies of the elites."

Similarly, Menkhaus (2003: P. 414) claims that "Somalia's crisis of state collapse, armed conflict, and lawlessness has endured because that is the outcome key players seek." According to him, these key players are warlords, businessmen, politicians or what he called "white colors." In addition, these elites or key players had power to obstruct any local efforts to impose the rule of law and revive the collapse of the central state. They were able to do through what Menkhuas has termed a "clever manipulation of clannism." However, this explanation failed to give much attention to the role played by the following factors: Politicization of clan identity, deprivation of basic needs, state's repressive role and external linkages.

By contrast, some scholars of Somalia have explained the Somali civil war in terms of inequality and economic factors. According to these scholars, the Somali civil war was a product of three interrelated problems: Inequality,

economic decline, and availability of weapons. (Osman A. A. 2007; Elmi and Barise 2006). It has also been viewed that; these explanatory aspects are the product of the colonial legacy. However, the analytic question is how did the weapons become available to the public?

According to Osman, weapons became available because when the war between Somalia and Ethiopia ended in 1978, the country's economy begun to deteriorate; as a result of this, the weapons became more accessible to the general public. This explanation fails to explain why the civil war broke out. Elmi and Barise (2006), argue that the Somali civil war was a result of resource competition or state power, the long-term brutality of the Siad Barre's military regime and the colonial legacy. Accordingly, the most important motivational factor which explains the Somali conflict is the competition for resources. This argument often refers to the Somali's pastoral life; the nomadic clans have always fought each other over grazing, water and livestock long before the country got independence. Conflicts among Somali clan families were relatively low until when they were notable in the pastoral life, where competition for grazing and water has resulted in violence and antagonism. However, Elmi and Barise have failed to address why masses or ordinary people armed up against the regime.

Elmi and Barise, have also argued that state repression by the military regime is the second cause of the Somali conflict. However, they failed to give a detailed description of how state repression led to the Somali civil war. According to the Theory of State Repression, the state's existence depends on nations giving their legitimacy. Therefore, repression is one of the instrumental means that the regime used to protect itself from political challenges. It should be noted that if one wants to understand the destruction of the Somali world order, one should explain it from the economic perspective rather than the cultural or sociological perspective. Mubarak (1996) argues that the regime's financial strategy; its reactions to the economic crisis in the late 1980s, has been harmful to national development. As a result, the country's economy and the political condition have deteriorated which in turn led to a civil war.

Similarly, in his study "Empty Bowl: Agrarian Political Economy in Transition and the Crises of Accumulation," Abdi Samatar is the scholar that wrote in detail the economic forces that led to the failure of the state under Siad Barre rule. His conclusion includes the under accumulation of capital as well as the predatory state that was kept in power as a result of international military and economic development aid. ((Kapteijns 2008: P. 28). With the end of the Cold War, economic support reduced and the state collapsed. As Samatar noted that, unlike Botswana's hegemonic class, the Somali petty bourgeoisie was not

united. Nor did it have disciplined leaderships who recognized the importance of bureaucratization in conjunction with systemic accumulation and the protection of the collective project. The disunity of the governing elite and the weakness and passivity of the rural population created such unstable and political weakness. This repressive state under Siad Barre rule was depended on and boosted by international supports. (Kapteijns 2008: P. 29).

In the language of realist, clan does not have any causal power and its effects on the Somalis political life are conditional rather than essential. As Abdi Samatar (1992: P. 631) argues, the search for the responsible factors in the outbreak of Somalia's civil war must begin by tracing the nature of the changes that had taken place in the social order rather than genealogical orders of the Somali society.

However, despite all these economic factors indicated above, Osman, Mubarak and Samatar failed to explain why the civil war broke out in 1991, but not during the economic crisis of the early 1980s. The civil war in Somalia has multiple causal forces and it has been drawn from political science, economics, anthropology, theology and more. As Samuel M. Makinda (1991: P. 118) argued that: The civil war has stemmed from a combination of various factors, including clan rivalries and differences, nepotism, corruption in high places, the uneven distribution of national resources and, above all, President Barre's dictatorial rule.

Somalia has been a stadium of clan warfare and experienced a catastrophic condition which ultimately led into disastrous and anarchy. Abdi Dirshe (2013) claims the conflict in Somalia has primarily resulted from the "colonial institutional legacy" and the presence of "neoliberal economic agenda." However, this explanation fails to account the role played by other factors such as politicized clan identity, deterioration of basic needs, state's repressive role, and external linkages.

The state under Siad Barre rule was authoritarian, and during his reign it was characterized by politicized clanistic policy, and clan manipulation, causing deterioration of basic needs, repression. Consequently, several clan rebel organizations armed up against this dictatorial regime. Thus, some scholars think that the outbreak of the civil war primarily resulted from the Barre's dictatorial leadership. (Paul, C., Clarke, C., & Serena, C. 2014; Samuel M. Makinda 1991). The Somali people were living under their own indigenous political system called Somali traditional system before the colonial powers came into Somali lands and introduced modern political system. When the colonial powers came into Somali lands, they destroyed the traditional system and substituted it into

the modern administration which was totally incompatible with the local cultural realities. This transformation has created a confusion and frustration among the Somali clan families. As a result, the country entered a protracted civil war.

In addition, the civil war resulted from the climax of a process which had started with the country's declaration of independence in 1960. As Ssereo (2003) argues. the Westphalia model of the state which Somali has adapted after independence, the process of state building and modernization of Somalia are the underlying causes of the Somali civil war. Accordingly, if we want to understand Somalia's political crisis, we need to look back at the process of decolonization and the formation of the first and second republic of Somalia.

To sum up, this paper argues the Somali civil war needs to be understood as mainly political. Therefore, the paper does not stand on the position of the classical clan readings and instrumentalism but stands on the middle. In other words, it will use some elements from the Primordialism and Instrumentalism to come up with a combined explanation of the Somali civil war.

Instead of siding with either of these two dominant schools of thought, the paper argues that Somalia's civil war was a result of a combination of inter-related factors: Politicization of clan identity, deprivation of basic needs, state's depressive role and international linkages. These inter-related factors are summarized in table 3. These causal factors not only caused Somalis against the Siad Barre regime but also Somalis against Somalis, which latter ended in civil war.

Table 3: The Causal Forces of Somalia's Civil War

Preconditions	Correlates
Clan	Politicization
Human needs	Deprivation of basic need
State's role	Scales of political repressions
International linkages	Military aid

Many scholars of Somalia have been putting much effort on the explanation of the civil war in Somalia by focusing on the genesis but overlooked these explanatory variables of the civil war. However, chapter three will analyze these overlooked explanatory aspects of Somalia's civil war and aimed to fill the analytical gap by finding out the missing literature on the Somali civil war.

Theoretical Analysis

This paper analyzes Edward Azar's Theory of Protracted Social Conflict for Somalia's civil war case. The civil war can be explained by the help of what Edward Azar observed as "preconditions of protracted social conflict." According to Edward Azar's PSC Theory, these preconditions are deprivation of basic needs, the bad governance and state's repressive role and international Linkages. Thus, the main theoretical concepts used in this chapter will derive from the Edward Azar's preconditions of the protracted social conflict.

Table 4: Preconditions for Pscs

Preconditions for PSCs	Correlates
Communal content	Degree of ethnic heterogeneity
Needs	Levels of human development
Governance	Scales of political repression
International Linkage	Volume of arms imports, economic aid, etc.

Source: Internal Analysis

In his book, The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases, Edward Azar defines protracted social conflict as "prolonged and often violent struggle by communal groups for such basic needs as security, recognition and acceptance, fair access to political institutions and economic participation." It generally understands that the hostile interaction between different clans resulted from a deep-seated ancient hatred that persisted over time with killing each other over water, land and grass.

The Protracted Social Conflict Theory is selected because of its uniqu form of social conflict. It recognizes the fundamental contributing variables of the Somali civil war. In addition, the civil war case in Somalia is a good example to understand the nature of violent conflict in the theory of protracted social conflict. Put it another way, some variables in the Somali civil war are vital to understand the conceptual preconditions of protracted social conflict. While there have been many efforts to develop theoretical explanations of the Somali civil war, no work has been done to explain it through Edward Azar's Theory of Protracted Social Conflict. Thus, this paper strives to find out the self-explanatory forces of the Somali civil war, a better understanding of underlying causes of the civil war.

It must be noted that, this chapter does not concern about the reasons behind the longevity of the Somali conflict rather it analyzes the nature of the Somali civil war. In doing so, the paper strives to answer one of the fundamental

questions about the genesis of the Somali civil war. How does politicized clan identity factor explain the Somali civil war? In answer to this question, the paper adopts Edward Azar's Theory of Protracted Social Conflict which explains the genesis of the Somali civil war.

Deprivation of Basic Needs

PSC Theory views deprivation of basic needs as a subjective characteristic that occurs when a [clan] does not receive what they think they have the right to receive. This leads to frustration that motivates political violence. This happened in the case of clan-based political organizations during the reign of President Siad Barre; as a result, grieved clan rebel organizations with frustration over basic needs were armed up against his dictatorial regime.

In early 1991, the military regime ended, and Somalia entered a protracted civil war. Some scholars argue that the civil war resulted from a combination of several factors-domestic and external. At the domestic level, many years of continued frustration over basic needs led to social unrest. In the 1980s, the underlying problems in Somalia were food shortage together with state's repression, lack of acceptance, security and fair access to political and economic institutions. In short, it is the deprivation of people's needs.

According to Thomas and Mazrui (1992), people tend to arm up themselves when their rights are violated, and their basic needs are not fulfilled by the government. Such unfulfilled basic needs were experienced by Somalia in the late 1980s. In his memoir, The Road to Zero, Mohamed Osman Omar, who served under the regime in various ambassadorial posts, provided his reflections on the deprivation of basic needs in Somalia: While the masses were suffering greatly, the ruling elite and the members of the upper stratum of the population were leading an extravagant, luxurious life. They had everything in abundance. Water and diesel were scarce commodities for the common man, but the tanks of the rich were always full. The women in high society competed to acquire the newest model of car to add to the collection in their garages. Possession of a Landcruiser was a special status symbol for those families who were members of the ruling clan. It is well-known that ...Siad Barre played one clan against the other to rule overall. Regime's repression against its people disrupted food production and distribution. Between 1980 and 1989, food shortages appeared, and local food prices doubled. Moreover, in the late 1989, hundreds of Somalis were at risk of malnutrition and starvation. By 1990s, the situation had become hopeless, and Somalis were suffering.

It can be argued that the regime under President Siad Barre developed a state-centric security rather than a human centric-security policy and led the country into deprivation of human needs. Frustration over basic needs often breeds social unrest which led to a civil war. As Edward Azar (1990: P. 9) stated that "Grievances resulting from need deprivation are usually expressed collectively; failure to redress these grievances by the State cultivates a niche for social conflict."

According to PSC Theory, access to political and social institutions are the key determinant factors for satisfying a clan group's needs. Furthermore, it claims "Such denial fosters greater cohesion within victimized communal groups and may work to promote collective violence…if no other means of satisfaction is available." (E. Azar 1990: P. 9-10). If these basic needs are denied by the state or the ruling clan, then these become collective grievances for future civil war. Consider the example of Somalia in the 1980s and in the late 1990s, the majority clans in the country were denied access to political institutions based on their clan identities.

Somalia was created out of the colonial nightmare, however in most cases the country is not positioned to supply the basic needs. This is primarily what we saw in Somalia before the civil war in 1991. Moreover, one of the reasons for the escalations of the armed clan-backed opposition groups against the military regime in post-ogaden war was frustration over basic needs coupled with insecurity and injustice. As Ssereo (2003: P. 28) noted that:

Children could not go to school because education was not free; the sick could not be cared for sufficiently because there were no facilities; populations from famine affected areas could not be fed because there was not enough food in spite of the provisions made by international humanitarian [organizations]; ...social and political aspirations could not be achieved because the political framework was not democratic. President Siad Bare was an illegal dictator and his military forces committed atrocities in Somalia, they slaughtered hundreds of innocent people and therefore, the country's economy deteriorated and Somalis, particularly the young people suffered. As Samuel M. Makinda (1991: P. 118) noted that "[the civil war] has also maimed the young and able-bodied persons and thereby denied the society some potential labour."

State's Repressive Role

According to PSC Theory, political authority is usually controlled by a hegemonic clan group or a dominant clan. These hegemonic clan groups or dominant clan limited access to social institutions by other [clans]… created crisis of legitimacy. (E. Azar 1990: P. 10). Nevertheless, this variable is related to the role played by the state in the game of bad governance and repression. Edward Azar argues that "Most states which experience protracted social conflict tend to be characterized by incompetent, parochial, fragile and authoritarian government that fails to satisfy basic human needs." (E. Azar 1990: P. 11).

Between 1969 and 1990s, Somalia was ruled by an authoritarian government characterized by incompetent leadership, clannistic in nature and fragile. As the following statement by Ingiriis (2016: P. 2) indicated that: Siad Barre's seizure of power followed by an 'absolutist authoritarian rule'–led the unified Somali State–as we knew it–to a state of statelessness. ...The [regime] was preoccupied from the beginning with promulgating draconian legislations to impose new authoritarian rules and regulations.

The authority relied on coercion rather than on fair competition between the various non-state forces, in other words, the various clans found within society. The regime weakened in the late 1980s, as the external linkage with Russia ended due to the diplomatic controversy. As a result of this, the regime was prone to a civil war. In addition to repression, the Presidential armed guards of the regime continued to harass the people, indulging in criminal acts of robbery and killing of civilians. Mass violence gradually engulfed the entire country (Ingiriis 2016).

President Siad Barre established a governance system which was based on clan-patronage and connections. This system led to the spread of corruption and bribery in the public offices. As Ingiriis (2016) observed that through a combination of corrupt practices and exhortation, the only people who had big money in those days turned out to be President Siad Barre's clan-oriented politicians.

Similarly, I M Lewis observed the repressive role of Siad Barre's regime, and its growing reliance on hard power rather than soft. In addition, all means of communications in the country were under President Siad Barre's clansmen, the oppressed clans began to resist. In this context, repressive and discrimination was severely institutionalized. (Ingiriis, 2016). The state under President Siad Barre rule used discriminate killing, burning of villages and torture as an

instrument of control. (Elmi & Barise 2006: P. 33). When the military regime took power in 1969, it made the situation worse.

The military regime's political and economic discrimination against its own people had been a regular incidet since the early post-independence years and rose to clan-related state terrorism against the northern clans. Also, in terms of distribution of development aid and state investment, the oppressed clans, particularly the Hawiye and Isaaq clans felt extremely neglected. State spending on infrastructure was lower than those in colonial times. In 1986, when the government was under Siad Barre rule, economic policies became clannish, the attacks were directed against both northern and southern clans who dominated the two major centers of private trade. As the state provided security mainly to those clans who were part of the government, it was mainly these named clans who were victims of Siad Barre exclusivist policy. (Barbora Rýdlová 2007: P. 47).

According to Elmi and Barise, state repression was the second major factor which explains the Somali civil war. Accordingly, in 1978, when some military officers attempted to oust the regime, the military regime used the national army forces to penalize civilian members of the eastern clan. The Military regime subsequently was involved in the killing of civilians and committed atrocities against its own people. (Elmi and Barise 2006: P. 35).

International Linkages

The fourth variable is the complicated external linkages. Edward Azar (1990: P. 11) stated that "The role of the state in preventing Protracted Social Conflict by… Satisfying basic needs is not determined solely by endogenous factors." He added that "the role of the state authority is greatly influenced by the linkage of the international actors." The economic and military relations of Somalia with international powers, namely Russia and United States of America, explained as one of the self-explanatory factors for the Somali civil war.

Russia sponsored economic and military aid to Somalia which in turn made the regime more dependent on external powers for survival. There is a Somali proverb which draws the Siad Barre regime's linkage with external actors, "Either be a mountain or have a mountain to lean on." Obviously, "Russia was the mountain for the regime to lean on for its survival." (Ingiriis 2016: P. 169). When Siad Barre came to power in 1969 through military coup, he cut off political relations with USA, and took steps to strengthen relations with Russia. Since the coup, there has been a patron-client relationship between Somalia and Russia. This relation deepened in late 1974, when Somalia signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Russia. As a result, Russia provided massive

military aid to its new comrade Somalia. As Ingiriis (2016: P. 85) pointed out that: The Soviet Union sent massive arsenal and hardware as military assistance to the military regime, providing 150 T-35 and 100 T-54 tanks, fitted with 105mm guns, 50 MiG 16 (later added MiG 16 and 21) fighter jets, 200 coastal batteries, Il-28 bombers, 300 armed carriers and SA-2 ground-to-air missiles. The military aid increased each subsequent year and cemented a strong client-patron relationship to such an extent that Somalia was supposed to be ever dependent on the Soviet Union for generations to come.

In the late 1980s, Somalia secured United State support. Hence, US gave substantial economic assistance but gave it little military aid. Similarly, Italy, a former colonial power was the only European country that has consistently maintained strong relations with Somalia. However, an important point of the international linkages in Somalia is when the relationship between Somalia and Russia became weak. As a result, the country was both economically and militarily ruined. Put it another way, there was a chance for clan rebellion movements to arms up against the regime. I. M. Lewis (1988: P. 260) observed that "Following the Ogaden war, as we have seen Somalia's primarily arms dependence on [Russia] had been replaced by more generalised aid dependence on the United States, the EEC and OPEC countries."

To sum up, military aid mainly from the sources named have played a key role as self-explanatory aspects on the demise of the Siad Barre's legitimacy rule and the civil war. Moreover, global political dynamics such as the cold war between USA and Russia had their impact on political developments in Somalia as the weak state was given means to secure its existence (Barbora Rýdlová 2007: P. 78).

Politicized Clans in Communal Content

In his book, The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases, Edward Azar identified basic variables as preconditions for the protracted social conflict. Politicized clan identity in multi-communal society, this paper considers as the most critical factor in Africa's civil wars. This supported Edward Azar's assertion "If a society characterized by multi-communal composition… conflict is most likely to arise." (Edward Azar 1990: 7).

According to PSC Theory, the state is usually dominated by a single clan or a coalition of few clans that are unresponsive to the needs of the other clans in the society [clan-based civil war]. Accordingly, people in the multi-communal countries give primarily loyalty to their clan identities rather than to the whole nation living in the country. Politicized clan group in the communal content

means “A generic reference” to politicized clan identity group whose members share a common ancestor, religion, linguistic and other cultural features. However, the core problem comes when the relationship between the state and clan groups become distrustful, in other words, what Edward Azar called “the articulation between the states and society as a whole.” As Edward Azar (E. Azar 1990: 7) stated that: Multi-communal societies are characterized by disarticulation between the state and society, with the state usually dominated by a single communal group or a coalition of a few communal groups that are unresponsive to the needs of other clan groups.

Somalia has experienced twenty-one-years history of dictatorial leadership, clan favoritism and clan dominance rule during the reign of President Siad Barre (1969-1990). It resulted from when Marehan (President Siad Barre’s clan) became the only clan that was able to steer the wheel of the state resources and power for their favour at the expense of other clan groups. (Ingiriis 2016). In addition, politicization of clan identity was fed into Said Barre’s regime politics and became even more dangerous. As a result, clan-based political affiliations along with politicized clan lines armed up against Siad Barre’s dictatorial regime. The ruling clans, known by the code-name MOD (Marehan, Ogaden and Dulbahante) controlled the key executive positions and the security forces, which in turn cultivated anger and grievances among oppressed clans and have fuelled a clan warfare that persisted until 2006. Somalia is a country characterized by a multi-clan composition. The identity profile of the country is complex. According to data in the World Factbook, the main ethnic divisions are: “Somali 85%, Bantu and other non-Somali 15% (including 30,000 Arabs).” (World Factbook 2018). The country also has genealogical divisions with a deep historical root that goes back pre-colonial era. Pre-colonial Somali society was divided into several autonomous clan groups that shared similar cultural traditions. Nevertheless, this paper recognizes that clan identity groups in the communal content are crucial factor shaping the Somali society, however, it argues that clan identity is not necessarily the cause of the Somali problem in general and particular in the outbreak of the Somali civil war.

Conclusion

The paper aimed to explain the underlying causes of the Somali civil war. The Paper analyzed the civil war with the help of Edward Azar’s theoretical framework of “Protracted Social Conflict.” The genesis of the civil war in Somalia was explored theoretically, based on a qualitative analysis of the literature review. The paper argued that clan itself or genealogical divisions of the Somali clan families were not responsible for Somalia’s civil war, it was the

politicization of clan identity, deprivation of basic needs, state's repressive role and external linkages.

Primordialists claimed that the Somali civil war involved clan rivalry and genealogical divisions among Somali clan families. Instrumentalists, on the other hand, argued that the civil war in Somalia did not result from genealogical divisions and ancient hatred or clan rivalry among Somali clans, but these variables have been used by political elites to draw lines, to draw allegiance in order to create political power. However, this paper argued that both explanations have failed to capture the role played by the politicized clan identity.

Having examined the role played by the politicized clan identity, findings showed that when clan identity gets politicized or put it in the context of struggle over state power, it produces clan-based civil war or political violence. Moreover, based on the examination of the politicization of clan identity in the Somali civil war, it was found that clan identity was deployed as a political resource in relation to social development, particularly used as an instrumental means of mobilization to fight for state power. It was also revealed that the state under Siad Barre rule is usually dominated by a single clan or a coalition of few clans that are unresponsive to the needs of the other clans in the society, which later cultivated clan-based civil strife.

Based on these theoretical reviews, the paper used the preconditions of the protracted social conflict as a means to identify the explanatory aspects of the civil war. According to the PSC Theory: Deprivation of basic needs, state's repressive role and international linkages suggested that these factors are the necessary underlying causes, proven to be sufficient conditions for Somalia's civil war.

Ultimately, the author of this paper admits that this research study does not cover every issue and aspects of Somalia's civil war; however, it suggests further field research on this topic from a broader perspective which investigates the role of politicization of communal content, deprivation of basic needs and external linkages on the Somali conflict in general. More importantly, further research would help to understand how politicization of clanship can explain both Somalia's protracted conflict and other social conflicts in Africa.

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The Role of ATMIS in Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation in Somalia

Dr. Mohamed Ghedi Jumale

Abstract

Conflict in Somalia has evolved from a civil war in the 1980s, through the breakdown of the state, clan factionalism, and feuding in the 1990s, and into a globalized ideological warfare in the current decade. A protracted civil conflict has been raging in Somalia for the better part of the past three decades. The purpose of this study was to gain an understanding of the function that ATMIS plays in the resolution and reconciliation of Somalia conflict. The study adopted desk research methodology. The analysis was conducted using John Paul Lederaches' reconciliation approaches and the results were based on secondary data taken from the literature. The primary findings suggested that Somalia has only implemented one level of the reconciliation process. While the top-down approach has contributed to a worsening of the conflict, the bottom-up approach that is currently understood by ATMIS is helping to promote national reconciliation in the country. According to the findings of the study, there are two primary factors that contribute to the failure of reconciliation efforts in Somalia. Firstly, the Somali protracted conflict would not have persisted if, for example, ATMIS and the international community had learned from the successful pragmatic reconciliations that had taken place in Somaliland and Puntland. And finally, the function of ATMIS should include women, youth and clan leaders in the reconciliation efforts to build the Somali state.

Keywords: *Somalia, Reconciliation, Top–Down, Bottom –Up, Peace building, State-Building.*

Introduction

The conflict in Somalia has evolved from a civil war in the 1980s, through the breakdown of the state, clan factionalism, and feuding in the 1990s, and into a globalized ideological warfare in the current decade. A protracted civil conflict has been raging in Somalia for the better part of the past three decades. For example, in 2022, the forces of the Somali National Alliance (SNA), in conjunction with the Macwisley militia, were the most active protagonists in the fight against Al Shabaab (AS) (Marry harper,2022)132. In spite of this, the total number of SNA operations dropped by a sizeable margin between 2021 and 2022, going from 59 operations in 2021 to only 39 operations in 2022. The frequency of American airstrikes did not change significantly from 2021 to 2022, with the exception of a little increase in the third quarter of 2022. ATMIS did not conduct any large-scale offensive operations against AS, with the exception of one instance in November, when the Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) targeted AS fighters in their hiding place on the fringes of Badhaadhe district in the Lower Juba region.

The Somalia conflict was triggered by a number of circumstances, including political, economic, and land conflicts between diverse parties, beginning with clans vying for control in order to better manage the few resources available in the country.[133] Clan-based conflict tore the nation apart, as clans battled for control of both rural and urban resources while plundering the state's remnants. An estimated 25,000 people were killed during four months of combat in Mogadishu alone in 1991 and 1992, 1.5 million people fled the nation, and at least 2 million people were internally displaced. The protracted battle in Somalia harmed the social cohesiveness and unity of the Somali people, and it led to the demise of the Somali state.[134]

Due to its deep historical roots and extreme complexity, the Somali conflict calls for a comprehensive approach to conflict resolution in order to establish a lasting peace. As a result, this article tries to describe the state-building initiatives that have been undertaken by AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) to find the best strategies and practices for promoting peace in Somalia.[135]

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The AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) is a new mission that replaced The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). AMISOM supported Somalia's government in state building through the fight against Al-Shabaab and other responsibilities meant to bring peace and stability for the past 15 years. ATMIS will continue to operate until the end of 2023. Over 18,000 soldiers, 1,000 police, and 70 civilians make up ATMIS' capacity, and the majority of its mandate is the same as that of its predecessor.[136]

Historical Context of the Conflict

A mixture of internal and foreign circumstances led to the demise of the Somali state as the conflict evolved from a civil war in the 1980s and into a globalized ideological warfare in the current decade.[137] The disintegration reached its peak in 1988 when the Somali National Movement (SNM) raided military

bases in Burco and Hargeisa, escalating the insurgency into a fully-fledged civil war. The government responded by attacking the Isaaq tribe resulting into the death of about 50,000 people and 650,000 people were forced to flee to Ethiopia and Djibouti. Foreign aid that had supported Somalia was cut off as its strategic significance to the West decreased. President Barre lost control of the nation and the army because he lacked the resources to keep the system of patronage politics in place. He was driven out of Mogadishu in January 1991 by United Somali Congress (USC) forces, who were helped by the Hawiye clans in south-central Somalia.

The Djibouti government's futile efforts to mediate a compromise in June and July 1991 represented the first attempt to save Somalia. Only in early 1992, when a truce was established between the two main combatants in Mogadishu, General Mohamed Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi Mohamed, did UN diplomatic engagement start. To stop the violence and deal with the famine, the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), a limited UN peacekeeping deployment, was established. The mission, however, was unable to disarm factions or broker a cessation of hostilities. Furthermore, the Addis Ababa peace conference in 1993 and the Kenya peace conference in 1994, both organized by the UN, failed to spark a national process of reconciliation and state restoration.[138]

[136] https://atmis-au.org/
[137] contributing variables. The Journal of social studies. 04
[138] Ibid

As Western countries withdrew from Somalia, regional states like Ethiopia stepped up to the diplomatic plate. For its part, Djibouti played a pivotal role by initiating the 'Arta process,' which resulted in the formation of a Transitional National Government (TNG) with widespread popular and international backing. However, this state –building effort was shuttered with the rise of Islamist movements that aimed to transform Somalia into an Islamic state inspired by Salafism and Wahhabism, as well as more conservative sufi orders. In 2006, with the help of other clan militia, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) drove a coalition of warlords out of Mogadishu that had been supported by the international community.

In December 2006, Ethiopian forces entered Somalia with the tacit support of Western nations. They installed the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Mogadishu after driving out the ICU. As a result, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1744 of 2007 authorized the deployment of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in early 2007 to safeguard the Transitional Federal Government.

The AU PSC Communique of 2007 instructed AMISOM, in its paragraph 8 among other things to:

"(i) provide support to the TFIs in their efforts towards the stabilisation of the situation in the country and the furtherance of dialogue and reconciliation, (ii) facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance, and (iii) create conducive conditions for long-term stabilisation, reconstruction and development in Somalia'

Although AMISOM's mandate has changed over the years, it has always included the following core responsibilities: protecting federal institutions and assisting them in performing their government functions; encouraging dialogue and reconciliation; safeguarding civilians, critical infrastructure, and sensitive sites; facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid; and supporting stabilization efforts.[139]

AMISOM operations have three key characteristics of conflict dynamics: They involve conflicts for power, politics centered on individuals' identities, and the political economics of organized violence. With the collapse of the central government of Somalia in 1991, there has been a string of clearly political

[139] Williams, Paul. (2013). The African Union Mission in Somalia and Civilian Protection Challenges. Stability: International Journal of Security and Development. 2. 10.5334/sta.bz

power struggles to reconstitute state and regional institutions and, more importantly, to control them. These efforts have been going on ever since. From the early 2000s, with a considerable increase in the number of external resources that were flowing into Somalia's state-building project, this aspect of the conflict has become significantly more intense. In the region where AMISOM is active, political power conflicts have mostly centered on the acquisition of control of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and, later, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS). By the latter half of 2012, these fights for dominance have spread to include the newly formed regional administrations or federal member states (FMS).[140]

Identity politics or, to put it more broadly, the sociocultural facets of Somali society are a second aspect of armed conflict.[141] As a provider of security, justice, and employment, this is frequently most directly related to clan dynamics and conflicts over relative authority and influence among Somalia's numerous clans, and sub-clans. But the issue of who is included or excluded from particular groups is also a part of identity politics. For all parties aiming to create constituencies that cross numerous clan identities, the question of who is allowed to speak authentically about interpreting religious beliefs or ideas of local justice is particularly important.

The politics and economics of violence is the focus of a third important part of the problem. In the south- central region of Somalia, many different types of organized violence have regularly displayed an intimate relationship with economic issues. These issues include the trading of khat, charcoal, and sugar; taxation, extortion, and the privatization of security; and the struggle to control key commercial hubs such as seaports, airports, and roadways. There was a lack of efficient state governance in Somalia, which led to the emergence of a large number of armed players who relied on various forms of coercion and violence in order to make money.[142]

[140] Ibid

[141] Bussey, Marcus & Farah, Osman & Randhir, Mr & Gautam, Kumar & Paul, Abhijeet & Farah, Osman & Eno, Mohamed. (2022). Theorizing Somali Society: Hope, Transformation and Development.

[142] Ibid

State-Building Efforts

State-building is one of the most important aspects for a country that has been torn apart by conflict. [143] This is because it establishes and fortifies the institutions that are required to sustain long-term economic, social, and political progress. In order to accomplish this goal, peace must come first. In the context of Somalia, initiatives for peace building have been initiated as a prerequisite and an important component to reconstruct the country and dissuade the country from returning to the conflict that paralyzed the country's political stability and development growth. As a consequence of this, activities aimed at resolving conflicts and fostering reconciliation are essential components required for the reconstruction of Somalia. The process of conflict reconciliation helps in the healing of the grievances and wounds of the victims, the perpetrators, and the civil war rivalries. It also establishes mechanisms to ensure the coherence and coexistence of the community, which is built through a conciliation process of factual and just elements.[144]

Since its deployment in March 2007, AMISOM can be credited with the following main achievements.14 First, AMISOM was vital in protecting the transitional Government and the ensuing Somali Federal Governments. South central Somalia was in the midst of many entities and warlords laying claim to different areas of the country. Hence, there was a great deal of conflict in this region. Mogadishu has been rocked by recurrent outbreaks of violence, which have resulted in the deaths of a large number of civilians and the relocation of others. In point of fact, the majority of the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFI), such as the Transitional Federal Parliament, was located in Baidoa town around 80 kilometers to the west of Mogadishu. As a result of these factors, therefore, some of the most visible, stabilizing, and far- reaching achievements of AMISOM was the recapture of various swathes of territory that had previously been under the control of Al-Shabaab (AS) and various other Armed Opposition Groups (AOGs), as well as the expansion of territorial space in which the Government and its Institutions could project their authority, continue dialogue and reconciliation efforts, and carry out their functions as government. [145]

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[143] Menocal, Alina. (2010). State-Building for Peace - A New Paradigm For International Engagement In Post- Conflict Fragile States? European University Institute (EUI), Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies (RSCAS), EUI-RSCAS Working Papers. 32. 10.2307/41341196.

[144] Ibid

[145] Madeira, Francisco (2022). Exit of AMISOM: Consolidating Gains and Charting New Trajectories in the African Union Presence in Somalia.Relief Web. https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/exit-amisom-consolidating-gains-and- charting-new-trajectories-african-union-presence

Second, AMISOM degraded Al Shabab and pushed the bulk of its forces from Mogadishu and from all other liberated areas across the sectors. AMISOM began the process of capturing cities and towns then under the control of Al Shabaab. The following major offensive operations were undertaken: Panua Eneo (2011); Free Shabelle, Eagles (March 2014), Indian Ocean (November 2014), Ocean Build (Nov 2014- July 2015), Juba Corridor (July 2015), Badbaado 1a and 1b (2018-2019). These operations led to the recovery of vast majority of towns and cities in Somalia, allowing governance, economic, social, and political activities to thrive in the country.[146]

AMISOM has played critical roles in a number of political, reconciliation, and state-building processes, culminating in the formation of new Federal Member States (FMS) in Galmudug, Hirshabelle, South- West, and Jubaland, as well as the establishment of the Banadir Regional Administration in Mogadishu. AMISOM has also provided institutional capacity building activities, gender mainstreaming, protection issues, and guidance on International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law to relevant line ministries. AMISOM's activities in this area have strengthened Somalia's drive toward state building and federalism, as well as bringing democratic dividends that are more tangible at the grassroots level. [147]

Third, AMISOM assisted in the process of establishing south-central Somalia's new Regional Administrations by providing transportation for attendees and security at many conferences: Jubaland (2013), South West (2014), Galmudug (2015), and Hirshabelle (2016). Without such regional organizations, Somalia would be unable to create a federal system of government.

Finally, throughout the years 2012, 2016–2017, and 2022, AMISOM played a critical part in ensuring the smooth running of two election processes that led to the formation of new federal governments. Last but not least, throughout the entirety of its mission in Somalia, AMISOM has been responsible for laying the foundation of security that has allowed the majority of the international diplomatic and humanitarian communities to conduct their operations out of Mogadishu and elsewhere in south-central Somalia. It is

[146] Lusiola, Albert. (2021). Key Challenges Facing AMISOM in Military Diplomacy in the Horn of Africa. African Journal of Empirical Research. 2. 54-67. 10.51867/ajer. v2i2.22.
[147] Ibid

exceedingly doubtful, with very few exceptions, that the various new or resurrected embassies would have been created without the security that AMISOM provides. In the same vein, AMISOM ensured the safety of hundreds of visits by different VIPs, which allowed for greater attention to be paid to Somalia in a number of different international forums.[148]

Analysis of Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation in Somalia

Top-Down Approach

Using a top-down strategy, AMISOM pursued a Disarmament, Demobilization, and Re-integration (DDR) approach to state building as a process that creates greater stability and reduces security threats. [149] The DDR seeks to dismantle the army, camps, and weapons of opposing factions in order to build up society' capacity for violence prevention. There are three steps in the DDR procedure. The first two stages are intended to address serious security risks, while the third stage focuses on peace building and attempts to reduce militants' motivation to engage in combat. In the first stage, known as disarmament, weapons are taken away from formerly hostile groups, stored in secure locations, and subsequently destroyed. Another procedure that disbands various armed groups closes militant camps, and separates ex combatants from militant groups is demobilization.

Reintegration is the last step, where soldiers try to go back to their old homes or new places. To return to their prior life and reintegrate into the community, the militants receive jobs, trauma healing, psychological counseling, and education throughout this period. A third party facilitates the process of reconciliation, which involves altering the dynamics of the connection that exists between those who have been wronged and those who have committed the wrongdoing in order to pave the way for a more harmonious and shared future.[150] In the context of Somalia, the AMIOSM Mission was not successful in transforming the relationship between victims and their perpetrators, facilitating the healing of trauma, or building confidence between the various clans, all of which would have played an essential part in the process of peace building in Somalia.

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[148] Ibid

[149] Ekpootu, Mfon. (2018). Women in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Programs in the Horn of Africa: Northern Uganda and Somalia in Review. The HORN Bulletin, Volume I; Issue IV.

[150] Doyle, Michael & Peterson, Kris. (2005). Re-Entry and Reintegration: Returning Home after Combat. The Psychiatric quarterly. 76. 361-70. 10.1007/s11126-005-4972-z.

Furthermore, fourteen national reconciliation conferences held with the objective of reinstating a central authority in Somalia by international actors were unsuccessful in accomplishing this goal. The most direct cause of this was the fact that the warlords and faction leaders who had signed the peace treaty and committed to work together to build a national government did not keep the commitments they had made to one another very often. The primary reason for these warlords' inability to keep their commitments was that they did not trust one another. Moreover, they dreaded the prospect of being sidelined in the national government, which would have resulted in a reduction in both their economic and political influence.

All of these efforts took a top-down approach to peacemaking, involving only the fighting parties, faction heads, and opinions of the former local politicians. Instead of addressing the underlying factors that led to the conflict, these reconciliation conferences sought to rebuild the demolished state. Power-sharing arrangements and political viewpoints, however, served as the common denominator of all the endeavors. This strategy, which was driven by outside actors and manipulated by the neighboring nations, especially Ethiopia and Kenya, failed to take into account the opinions of clan chiefs at the local level. Mohamed,[151] contends that this top-down strategy contributed to Somalia's protracted turmoil and violence.

Way Forward: Bottom-up approach of conflict resolution and reconciliation

Throughout the past 15 years, AMISOM has made tremendous progress in building the Somalia state.[152] These successes have resulted in considerable advances. The mandate of the newly adapted mission, known as the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), reflects the changing circumstances in the nation as well as the sustained dedication of the African Union to assist Somalia in its efforts to regain permanent peace, security, and stability.

[151] Mohamed, i Elmi (2021). Post Conflict National reconciliation in Somalia. Bachelor thesis on Peace and Development Studies, Linnaeus University.

[152] Ali, Samira & Pandey, Neelam. (2020). An Assessment Role of AMISOM in the Peace building Process in Somalia: A Study: n assessment role of AMISOM in peace building process in Somalia: A study. Humanities & Social Sciences Reviews. 8. 1073-1081. 10.18510/hssr.2020.8311

Therefore, to build the Somalia state, the first critical stage for Somali clans is to acknowledge and express their support for the concept of a reconciliation process. The next step is to figure out how to resolve clan disagreements and grievances, which may require forgiving one another. In order to accomplish this goal, Somalia needs a genuine bottom-up reconciliation process. The ATMIS Mission reconciliation process is increasingly playing a major role in addressing and reinforcing reconciliation while also providing critical support to the Somali federal government. When this is taken into consideration, the ATMIS Mission has the responsibility of ensuring that the process of reconciliation may be developed from the ground up and is inclusive of all clan divisions in Somalia.

A bottom-up reconciliation that was pushed and led by Somalis has been encouraged by the ATMIS Mission as part of an effort to establish the space necessary for the many aspects of clan conflict to be resolved through dialogue, reconciliation, and negotiation. For instance, ATMIS has recently finished conducting several training sessions on conflict resolution and reconciliation for representatives from the states of Hir Shabelle and Galmudug. The goal of these training sessions was to teach participants how to mediate conflicts in order to bolster efforts to promote peace at the grassroots level. Over the course of the three days, the participants (prominent elders, clan leaders, religious leaders, women and youth) were led through oral and practical lessons, including group work, on understanding conflict, the causes of conflict, reconciliation, and the best practices for conflict resolution. In addition, the participants were given more specific information on the types of generic traditional conflict.

Under the bottom-up strategy, the peace process should not be thought of as a single procedure that can be completed in its whole. In previous peace processes, efforts were made to establish a government for Somalia; however, little had been done to raise the people's awareness of the situation, to identify the social, cultural, and political constraints for the process, or to prepare the Somali society to accept the government once it was established. Building up local capability and establishing fundamental institutions is an absolutely necessary step toward establishing a stable peace in Somalia. Accessibility on a strategic level and the mobilization of those locales and communities, as well as segments of society like older people and women, who are willing to participate in the process are also essential steps in the direction of achieving peace.[153]

[153] Nyadera, Israel & Agwanda, Billy. (2019). Transformation of the Somali Civil-War and Reflections for a Social Contract Peacebuilding Process. Gaziantep University Journal of Social Sciences. 18. 1346-1366. 10.21547/jss.536203.

The Role of Women

In Somalia, the women play a significant part in the process of reunifying communities that have been divided. In traditional Somali society, women play a role that is not directly involved in dispute resolution but is nonetheless significant. They have the ability to act as peace envoys for their clans at the beginning stages of a conflict and are often the "first messengers" dispatched between disputing clans in order to break the ice and begin negotiations. Even though the country was still in the midst of its civil conflict, women all around Somalia were actively participating in efforts to foster peace and make peace.

At the grass-roots and community level, women have respect from their traditional leaders (clan chiefs), elders, and politicians, and they are able to have some influence on them. In recognition of this reality, the Life and Peace Institute has placed a significant emphasis on the facilitation of women's participation in the peace building process. This has been accomplished through the provision of direct capacity building and training, as well as support for special gatherings of women. Hence, in order to ensure that women are at the forefront of any efforts to bring peace to Somalia, they need be given more agencies. They ought to be permitted to take part in any future peace and reconciliation conferences as well as the decision-making procedures associated with those gatherings.

Cross-clan and sub-clan marriage relations

Finding relationships between sub-clans and other clans through marriage could be an important step in the process of forging peace from the ground up. Marriages between members of different clans and sub- clans are very common in Somali society.[154] Young people in Somali society are encouraged to marry into groups where new relationships can be developed since marriage is seen as a contract between families or lineages in Somali culture. Marriage is a unifying force that can assist members of various clans and subclans forge closer bonds with one another and find peaceful resolutions to any conflicts that may arise. Marriages between members of different clans foster diplomatic contacts between communities and are consequently accorded a high level of deference. Marriage not only helps to solidify the ties that bind distinct lineages, but it also frequently serves as the catalyst for interaction between various clans and subclans. So, in a bottom-up approach to peacebuilding, cross-clan marital interactions could be used to reconcile problems between communities as a

[154] Aengwony, Robert & Iteyo, Prof & Simiyu, Ruth. (2019). Nature and Extent of Inter-Clan Conflicts in the Somali Community in Wajir North Sub-County, Kenya. The International Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities Invention. 6. 5580-5595. 10.18535/ijsshi/v6i8.06.

means of bringing about peace. Individuals who have married into various clans and subclans have the potential to play a pivotal role in reducing tensions and improving attitudes between communities that are traditionally at odds with one another so that they can cooperate in the pursuit of long-term peace.

Timing

There shouldn't be any time constraints placed on the peace process because the bottom-up method necessitates the development of a mutual understanding and confidence among the people involved.[155] A sufficient amount of time must be made available in order to discover a quality settlement, which may be defined as one that deals with the fundamental concerns of the conflict in an efficient manner. If this requirement is not met, and the negotiators are compelled to make a decision in a hasty manner, it is possible that poor quality agreements will be reached. These kinds of challenges, which include having a limited amount of time and having to make a decision in a hurry, have provided peacemakers with sour lessons that they should not forget, particularly those that were learned during the conference in Addis Ababa that was sponsored by the United Nations in 1993.

In relation to the timetable, it is important for the mediators in the peace process to be familiar with the social and cultural realities of the communities with which they are working. This will allow them to comprehend the genuine issues that are plaguing the culture and contribute to the effort of finding solutions to those issues. Only intermediaries who understand the cultural nuances of the society as an issue and who enjoy the Confianza (something more than simply 'trust') of the adversary can hope to carry out intermediary roles successfully in protracted conflicts between societies that have mutual suspicion and distrust of each other.

Somali Traditional Peace and Reconciliation Mechanism

When we look at Somali traditional processes for maintaining peace and reconciliation known as Xeer, the bottom-up approach has a lot of obvious appeal in Somalia.[156] Xeer is a precedent-based social code that is thought to

[155] Mitchell, David. (2020). Comparative consultation: The theory and practice of 'sharing lessons' between peace processes. Cooperation and Conflict. 56. 001083672092091. 10.1177/0010836720920914.

[156] Leite, Natasha (2017). Reinvigoration of Somali Traditional Justice through Inclusive Conflict Resolution Approaches. Relief Web. https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/reinvigoration-somali-traditional-justice-through- inclusive-conflict-resolution.

apply to all Somali people. It acted as a necessary constraint and regulating guidance in controversies and feuds between groups and individuals in Somali society. Xeer was developed in the 15th century. It is analogous to an impromptu village council, and it is a meeting at which all adult males are ostensibly allowed to express their opinions and concerns. It is the most democratic strategy, since it allows all people to participate equally in the process of electing their leaders and forming their administration. Disputes may be resolved amicably using this method, and it is also the most effective.[157]

In the sense that it comprises social and political norms and contracts, and in the sense that it promotes a decentralized political power that is controlled by community leaders, Xeer is consistent with the bottom- up approach. In the modern Somalia, which is still plagued by anarchy and the disintegration of the state, Xeer is an institution that attempts to arbitrate social and political arrangements. Experiments with Xeer have been carried out in both Somaliland and Puntland, and they have produced very positive results thus far. These two areas were successful in establishing institutions that are both mandated for, and have experience in, resolving conflict and continuing obligations in establishing peace. These institutions are governed by a council of elders. Not only is the council of elders successful in writing a constitution but also in filling government positions and this is especially true in Somaliland.

It's possible that Somaliland and Puntland might act as examples for how to stabilize the other regions. State-building is a process of negotiation that takes place in a highly political environment rather than

being a legal and technical endeavor. Negotiated statehood produced Somaliland and Puntland. Politicians, senior citizens, the military, corporations, members of civil society, NGOs, and representatives of the larger international community all participated in the negotiations. These actors engage in negotiation utilizing a variety of tactics and discourses, alternating between rhetoric and networks based on states and clans.[158]

The building of Somalia state would not be difficult to accomplish if all of the areas were successful in developing community-based administrative institutions. Realize that true peace for Somalia can only come from the Somali people themselves, via the participation of traditional and indigenous peace and

[157] Ibid

[158] Marchal, Roland. (2010). The Puntland State of Somalia. A Tentative Social Analysis. HAL Id: hal-01044642.

reconciliation institutions, and without the domination of the international community. This is something that must be recognized.[159]

Power and Resources Sharing

The inability to find a solution to the problem of electricity and resource distribution was a significant contributor to the collapse of earlier peace initiatives in Somalia. The dilemma of power and resource sharing is not unique to the Somali situation; rather, it is a factor that determines the outcome of the majority of civil conflicts and intrastate conflicts. It stands to reason given that these battles are fought over positions of power and influence within society. It is possible to handle the engagement of parties in a society after a war by doing the following: giving space to a host of players who have been previously silenced or excluded from influence in the community. If none of the involved parties have a sense of safety, the peace process is doomed to fail due to the fact that it "involves power over government." This is because the resources of the government can either be utilized to sustain the security dilemma or to overcome it. As a result, safeguarding the safety of all parties involved should be an essential component of any peace process.[160]

If one of the fighting parties is concerned about its security after the accord or in the next government, then the accord will almost probably be derailed by this concern. Even a very modest but devoted group of individuals is capable of carrying out a string of violent acts that can result in the breakdown of the peace process. Hence, participation from all parties is necessary for any peace process to achieve its goal of success. In addition, for a peace process to be effective, it is necessary for power and resources to be shared in an equitable manner. Yet, shared control may call for a certain level of confidence, and it may also be an arrangement that is only meant to be transitory during a moment of change. This is the system through which all parties are given representation in the government in accordance with a formula that was decided upon in advance.

Consequently, the employment of the bottom-up strategy is suitable for overcoming the existing problems of power and resource-sharing, as well as the dilemmas regarding participation and security, in the context of the Somali situation. Traditional Somali methods of land management include conflict mediation, judicial adjudication, agricultural and grazing systems, and a variety

[159] Mitchell, David. (2020). Comparative consultation: The theory and practice of 'sharing lessons' between peace processes. Cooperation and Conflict. 56. 001083672092091. 10.1177/0010836720920914

[160] Sriram, Chandra & Zahar, Marie-Joelle. (2009). The Perils of Power-Sharing: Africa and Beyond. Africa Spectrum. 44. 11-39. 10.1177/000203970904400302

of other tasks relating to these areas. Somalis use this system to resolve disagreements regarding power, territory, resources, and the safety of various clans and towns. A broad-based power sharing is something that the Somali people are looking for, in part as a nod to their nation's history and in part as a search for a more participatory future. Because of this, any new model of government needs to incorporate power sharing, which can only be achieved through a bottom-up strategy in order to be representative of all Somalis. This is a requirement for any new model of state building.[161]

NGOs and Civil Society

In order to strengthen local competence, the ATMIS mission must collaborate with NGOs and civil society. With awareness-raising campaigns and the implementation of various socioeconomic projects that benefit the local population, NGOs and civil society might make a significant contribution to the peace process in Somalia [162]. Through influencing people's hearts and minds to foster mutual trust and confidence, civil society groups and NGOs can elevate the hopes of members of various clans so that they can all strive arduously for a lasting peace. These people are the parents of the warlords and fighters who have ravaged the nation. It might be simple to end warlordism if society could grow in mutual trust and confidence.

The tales that parents pass on to their offspring have a significant role in ensuring social cohesion and stability in every culture. If one teaches children stories of animosity and hostility, the conflict and mistrust will likely persist until the next generation. Hence, civil societies, organizations at the grassroots level, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are required to alter the hearts and minds of Somali people in order for them to begin burying the sorrow, bitterness, and animosity of the past for the sake of peace and a united Somalia.

Conclusion

The Somali people are in dire need of constructing a state at the present time. With a tremendous amount of devastation in Somalia's economic, social, and political domains, as well as the loss of lives, the people deserve some kind of peace. In every prior attempt at peace, the Somali people have maintained the hope that they will eventually hear positive news, news of peace and

[161] Ahmed, Nasteha. (2019). Somalia's Struggle to Integrate Traditional and Modern Governance Systems: The 4.5 Formula and the 2012 Provisional Constitution. Journal of Somali Studies. 6. 41-69. 10.31920/2056- 5682/2019/v6n1a2.
[162] Ibid

togetherness. Sadly, the majority of previous peace initiatives were not successful in bringing about the stable peace that Somalis have longed for over the course of several decades. The unequal distribution of power and wealth among the various Somali clans and sub-clans is said to be one of the primary factors contributing to the conflict. In any of the prior initiatives, not a single one of these problems was ever resolved. In the prior attempts at achieving peace, the top-down strategy, in which a centralized administration was constructed by beginning with the highest-level leadership, was utilized. A top-down strategy would not be able to solve the Somali problem, however, because of the animosity and mistrust that exists amongst the Somali clans. Using a bottom-up strategy is the only method that has any chance of being successful in resolving the problem in Somalia.

When it came to settling conflicts and bringing about peace, the ATMIS mission, formerly known as AMISOM, utilized both a top-down and a bottom-up approach and experienced both success and failure in some areas. Recent events have made it abundantly evident that ATMIS has selected the bottom-up approach as a holistic and community-centered long-term model that has the potential to bring about peace that is sustainable in Somalia. In order to take a bottom-up strategy in Somalia, the local people need to be given more support, public awareness needs to be raised, and the process needs to include representation and participation from all segments of the community. Women and older people, two segments of society that are relatively easy to reach, should play significant roles in the peace efforts. In Somalia, the process of peace building ought to be indigenously driven and should be approached from the ground up. The reconciliation process should begin on Somalia's own soil and work its way up through the country. It should also succeed in winning the support and approval of the Somali people.

By ATMIS mission taking a bottom-up approach, it is conceivable that Somalis at the grassroots level will be given the opportunity to play a key part in the building of the Somali state. ATMIS ought to limit themselves to acting in the capacity of facilitators and security force for the process. In addition to that, they ought to offer some form of moral support for the process.

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Rebuilding The Somali Nation-State: The Needs for Sustainable Peace

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Abstract

Somalia has been defined as a state collapse with conflicts for almost four decades as it has been at war with ethnic and religious insurgency. As a result, this led to creating post-war conflict tension. With its multi-dimensional consequences, the conflict has been an obstacle to progress, sustainable peace, and overall socio-economic development. Participation in peacebuilding and sustainable conflict resolution can only be made by Somalis when they seriously consider setting a bottom-up approach to peacebuilding. This approach could contribute to ending a given conflict, conserving their limited resources, and preserving their nation-state. This paper discusses how conflict resolution and sustainable peacebuilding can transform Somali society with a sustainable peace situation and an atmosphere of development. It will try to answer the following questions: What tools are required to have sustainable peace to help Somalia's future as a nation?

Keywords: *Somali conflict, Peacebuilding, Sustainable Peace, Bottom-up approach, Top- down Approach, Conflict Resolution.*

Introduction

With the creation of the Transitional Federal Government in 2004, Somalia formally embraced a federal system. With the approval of the Provisional Federal Constitution (PFC), which clarified many vital aspects of Somalia's governing system, this approach gained significant traction in 2012. In theory, implementing federalism was meant to discourage conflict since it was believed that shifting authority and resources away from the center could prevent parties to the dispute from vying for control center. (Somali Dialogue, 2022). The federal experiment in Somalia has experienced a need for more consensus among the federal member states. The nation needs to be faster in properly establishing how authority should be divided between the FGS and its constituent divisions. Recurrent FGS-FMS debates over resource sharing were typically related to differences in how natural resources are managed. (Ibid.)

As stated above, a constitutional review procedure was established in 2012 to address these flaws and advance understanding and agreement on Somalia's federal structure. Although significant technical advancements have presented some pertinent possibilities, the political dialogue required to agree on arrangements has yet to occur. Furthermore, there have been sensitive political matters regarding the technical aspect of federalism for the nation, ranging from very centralised to very dispersed models. (Somali Dialogue, 2022).

According to Okpetu (2011), the association of conflict and concepts is represented in situations in which peace is lacking. Thus, it is nearly impossible to discuss peace and development without appreciating and situating the problem of conflict in human society (Okpetu, 2011). Analysts believe conflict studies to be multifaceted (Okpetu, 2011). The fact that conflicts appear widespread or present in every corner of the globe is one of the arguments for why conflicts are so common in human civilizations. Second, it is proven that conflict must be avoided or reduced to a minimum for human progress to take place. As a result, finding natural resources for human existence and progress is only considered after considerable effort and dispute settlement.

On the other hand, it is crucial to understand how political practices and institutions have failed, how inadequate or limited efforts at reconciliation further damage these systems, and how these factors contribute to nation collapse, such as Somalia. Somalis have become polarized and have limited social cohesion due to a prevalent culture of violence utilized to maintain power and resources. Clannism provided informal protection in an environment marked by violent rivalry and division between and within the clans. In some cases, there has been a gap between civil society — which has been more susceptible to

manipulation by violent extremist groups — and securing tension-reduction efforts. Consequently, the lack of venues for communities to participate in these efforts has been reduced because of the lack of a long-term peace setting. Consequently, the communities' need to have political representation has increased and fostered distrust and conflict within and between communities, society, and the government. A weak economy, unresponsive governance structures, unresolved clan disputes, and tensions between rival clans posed problems at the national and local levels.

Sustainable Peace; A Systematic Approach to Peacebuilding

Since the collapse of their state, Somalis have not had the opportunity to have national reconciliation to enable them to live in sustainable and systematic peace. In every so-called government since the formation of the federal government in late 2012, there is yet to be a case that focuses on this process. That is what makes Somalia still have an unsustainable peace situation despite the setting of federal member states. As stated, in Somalia, the case about power distribution has been complex, resulting in a significant vacuum in the political agreements. It has created a situation that demanded severe attention, along with other federal issues like the national security framework and the condition of the capital. The best chance of achieving this is through an integrated, inclusive political process that considers these problems before influencing the constitutional review process.

Peacebuilding from Top-Down Shortcomings

On April 27, 2016, the General Assembly and Security Council adopted resolutions on peacebuilding that were virtually identical (A/RES/70/262 and S/RES/2282 (2016)). Instead of reframing peacebuilding, the resolutions introduce the term "sustaining peace," which offers greater clarity and a broader definition. In the 1990s, post-conflict peace building was the primary concept of peace building inside the UN.

The Security Council Presidential Statement S/PRST/2001/15 and the subsequent 2007 Policy Committee decision, which defined peace building as trying to prevent the outbreak, recurrence, or continuation of armed conflict, however, caused a change in this perspective in the 2000s. As stated in the preamble of the new resolution's A/RES/70/262 and S/RES/2282, "sustaining peace encompasses activities aimed at preventing the outbreak, escalation, continuation, and recurrence of conflict." Practically speaking, peace building and peace keeping should not be differentiated. It does not refer to redefining the various UN bodies' roles, duties, or mandates. The ultimate goal of maintaining

peace and peacebuilding is to lessen the possibility of a breakdown or relapse into violent conflict. It is an inspirational objective aiming to create the aptitude and ability to look beyond crisis management and promptly resolve disputes. The resolutions present a chance to direct more of the UN system's attention toward conflict prevention, allowing core causes and symptoms of disputes to be addressed. Thus, the idea addresses problems that could otherwise ignite fresh conflict cycles.

Theorizing Peace building

Galtung (1975) theorized that peace building is one of the three methods for achieving peace: structural, direct, and cultural. This could come along with peacemaking and peace keeping (quoted by Abduljabar). Therefore, peacebuilding is addressed as the root cause of conflict and prevents it from degenerating into violence. Further, it is added that peacebuilding achieves positive peace through developing structures and institutions of peace based on justice, equity, and cooperation.

Lederach suggests that peace building is an enormously complex endeavor in unbelievably complex dynamic and often destructive violent settings. He contends that third-party intervention should focus on coordinating outside peace efforts to strengthen domestic players. Because notable people have connections to the top and grassroots levels, they can support the establishment of peace and impact both the bottom and the top (Lederach, 1997).

On the other hand, Paffenholz (2003) distinguished three layers of society. She describes the three steps in establishing peace but suggests starting at the ground level. Similarly, Paffenholz (2003) defines peace building as a long-term process to end violence and advance sustainable peace. She contends that the goal of peace building changes from phase to phase depending on the level of conflict escalation. Beginning with explaining the many sorts of conflicts and the appropriate approaches, Paffenholz (2003) discusses peace building as a means of turning violent forms of conflict into peaceful ones when they have already reached a warlike stage. Peace building should help end the war or civil unrest and maintain peace when widespread violence has subsided. Therefore, stability can be promoted through a variety of strategies and initiatives. Still, it is crucial to comprehend the conflict's sides, their role in society, the influence of regional and global players, and other relevant factors. (Paffenholz, 2003).

The Need for Sustainable Peace building

Participating in sustainable peace building is a proactive step that promotes resolving a particular conflict, preserving human life, and prudent use of finite resources. (Ojighoro, 2021) Quoted by Abduljabar Mohamed (2021), the concept of peace building proposed by the UNSG in the early 1990s is called to be expanded upon in Lederach's theory. Quoted by Abduljabar Mohamed (2021): “The framework was developed to bring an end to conflicts and achieve sustainable peace. The proposal included four major areas of activities: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and post-conflict peacebuilding”. Further in the approach to peacebuilding, Abduljabar Mohamed (2021) emphasizes that Lederach established a framework based on an understanding of peacebuilding that centers on sustainable reconciliation within societies. Building peace can be done by establishing systems and protocols and teaching people over an extended period (ibid). This strategy's importance, which Lederach (1997) refers to as "indigenous empowerment" or "peace building from below," focuses on releasing communities from oppression and bloodshed. In addition, Lederach acknowledges the necessity to address the underlying causes of conflict and the contradiction between immediate dispute resolution and long-term relationship building. (Lederach 1997).

It is understood that emphasizing peace builders must embrace complexity and that once the total complexity is understood, one can choose what particular thing to do in a given setting. Lederach (2005) adds that peace building is an enormously complex endeavor in unbelievably complex, dynamic, and often destructive settings of violence.

Similarly, Paffenholz (2003) defines peacebuilding as a long-term process to end violence and advance sustainable peace. Here, the goal of peacebuilding changes from phase to phase depending on the level of conflict escalation. Further quoted, Abduljabar Mohamed (2021) and Paffenholz (2003) describe the different types of conflicts and the appropriate approaches. For example, when a conflict has become violent, peace building aims to turn it into a peaceful one. Similarly, if violence escalates to war or civil unrest, peace building should help end the conflict and maintain peace after the intense violence has subsided (Paffenholz et al, 2003:14).

Results of Sustainable Conflict Resolution

Different strategies must be used at all societal levels to turn conflict into a durable peace over time. Therefore, a medium with long-term assistance is needed to assist societies directly harmed by conflict. Programs that carry out local initiatives must be developed to promote inclusive peace processes with regional stakeholders. Continued development and use of local peace methods require collective efforts to convey research findings to conversations and actions connected to peace building.

A sustainable system must be created to aid societies affected by conflict in transitioning to permanent peace. The peace procedures need to be developed by regional and conflict-aware local stakeholders. A society can achieve peace by enhancing the institutions and structures that make it up, which goes beyond simply being free from violence. In an increasingly interconnected and complex regional environment, political decisions and societal conversations must consider national perspectives and best practices. This strategy will call for knowledge of cutting-edge research and innovative fixes for societal issues (Ojighoro, 2021). It is vital to encourage the development of evidence-based policy recommendations and solutions. Mechanisms must be in place to promote open dialogues among decision-makers, influential people, and experts from diverse sectors to achieve this goal. (ibid)

Conclusion

For almost 40 years, warfare and state collapse have characterized Somalia. As stress from the post-war conflict is felt in Somalia, war and ethnicity have been added to the religious insurgency. The conflict has hampered growth, long-term peace, and general socioeconomic development because of its multifaceted effects. As a result, involvement in peace building and sustainable conflict resolution promotes the eventual resolution of a particular conflict, conserving finite resources and protecting human life.

The paper has addressed the case about how Somalia could get a sustainable peace. Somalis need to think seriously about their future as a nation-state. They should foster and grow the building blocks of a working nation-state apparatus and find a long-term peacebuilding resolution.

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Glimpse into The Drawbacks in The Somali Political Landscape in 1960-1969

Mustafa Feiruz

Abstract

The political history of Somalia, from 1960 to 2023, unfolds across four distinct eras, i.e. democratic multi-party system, authoritarian military regime, political vacuum and national fragmentation, and clan-based selection/election; each marks a significant period in the country's political landscape. Each period has its characters and common denominator. The first era, from 1960 to 1969, witnessed the initiation of a democratic multi-party system, a unique phase in Somalia's contemporary history. Despite its brevity in the broader historical context, this phase holds profound significance in shaping Somalia's political mentality and has left an indelible mark on the Somali mindset. This paper delves into the political dynamics of this initial era, with a particular focus on the drawbacks that emerged and influenced its trajectory. The paper emphasizes the importance of recognizing and addressing these drawbacks within their historical context. The findings contribute to a nuanced understanding of Somalia's political evolution, offering valuable insights for formulating effective reforms to establish a resilient and inclusive political system in the future.

Keywords: *Somalia, multi-party system, political history, political drawbacks.*

Introduction

Beginning with a chronological exploration of political landscape in Somalia from its inception in July 1960 to 2023, while preparing this paper, this 63-year overview categorizes the nation's political trajectory into four distinct eras. Somalia's political journey unfolds across these four periods. The first period, from July 1960 to October 1969, witnessed the emergence of a new multi-party system that underwent the process of institutionalization and gained valuable experience, despite facing challenges and having its own drawbacks. In October 1969, the military intervened in politics, overthrowing the elected government and paving the way for a second period—a drastic shift marked by the emergence of an authoritarian military regime from October 1969 to January 1991. This period was characterized by military rule, centralized power and the suppression of civil liberties.

The subsequent third period, from 1991 to 2000, was characterized by a political vacuum, national fragmentation, and the rise of localized fiefdoms.[163] Since 2000, Somalia has navigated a clan-based system of selection and election, shaping its political landscape to the present day, which constitutes the fourth stage. Subsequent sections will provide some more details about these eras.
To transition from the current fourth stage, we notice in recent years, despite encountering difficulties and frequent setbacks, ongoing efforts and promises towards a democratic government with multiparty elections and establishing political stability amidst challenges.

The political history of Somalia from 1960 to 1969 is a crucial period in the contemporary political history of Somalia. It is the only period which experienced a democratic multi-party system. Spanning only nine years of the 63-year timeline, it constitutes 14.3% of the nation's post-independence history. However, it shaped the democratic experience of Somali society and its elite. Additionally, whenever discussing the establishment of a democratic system and the implementation of direct elections, the experiences of this period are often recalled. Therefore, it is essential to study this period, understand its characteristics, and draw lessons from it to enhance future democracy in the country.

This paper examines the drawbacks and weaknesses which Somalia's political landscape experienced during 1960-1969, aligning with the wisdom imparted by the Somali proverb 'khayr waxba kaama dhibee, shar u toog hay',

[163] Somaliland, the self-declared republic in ex-British Somaliland in May 1991, charted its own political trajectory since then; hence, we do not discuss its political history in this paper.

which means ‘do not be harmed by the good, but beware of the evil’ which underlines the significance of avoiding potential problems and the associated consequences —being proactive to prevent harm.

By delving into historical events and circumstances, the study seeks to provide a summarized comprehensive understanding of the factors that hindered the democratic multi-party system during this period. While existing narratives acknowledge the democratic nature of the era, this study aims to unveil, or highlight, the less-explored drawbacks that compromised the effectiveness of the political system. Hence, it contributes to a profound and nuanced understanding of this stage and encourages further studies, extracting objective lessons from it. As a methodological approach, this study aims to critically examine events and their implications by leveraging historical narratives, scholarly works, and available sources. The objective is to provide nuanced insights into the drawbacks that influenced Somali democracy during the study period.

A Journey Through Time (1960-2023) - A 63-Year Overview

Embarking on a chronological exploration of the political landscape of the Somali republic since its inception in July 1960, this 63-year overview categorizes the nation's political trajectory into four distinct eras up to 2023. The fourth era may even extend to any future time until the implementation of direct democratic elections.
These four eras are as follows:

1. Democratic multi-party system era (July 1960 – October 1969):
2. Authoritarian military regime era (October 1969 – January 1991):
3. Political vacuum and national fragmentation era (1991-2000):
4. Clan-based selection/election era (2000 – present):

The chronological breakdown into these four distinct periods offers insight into the various phases, each sharing common characteristics and a common denominator. This breakdown defines the contemporary political history of Somalia, providing an overview of political dynamics and developments since 1960.

Democratic Multi-Party System Era

At the inception of the Somali Republic in July 1960, Somalia adopted a democratic multi-party system, marking the establishment of a multi-party democratic system, which also operated in the final years before independence.[164] This system persisted until the coup d'état of October 1969. During this period, the foundational principles of democracy were evident and active. Free and fair elections were conducted regularly, allowing citizens the right to vote for their representatives. Political pluralism flourished, fostering a diversity of parties and opinions. Fundamental freedoms, including speech, assembly, and association, were respected, and the media operated freely and independently. Democratically elected governments alternated between July 1960 and October 1969 in a parliamentary system, with elections ensuring a smooth transition.[165]

However, beneath these positive aspects, noteworthy drawbacks emerged, and various setbacks occurred, testing the robustness of the process, governance efficiency, sustainability and institutionalization. These issues will be explored briefly in the upcoming sections.

Authoritarian Military Regime

In October 1969, Somalia transitioned to a military regime after a coup d'état, initially described as a 'bloodless coup', later revealing itself to be a 'bloody coup'.166 On October 21, the military overthrew the elected civilian government, abolished the parliament, nullified the constitution, banned all political and social organisations, and governed the country through a junta known as the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) (Golaha Sare ee Kacaanka) led by Mohamed Siad Barre. After a year, in 1970, Siad Barre declared the 'scientific socialism' (hantiwadaagga cilmiga ku dhisan) as the guiding principle for the new Somalia.167 By July 1976, the nation transitioned into a one-party state under the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP). This period of totalitarian rule, encompassing the Military Regime and the One-Party State, endured for approximately 21 years. Throughout this era, power was centralized

[164] The Trust Territory of Somalia, encompassing the southern part of the Somali Republic, experienced democratic elections and a multi-party system beginning in 1956. In contrast, British Somaliland, constituting the northern part of the Somali Republic, initiated this experience later and had less than two years of exposure before gaining independence.
[165] For further details, refer to Trunji, *'Somalia: The Untold History 1941-1969'*, from page 371 and beyond.
[166] Mohamed Haji Ingiriis, *'The Suicidal State in Somalia'* p.66.
[167] For more details, refer to Mohamed Haji Ingiriis. *'The Suicidal State in Somalia'* ' pp. 83-84

within a military junta or a singular party, where the leader, Siad Barre, held substantial control over all aspects of governance. He became the head of the junta, the party, the government and the state, consolidating all powers in his hands.

Human rights have been systematically violated on a significant scale. Civil liberties were notably restricted, curtailing fundamental human rights and freedoms such as speech, assembly, and association. The situation continued to deteriorate steadily. Any dissent or opposition was promptly suppressed, reflecting the hallmark characteristics of a totalitarian system. The regime systematically controlled and manipulated information through censorship, propaganda, and state-controlled media to shape public perception and stifle dissenting voices. Dissent was consistently suppressed through extensive political repression, including surveillance, arbitrary arrests, torture, and the elimination of political opposition. The regime's control extended to a formidable military presence, underscoring its reliance on military might to maintain its grip on power. The regime utilized any means to consolidate power, obliging citizens to adhere to its tenets.[168]

A cult of personality was cultivated around the president, Mohamed Siad Barre (1919 – 1995). He was named with many honorary titles,[169] and revolutionary songs praising him were composed,[170] constructing a heroic image for him, portraying him as an iconic figure and the embodiment of both the revolution and the state. This cultivation demands full loyalty; otherwise, he will be found guilty of 'dibusocod' which means 'reactionism' and 'qaran dumis' which means 'high treason'; the song 'Samadiidow' will be played on the radio, and he will be led to the gallows.[171]

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[168] For more details about this era, refer to Mohamed Haji Ingiriis. *'The Suicidal State in Somalia' '* p. 63 and beyond

[169] The prominent honorary titles included *'aabbihii kacaanka'* meaning 'father of the revolution', *'aabbihii garashada'* meaning 'father of all wisdom' and *'guulwade Siyaad'* meaning 'Siad, the bearer of victory'.

[170] Among the prominent songs were *'Guulwade Siyaad'* and *'Caynaanka hay'*. *'Guulwade Siyaad'* means 'Siad, the bearer of victory', it was mandatory to recite it loudly in schools, community gatherings and government meetings. This song, composed by Hassan Haji Mohamed, aka 'Hassan Guulwade', in 1970 at the beginning of the revolution, held significant importance. The second song, *'Caynaanka hay*', or "May you hold onto the reins of power forever", was composed by Abdi Muhumed Amin in 1971.

[171] Playing the song *'Samadiidow dabin baa kuu dhigan lagugu dili doono'*, meaning 'Be cautious, those who reject virtuous actions, a deadly trap has been laid for you', on Mogadishu and Hargeisa Radio, the only two radio stations in the country, became a signature tune for subsequent executions during the revolution. In September 1970, it was composed by Hassan Haji Mohamed, also known as '*Xasan Guulwade*' (1949).

During this period, armed rebel organizations emerged with the aim of overthrowing the regime. Their power steadily grew in the late 1970s and 1980s. By the mid-1980s, supported by the Ethiopian administration, their presence had spread geographically to several regions nationwide.[172] The prominent organisations were the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), established in 1978/1981; the Somali National Movement (SNM) in 1981; the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) in 1989; and the United Somali Congress (USC) in 1989.

Obviously, the first armed clash, marking the ignition of the Somali civil war, was the 'Awrayaal or Awryaalay Operation' in January 1979. It was conducted by 72 militants of the Somali Salvation Front (SSF); one of the organisations later became SSDF, around Galxamur in the northern part of the Mudug region.[173]

The clashes escalated in magnitude and spread across various regions. The military forces engaged in numerous harsh and cruel activities, targeting unarmed civilians based on their clan affiliations. This resulted in the killing of livestock, the destruction of water pools and wells, and the destruction of cities and towns. The most severe devastation occurred in Hargeisa and Burao cities in 1988.[174] This affected place far from the front lines, including Mogadishu, the capital. The most horrific aggression occurred during the Jazeera Beach Massacre on 15 July 1989, resulting in the killing of around 59 civilians who were captured from their homes at night.[175]

After the tyrannical regime of Barre, which disregarded the advice of the wise to seek a political resolution for the deteriorating crisis, the country sloped into an intensifying civil war. This period ultimately concluded with the ousting of the regime by armed opposition militias on 26 January 1991.

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[172] This rebellion marked the beginning of the civil war in Somalia, which persisted for decades under various banners and agendas. Regional or international actors played various roles at different stages in this conflict.

[173] They used *'awr',* means he-camels, for transportation instead of cars, hence the term awryaal. Upon entering the border, the Somali military attacked them. After three rounds of clashes, they were defeated by the army, with nearly half of them killed and the other half mostly wounded. Refer to Xuseen Khaliif 'laba isma Saarin' pp. 172-176 and Abdulkadir Shire Farah 'Matxafka Cadaabta' p.245. Abdulkadir asserts that this clash was the initial spark that ignited the prolonged civil war.

[174] For more details refer to International Crisis Group [ICG]. (2006). Somaliland: Time for Africa Union Leadership, pp. 5-6;

[175] For more details refer to Abdulkadir Shire Farah 'Matxafka Cadaabta' p.212-231; and Historical Dictionary p. 128. Abdulkadir listed the names of 59 victims in his book 'Matxafka Cadaabta' on pp. 228-231.

Political Vacuum and National Fragmentation

After a nearly decade-long armed conflict, Barre fled from the capital on 26 January 1991, and the armed opposition captured the capital, Mogadishu.[176] This marked a transition to a new era. This transition marked a shift from the era of dictatorship to the subsequent period of bloody chaos, extensive fragmentation and violence— a situation that aptly reflects the Somali proverb 'kud ka guur oo qanjo u guur' which means 'out of the frying pan and into the fire'.

After the expelling of the president and his government from the capital, the USC, allied politically with other armed factions, began competing for the power and the ensuing turmoil and large-scale civil war, mostly in the south. The absence of a central government led to power vacuums exploited by faction leaders and localized 'fiefdoms'.

Consequently, this period was marked by national fragmentation and a deepening civil war, representing a challenging and turbulent phase with disruptions, tensions, and chaos with further deepening of the shattering of social cohesion. The competition among armed groups and factions, aligned with subclans, escalated persistent armed conflicts and power struggles, resulting in a devastating civil war, economic disruption, humanitarian crises, and impeding national political reconciliation efforts. Prevailing instability and uncertainty contributed to a lack of predictability in political, economic, and social affairs. The rise of out-of-control militias and criminal gangs is witnessed in various regions.[177].Numerous peacemaking conferences were conducted between 1991 and 1997, resulting in agreements that were never implemented.[178] In 2000, the Somalia National Peace Conference in Djibouti led to the formation of a clan-based political system and inaugurated the Transitional National Government (TNG).[179]

[176] For more about the circumstances at that time, refer to Badiyow, Somali History V2, pp. 32-36.
[177] The situation has evolved in the first years, leading to the emergence of three distinct zones in the country: the North-West Zone (Somaliland), the North-East Zone (Puntland), and the Central-South Zone. This division remains prominent to this day.
[178] For more details, refer to Badiyow, Somali History V2, pp. 37-46.
[179] Mohamed Haji Mukhtar, Historical Dictionary, pp. 41-42.

4 Clan-Based Selections/Elections

In 2000, the Somalia National Peace Conference, also known as the Djibouti Conference, was convened under the auspices of civil society and traditional elders in Djibouti.[180] This gathering led to the formation of a provisional government, the Transitional National Government (TNG). The '4.5 formula' was adopted for power sharing of Somali clans, an official clan-based political system.[181] Since then, Somalia entered a new era, it has operated under a system of clan-based selection and election, guided and influenced by clan elders.

It is worth noting that clannism has informally influenced Somali politics, often involving under-the-table deals away from public announcements or official documentation.[182] However, this conference formalized clannish politics and introduced the '4.5 formula' for political power-sharing among clans. It aims to achieve de facto representation and cultivate a more inclusive political environment in Somalia, a society ravaged by civil war. Under this formula, the clan community became an official political entity; hence, parliamentary seats and cabinet portfolios were divided among clans, instead of political parties.[183]

The newly established TNG faced multifaceted internal, regional and international challenges immediately upon commencing operations, with one of the most prominent issues arising from the armed factions in Mogadishu. This predicament weakened the TNG, pushing it to a critical state.

In this context, it became necessary to convene another conference to revive the government institutions. A new reconciliation conference emerged in 2002, known as the Somali Reconciliation Conference in Kenya, amidst the influence of armed factions. After lengthy negotiations and extensive debates, the

[180] For more details, refer to Badiyow, Somali History V2, pp. 155-164.

[181] Power-sharing in the 1990s primarily involved political organisations, identified by their national names. However, with the Cairo Declaration on Somalia in December 1997, power-sharing dynamics shifted towards a community-based approach, employing the names of clans rather than the names of political organizations.

[182] The Somali political parties and their clan affiliations in 1960 and 1991, refer to Badiyow Somali History V1 p. 138 & 155.

183 The '4.5 formula' in Somali politics refers to a power-sharing arrangement, the distribution of political power and representation in the government, aiming to ensure inclusivity and representation for the clans. It is applied strictly in the distribution of parliamentary seats and cabinet posts. Accordingly, each of the four major clans (Hawiye, Daarood, Dir, and Digil & Mirifle) is allocated an equal share of political power (MPs and cabinet posts), approximately 22.22% for each. The remaining 0.5 represents a collective share for the remaining clans (Beesha Shanaad), accounting for around 11.12% for them.

Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was formally inaugurated in October 2004. After about eight years, it upgraded to the Federal Government of Somalia in August 2012.

In summary, challenges to state-building persisted during efforts to reconstruct functional national governmental institutions and restore stability and the rule of law. The transitional period (2000-2012) witnessed successive transitional governments, including the Transitional National Government (TNG) from 2000 to 2004 and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) until 2012. Establishing the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) in 2012 marked another step toward national consolidation.

One of the main missions of these successive governments during this period was to shift the country from a clan-based political system to establishment of democratic politics rooted in party pluralism, leading to the implementation of 1V1P elections, a Long-awaited aspiration that people have been anticipating until this moment. The latest initiative was in May 2023 when the National Consultative Council convened in Mogadishu and resolved that 'elections throughout the entire country should be conducted through a one-person, one-vote system in 2023', beginning with municipal elections on 30 June 2023, followed by presidential and parliamentary elections on 30 November 2023.184

More Insights into Somalia's Political Landscape: 1960-1969

The overview of Somalia's political landscape from 1960 to 1969 reveals that significant historical events played a pivotal role in shaping the trajectory of the newly formed Somali Republic in July 1960. The republic embraced a multi-party system, conducting democratic elections for power rotation and fostering basic societal freedoms. Democratically elected governments alternated between July 1960 and October 1969 in a parliamentary system, with representatives chosen every five years and a President is chosen every six years by the parliament. With elections ensuring a smooth transition, peaceful power transfers characterized the democratic process. During this era, power was transferred between two Presidents, Aden Abdulle Osman (Aden Adde) and Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, along with three consecutive Prime Ministers leading the government in those years, indicating political instability.185 In this regard,

184 Refer to *'Heshiiska Hannaanka Doorashooyinka Jamhuuriyadda Federaalka Soomaaliya. 27 Maajo 2023'*. Muqdisho, Soomaaliya.

185 Aden Abdulle Osman Daar, aka 'Aden Adde' (1908-2007), served as the first president of the Somali Republic from July 1960 to July 1967. He transferred power to Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke (1919-1969), the second president, who held office from July 1967 until his assassination on

international observers have acknowledged the distinctiveness of Somalia's performance in African politics:[186]

'In the arena of African politics, Somalia has fared well. No coups, no civil wars, no internecine splits have marred its nine-year history. Its people—united by language, culture, and religion—form a national state which will probably remain intact for the foreseeable future. Elections for the presidency and parliament have demonstrated the system's ability to transfer power democratically. The country's Ex-President and two former Prime Ministers are today all in parliament—not imprisoned, exiled, or dead.'

The emerging republic encountered challenges in nation-building, characterized by weak political institutions, leadership inefficiency, incomplete laws, and intricate social and cultural dynamics. The political and administrative elite lacked enough experience and qualifications, impeding effective governance. The shortage of university-educated Somalis exacerbated administrative weaknesses, presenting obstacles across state institutions and departments.

The political turmoil, exacerbated by the weakness of political parties and a singular actor's unfortunate manipulation of the political landscape, i.e. the hegemony of SYL ruling party, which contradicts the essence of multi-party pluralism, has disrupted the check-and-balance and monitoring system. Moreover, development and social services did not receive their share of the general budget; instead, 'most of the budget was absorbed by the expenses of the bureau/administrative and military staff'.[187] The situation deteriorated, things went awry, and the state descended into confusion and disturbance. This state has thrust the country into a suffocating political and social crisis with ominous implications if not addressed by the wise in a timely manner.[188]

October 15, 1969. In the role of prime minister, Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke served from July 1960 to June 1964, followed by Abdirizak Haji Hussein (1924-2014) from June 1964 to July 1967. The third prime minister was Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal (1928–2002), in office from July 1967 to October 1969 until the military ousted his government.

[186] Samatar p. 214, quoted from (US Department of State, Research Memorandum RAF-10, July 8, 1969, US National Archives, College Park, MD).

[187] Abdalla Mansur, 'Contrary to a Nation: The Cancer of the Somali State' in Ahmed, Ali Jimale (ed), The Invention of Somalia (Lawrenceville, NJ, Red Sea Press, 1995), p. 133

[188] Trunji, Somalia: The Untold History. pp. 532-535; Abdalla Mansur, *'Contrary to a Nation'* p.114.

In this context, President Abdirashid Ali Shermarke was assassinated on October 15, 1969, in the city of Las Anod, precipitating a military coup on October 21, 1969.189 The coup marked a regression from a fledgling and struggling democracy, anticipated to mature, to an era of comprehensive military rule and a repressive police state.

Key Drawbacks in the Somali Political Landscape in 1960-1969

There are significant weaknesses in the Somali Political Landscape in 1960-1969. This article addresses various issues, difficulties, or obstacles, particularly emphasizing the negative aspects, limitations, or weaknesses in the political landscape during the specified time. The objective is to highlight the unfavorable elements of the political situation or the negative aspects of the political landscape during that period.

From 1960 to 1969, through a careful examination of the events and circumstances within the Somali context, the Somali political landscape encountered a range of significant drawbacks and left a negative experience. The key drawbacks or setbacks during this period can be identified, among others, as discussed in the following section.

Fragmented Hollow Small-Sized Parties

The political landscape during this period was characterized by the presence of numerous small-sized parties that, at least most of them, lacked substantive ideologies, clear objectives, and cohesive representation. In the colonial era, the Somali political parties originated as national liberation movements; after gaining independence, they failed to develop a new program that addressed the new challenges. As a result, despite their slogans and previous credibility, they transformed into parties with hollow content. Therefore, most parties lacked a comprehensive and well-defined agenda, making it challenging to effectively address the needs and aspirations of the people. Many of them were temporary formations utilized merely as vehicles to compete in elections and gain entry into the parliament. In addition, the number of political parties increased steadily. In the parliamentary elections of March 1964, 21 parties contested, but after five years, the number of contesting parties increased threefold to 64 in March 1969.190. The political arena was overwhelmed by 'hollow parties', often lacking a meaningful set of principles, policies, or a solid organizational structure; they were 'temporary clan groupings… formed solely for the purpose

[189] Mohamed Haji Mukhtar, Historical Dictionary of Somalia. P.17

[190] Abdi Ismail Samatar, Africa's First Democrats. p.199 and Trunji Somalia: The Untold History p. 525.

of putting up candidates with the ultimate aim of joining the ruling party after the elections.[191]

The abundance of these hollow, small-sized parties led to fragmentation, limited representation, and posed challenges in establishing a stable and efficient government with effective checks and balances. During this era, diverse partisan views and debates were disseminated in the parliamentary chamber rather than within party institutions. The ruling party, SYL, often avoided clear positions on crucial matters, such as selecting a presidential candidate or appointing a prime minister.[192] This failure to resolve internal debates internally led to conflicting positions among party members in the chamber. This situation contributed to the fragmentation of the ruling party, hindering its strength and success;[193] despite this, they entered the arena appearing as a single party, but their members were simultaneously playing on both sides. Moreover, one author wrote in this regard, '… the role of political opposition has always been played by factions within the ruling party, and not by the opposition parties alone.'194 Furthermore, this generally weakened the role of the parties and their task in shaping national politics and addressing key issues.

Opportunistic Hopping Parliamentarians

There were elected representatives who opportunistically switched their party affiliation, which can be called *'hopping'* Parliamentarians. During campaigns and elections, temporary parties were formed, and candidates aligned themselves with these parties solely to benefit from their symbols during the campaign. If elected, they quickly shifted their allegiance to the majority party, the Somali Youth League (SYL), abandoning their original party. Additionally, when significant issues or motions arose in the parliament, temporary informal coalitions of parliamentarians emerged, often diverging from their established parties. Emphasizing the abrupt and opportunistic nature of their political involvement, Dr Abdi Samatar describes these MPs as *'overnight political wannabes'*, and says:[195]

"*… the proliferation of political parties clearly demonstrated that most of these overnight political wannabes had no national agenda but were merely interested in securing a seat at the national table to gain access to public resources."*

[191] Mohamed Trunji, Somalia: The Untold History p.525.
[192] Samatar. Africa's First Democrats. p. 137
[193] Samatar, Africa's First Democrats. p. 143
[194] Mohamed Trunji, Somalia: The Untold History, p.533
[195] Samatar, Africa's First Democrats. P. 128

In parliamentary elections in March 1969, 64 parties were contested; SYL, the ruling and main party in the country, got 73 out of 123 seats of parliament. But in the voting for the government in June 1969, there was only one opponent voice.[196] Only three months prior, the newly elected MPs switched from the opposition to the ruling party. In this regard, Premier Abdirazak wrote in his memoir:[197]

'The general rule was that every deputy, especially those elected for the first time, was told by their constituencies not to be in the opposition. The reason for this was so that he would be in a better position to do something for his people.'

It is not surprising then that the matter ends with *'a single-member opposition'*.[198] This conduct prompts the question: in principle, why did they advocate for a multi-party system?!

This opportunistic behaviour, driven by short-term gains or self-interest, hinders politics, adds complexity to its landscape, contributes to the fragmentation of political representation, and undermines the integrity of political figures or institutions in the eyes of the public. It adversely affects overall stability, effective governance, and the credibility of political entities.

Another negative behavior in this era was the transmission of diverse partisan views and debates within the parliamentary chamber instead of the partisan institutions. The ruling party, SYL, takes the lead in this regard, often refraining from adopting specific and decisive positions on crucial matters that require later parliamentary decisions, such as selecting a presidential candidate, appointing a prime minister, and approving the cabinet.[199] The ruling party, unfortunately, fails to resolve its internal partisan debates internally and instead brings them into the chamber, resulting in opposing and conflicting positions within the party parliamentarians. This manner also encourages opportunistic behaviour among parliamentarians.

Explicit Ethnic Politics (Political Clannism within Political Parties)

Somali society is inherently tribal, structured around clans, and this tribal influence has significantly permeated and become a prominent phenomenon in the political landscape. This phenomenon, known as political clannism or ethnic

[196] "Elections in Somalia" African Elections Database; and Samatar p. 199.
[197] Abdisalam Issa-Salwe (ed.) *'Abdirazak Haji Hussein: My Role in the Foundation of the Somali Nation-state, a Political Memoir'*. P.289
[198] I borrowed this phrase from Trunji. It is a subtitle in his book. Trunji p.532
[199] Samatar. Africa's First Democrats. p. 137

politics, is now evident in the political mainstream. [200]. The influence of clans in politics has grown substantially, to the extent that certain political entities are now identified as representatives of specific clans. The prevalence of political clanism prioritizes loyalty to specific clan affiliations over broader national issues within political parties. Clannism has long been an informal force in Somali politics, often operating behind the scenes. However, with the escalation of political competition, the politicization of clans has intensified. In the second half of the 1960s, certain parties were identified as parties for specific clans or subclans and determined by common ancestry.[201]

While clannism has long been an informal factor in Somali politics, its significance has grown with the intensification of political competition. People gradually recognized the significance of being close to government offices and political positions for influence in the management of public affairs, leading to the attainment of power and wealth.

The impact of political clannism includes division, favouritism, and the exclusion of certain groups, hindering inclusive governance and equitable representation. Addressing this issue has become crucial to cultivating a more unified and effective political environment. It has become a negative phenomenon that undermines the development of a national agenda and the effectiveness of national parties, with minimal efforts to rectify this growing concern. However, this challenge remained unaddressed and hence unsolved. Rather, it has worsened over the years.

By the end of the 1960s, it became evident that clan politics contributed to the segmentation of society along ethnic lines, fostering 'us versus them' mentality and marginalizing small clans or excluding them from decision-making processes. In the March 1969 election, the society polarized more than ever before along tribal lines. In some cases, clan politics and the competition for control escalated into inter-clan conflicts and violence.202

[200] Clan politics refers to a political approach in which political parties or leaders are organized and aligned based on their clans, meaning ethnic identities. Accordingly, it formed political alliances, voted, or advocated for policies primarily based on clan affiliations. This conduct may contribute to discrimination and clan-based tensions, within other issues. Hence, it divides society into politicized parallel segments of clans that are not connected by issue-based agendas. In my opinion, the problem lies not in the existence of clans as societal segments but in their politicization, using them as a political agenda.

[201] Saadia Touval, Somali Nationalism, p.90. also, see Abdalla Mansur p.114. About the clan affiliations of Somali political parties in 1960 and 1991, refer to Badiyow Somali History V1 p. 138 & 155.

[202] Mohamed Trunji, Somalia: The Untold History, p. 535

Lack of Strong Democratic Institutions

The democratic process and effective multi-party system need a robust independent judiciary, impartial electoral management bodies, political parties and effective checks and balances — robust democratic institutions. On the other hand, lack of strong democratic institutions can undermine transparency, accountability, and the rule of law, impeding the development and sustainability of a democratic system. In the era of 1960s, these institutions were certainly newly established and in the process of growth. They were functioning and somewhat effective and growing gradually during the early seven years after independence.

However, before reaching full maturity, their trajectory declined and took a downward turn. As a result, they lost their strength and effectiveness in later years, eventually leading to the dominance of manipulation in the elections of March 1969. Therefore, compromising the fairness and integrity of the election, the government utilized its authority and the resources of the state to manipulate the electoral process in its favor. Officials who did not comply with this conduct were dismissed a few months before the elections. In this regard, government officials in the relevant offices took steps to hinder certain active competitors and influential politicians from participating in their power bases and excluded them from the electoral process.[203]

In the judiciary, the Supreme Court rejected a number of electoral complaints filed by political parties against decisions made by local authorities. Some of these cases involved what could be described as 'scandals', yet the court rejected them on procedural grounds.[204]

Some scholars argue that the decline of institutions began in 1967 when top political leaders intended to seize power outside the rule of law and institutionalized government, and some scholars described that as 'The march toward dictatorship'.[205]

What is at stake?

Above, we have highlighted several drawbacks that emerged during that period. Of course, they were multifaceted and complex, influenced by various

[203] Mohamed Trunji, Somalia: The Untold History, pp. 527-528; Samatar, 'Africa's First Democrats', p. 199.
[204] Mohamed Trunji, Somalia: The Untold History, pp. 529-531.
[205] Dr. Abdi Ismail Samatar explores this topic in Chapter seven of his book 'Africa's First Democrats, on page 186 and beyond.

political, social, and economic factors. Furthermore, it is important to recognize that certain factors may have interdependencies and mutually influence each other in a cause-and-effect relationship. During this era, significant challenges emerged, including structural issues, systemic obstacles, institutional limitations, and deficiencies. These encompassed problems such as inadequate governance mechanisms, weak democratic institutions, and ineffective checks and balances. Additionally, the challenges were compounded by socioeconomic disparities and limited civic engagement.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The period from 1960 to 1969 holds profound significance in the contemporary political history of Somalia despite its brevity within the broader trajectory, only nine years out of 63 years. Its importance lies in the exclusive period during which Somalia practised a multi-party system and exercised its constitutional rights despite accompanying weaknesses and drawbacks.

This study identifies four key drawbacks that hindered the efficiency of multi-party politics during the 1960-1969 study period. They are as follows: firstly, numerous small-sized parties lacked substantive programs and cohesive representation; secondly, opportunistic parliamentarians frequently switched allegiance; thirdly, political clannism emerged within parties; and fourthly, a deficiency in strong democratic institutions and effective checks and balances, where they experienced a downward trajectory before reaching full maturity, obviously in later years.

Though predominantly influenced by negative narratives and events, the experiences gained during this era left lasting impression on the Somali mentality. Its impact extended beyond its temporal boundaries. The negative narratives and events from this period became embedded in the collective consciousness of some Somalis, influencing their perceptions and attitudes toward political systems. Moreover, the military junta emphasized perceived inadequacies in that period. The predecessor exaggerated concerns about the problems, disruptions and challenges that involved the electoral process, possibly to justify the military coup and their actions in consolidating power.

The importance of this phase in Somali politics should be recognized, as people exercised their constitutional rights despite associated weaknesses and drawbacks. These drawbacks should not be a discouraging complexity that instils fear and hesitation about the elections. Instead, it should be considered an experience and lessons that enrich our vision towards an election process and political pluralism and illuminates the pathway, its landmarks and obstacles. It can shed light on the path for future elections. This involves taking necessary

measures to avoid setbacks in terms of laws and practices while keeping up with recent developments.206 In this regard, several key steps need to be taken. These include fostering a culture of political pluralism and tolerance, promoting civic education and engagement, strengthening democratic institutions, ensuring a transparent and fair electoral process, and encouraging effective political parties. Additionally, efforts should be made to address potentially existing challenges, such as fragmentation and opportunism among small-sized parties, and establish effective mechanisms for resolving internal party disputes.

This requires a comprehensive and collaborative approach to establish an inclusive, responsive and resilient political system. This necessitates achieving effective electoral engineering to overcome the main drawbacks and challenges that hindered the democratic system in 1960-1969. Precautions should be taken to avoid returning to a totalitarian system or establishing weak democratic institutions. The sustainability of a multiparty system necessitates the encouragement of political inclusivity and participation, as well as the promotion of responsible party politics that engages in issue-based debates, fosters constructive dialogue, and fulfils the aspirations of the people.

[206] For example, I authored a paper addressing drawback #1 'Fragmented Hollow Small-sized Parties', and proposed 'electoral threshold' to prevent the fragmentation of the legislature. The paper entitled *'Xatabadda Doorashada: Taabbagelinta Xisbiyo Badan iyo Baarlamaan Tayo leh'* [Electoral Threshold System in Somalia: Towards a Sustainable Multiparty System & Enhancing Political Representation] published on *WardheerNews, August 24, 2023. It is available at* *https://wardheernews.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/Xatabadda-Doorashada-WQ-Mustafe-Fayruus.pdf*

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The Role of Federalism on State Building in Somalia

Abdullahi Abshir Abdirahman

Abstract

This study aims at investigating the impact of federalism on state building in Somalia. Federalism is a constitutional manner for breaking up the power between the central government and its member states, so that federated units and state are a territorial and constitutional community forming part of a federation. Thus, federalism incorporates partial self-government with collaborative government. The main purpose of this study was to investigate the impact of federalism on state building in Somalia. There have been imaginative efforts to trace the history of federalism back into antiquity, the United States Constitution 1787 is the earliest example of a modern federal constitution. Federalism, the division of sovereign authority among levels of government, can be seen as a way of stabilizing, or making credible, decentralized governmental structures. The study is cross-sectional and quantitative in nature to establish the relationship between federalism and state building in Somalia. The population of the study is unknown; therefore, the study used 100 respondents comprising of civil society, politicians, and civil servants that were most important sources to get reliable information about the study. The data has been analyzed by using statistical package for social sciences SPSS.

Keywords: *Federalism, central government, member states, state building, Good Governance*

Introduction

Federations have been formed in a series of historical waves over the last two centuries. The first wave, from late 18th to early 20th centuries with formerly independent units coming together in a confederation, lasted for only eight years, from 1781 to 1789, when the 13 states addressed a weakness at the center by forming the first modern federation: the Swiss confederation evolved over more than five centuries, but after a brief civil conflict it adopted, in 1848, a federal constitution modeled on the American example. The next significant wave came with new federations emerging from the collapse of communism. The communist Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia all normally had federal constitutions, but were in reality a centrally controlled one-party regime. However, as they democratized, their federal structure took on real political significance (Mohamed-Bishar Barre Jama, 2019).

In Africa, federalism is associated with the colonial experience of divide and rule (Assefa 2007). However, in Africa, one of the most difficult problems in federal states is the persecution and expulsion of members of various ethnic groups who do not belong to that specific region. Until recently, the only federal state in Africa was Nigeria (Brosio 2000).) But, as Osaghae (2004) notes, at present, some more countries in Africa like Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Africa and Tanzania follow federalism (Bednar 2006). In general, countries like Cameroon, Comoros, Congo DR, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda either follow federalism or have constitutions with strong federal flavor (Teshome, 2008).

Federalism is a political organization in which the activities of government are divided between regional governments and central governments in such way that each kind of government has some activities on which it makes final decisions (Riker 1975). This is how one of the most important researchers in the field of federalism, William H. Riker, defines federalism. By this statement it is clear that a division of power between different levels is the fundamental characteristic for a federal state (Söder, 2009). In 1991 after the ouster of Siad Barre, Somalia plunged into a political conflict leading to state collapse. The country did not have a recognized functioning government for more than 20 years due to prolonged civil war and inter-clan conflicts which resulted in massive destruction and incalculable loss of human life and property. During this period, 14 national reconciliation meetings were held outside the country, mostly sponsored by the countries of the region under the auspices of the Regional Organizations of IGAD, AU and the Arab League (Dharar, 2016). The politics of Somalia have gone through various periods of change. A few autonomous regions, including the Somaliland, Puntland and Galmudug administrations,

emerged in the north in the ensuing process of decentralization. The early 2000s saw the creation of fledgling interim federal administrations. The Transitional National Government (TNG) was established in 2000 followed by the formation of its successor the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 2004, which reestablished national institutions such as the Military of Somalia. In 2006, the TFG assisted by Ethiopian troops, assumed control of most of the nation's southern conflict zones from the newly formed Islamic Courts Union (ICU).

The ICU subsequently splintered into more radical groups such as Al-Shabaab, which battled the TFG and its AMISOM allies for control of the region, with the insurgents losing most of the territory that they had seized by mid-2012. Following the end of the TFG's interim mandate in the same month, the Federal Government of Somalia, the first permanent central government in the country since the start of the civil war, was also formed. The nation has concurrently experienced a period of intense reconstruction, particularly in the capital, Mogadishu. Several internal and external actors tried and failed in reconstructing the Somali state (Dahiye, 2014).

Research Problem

Since its last government's collapse in 1991, Somalia remained lacking a viable and functional government for over twenty years. The civil war, collapse of its central state, and now armed rival factions continue to haunt the country (Ciment, 2015). For over 20 years Somalia endured turmoil caused by militia warfare, corruption and terrorism. Somalis suffered because of the governing dysfunction. The most common reasons given for Somalia's failure include: its clan system, enduring effects of colonialism, lack of sufficient economic resources, and blundering by the international community at peace building (Dahiye, 2014). A decentralized central federation of regional political entities has emerged, including the self-proclaimed but unrecognized Republic of Somaliland in the northwest, Puntland State in the northeast, Jubaland in the south near Kismayo. Therefore, the researcher wanted to conduct research on how federalism can be part of Somalia's state building.

Aims of the Study

The main purpose of this study is to find out the role of federalism on state building and its specific objectives are:

i. To investigate the role of central government on state building
ii. To examine the role of state preparedness in terms of systems and government on state building.

1.0 Methods

1.1 Study design

The study used descriptive design through quantitative approach and cross-sectional survey questionnaire.

1.2 Population and Sample size

The population of the study is unknown; therefore, the study used 100 respondents as a sample compromising of civil society, politicians, and civil servants that were most important sources to get reliable information about the study.

1.3 Sampling Procedure

In this study, simple random sampling was used which is a reliable method of obtaining information where every single member of a population is chosen randomly, merely by chance.

1.4 Study Instrument

Questionnaire was the main tool used in this study in order to get more information in the shortest possible time.

1.5 Data analysis

SPSS version 24 was used to analyze the data in this study and the result was tabulated displaying frequency distribution and percentage basis.

Results

Respondents

According to the above-mentioned statistic, 88% of the respondents were men, and only a small percentage of the remaining 12% were women. The above figure shows that 68% of the respondents were married and only a little over 32% were single. The aforementioned figure shows that only 6% of respondents had a PhD, 14% had a bachelor's degree, and 80% had a master's degree.

Table1: Federalism has played a role in the process of state-building in Somalia.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly Agree	32	32.0	32.0	**32.0**
	Agree	28	28.0	28.0	**60.0**
	Neutral	12	12.0	12.0	**72.0**
	Disagree	14	14.0	14.0	**86.0**
	Strongly Disagree	14	14.0	14.0	**100.0**
	Total	**100**	**100.0**	**100.0**	

According to the above table, 32.0% of respondents strongly agreed that federalism has contributed to Somalia's state-building process, 28.0% agreed with that statement, 12.0% said they were neutral on the matter, 14.0% disagreed that federalism has not contributed to Somalia's state-building process, and only 14.0% strongly disagreed.

Table 2: The federal system is seen as a potential factor for contributing to peace and stability in Somalia.

		Frequency	**Percent**	**Valid Percent**	**Cumulative Percent**
Valid	Strongly Agree	12	12.0	12.0	12.0
	Agree	38	38.0	38.0	50.0
	Neutral	18	18.0	18.0	68.0
	Disagree	16	16.0	16.0	84.0
	Strongly Disagree	16	16.0	16.0	100.0
	Total	**100**	**100.0**	**100.0**	

Table 2 shows that 12.0% of respondents strongly agreed that the federal system is seen as a potential factor for promoting peace and stability in Somalia, 38.0% agreed with that statement, 18.0% said they were neutral on the subject, 16.0% disagreed that the federal system is not seen as a potential factor for promoting peace and stability in Somalia, and only 16.0% strongly disagreed.

Table 3: The federal system has the potential to support consolidation and democratic progress in Somalia.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly Agree	12	12.0	12.0	12.0
	Agree	40	40.0	40.0	52.0
	Neutral	18	18.0	18.0	70.0
	Disagree	22	22.0	22.0	92.0
	Strongly Disagree	8	8.0	8.0	100.0
	Total	**100**	**100.0**	**100.0**	

According to Table 3, 12.0% of respondents strongly agreed that the federal system has the potential to support consolidation and democratic progress in Somalia, 40.0% agreed, 18.0% said they were neutral on the issue, 22.0% disagreed that the federal system has the potential to support consolidation and democratic progress in Somalia, and only 8.0% strongly disagreed.

Table 4: The central government of Somalia is working towards fair and equitable reintegration of citizens.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly Agree	10	10.0	10.0	10.0
	Agree	26	26.0	26.0	36.0
	Neutral	20	20.0	20.0	56.0
	Disagree	34	34.0	34.0	90.0
	Strongly Disagree	10	10.0	10.0	100.0
	Total	**100**	**100.0**	**100.0**	

In accordance with the data in the table above, 10.0% of respondents strongly agreed that the central government of Somalia is working towards fair and equitable reintegration of citizens, 26.0% agreed with that statement, 20.0% indicated they were neutral on the subject, 34% disagreed, and only 10.0% strongly disagreed.

Table 5: The central government of Somalia is working to resolve disputes between different groups in society and encourage reconciliation.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly Agree	12	12.0	12.0	12.0
	Agree	50	50.0	50.0	62.0
	Neutral	16	16.0	16.0	78.0
	Disagree	14	14.0	14.0	92.0
	Strongly Disagree	8	8.0	8.0	100.0
	Total	**100**	**100.0**	**100.0**	

According to the information in the table above, 12.0% of respondents strongly agreed that the central government of Somalia is trying to settle disagreements between various social groups and promote reconciliation, 50.0% agreed, 16.0% said they were neutral on the issue, 14% disagreed, and only 8.0% strongly disagreed.

Table 6: The central government has made efforts to rebuild state structures, reduce violence and promote peace and order in the country.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly Agree	20	20.0	20.0	20.0
	Agree	40	40.0	40.0	60.0
	Neutral	16	16.0	16.0	76.0
	Disagree	20	20.0	20.0	96.0
	Strongly Disagree	4	4.0	4.0	100.0
	Total	**100**	**100.0**	**100.0**	

Table 6 shows that 20.0% of respondents strongly agreed, 40.0% agreed, 16.0% said they were neutral on the matter, 20% disagreed that the federal

system is not seen as a potential factor for promoting peace and stability in Somalia, and only 4.0% strongly disagreed. The central government has made efforts to rebuild state structures, reduce violence, and promote peace and order in the country, according to Table 6.

Table 7: State governments are working to balance representation of different clans while adhering to the federal government's policies on direct elections for political positions.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly Agree	16	16.0	16.0	
	Agree	24	24.0	40.0	
	Neutral	26	26.0	66.0	
	Disagree	26	26.0	92.0	
	Strongly Disagree	8	8.0	100.0	
	Total	**100**	**100.0**		

According to the information in the table above, 16.0% of respondents strongly agreed that state governments were trying to balance representation of various clans while adhering to federal policies on direct elections for political positions, 24.0% agreed with that statement, 26.0% said they were neutral on the issue, 26.0% disagreed, and only 8.0% strongly disagreed.

Table 8: State governments have a significant role to play in preparing for and responding to political and economic transformation processes.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly Agree	20	20.0	20.0	20.0
	Agree	50	50.0	50.0	70.0
	Neutral	16	16.0	16.0	86.0
	Disagree	10	10.0	10.0	96.0
	Strongly Disagree	4	4.0	4.0	100.0
	Total	**100**	**100.0**	**100.0**	

According to the data in the table above, 20.0% of respondents strongly agreed, 50.0% agreed, 16.0% said they were neutral on the matter, 10.0% disagreed, and only 4.0% strongly disagreed that State governments have a significant role to play in preparing for and responding to political and economic transformation processes.

Table 9: Somalia faces challenges in implementing a functional federal system.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly Agree	56	56.0	56.0	56.0
	Agree	30	30.0	30.0	86.0
	Neutral	4	4.0	4.0	90.0
	Disagree	6	6.0	6.0	96.0
	Strongly Disagree	4	4.0	4.0	100.0
	Total	**100**	**100.0**	**100.0**	

According to Table 9, 56.0% of respondents highly agreed, 30.0% agreed, 4.0% claimed they were neutral on the subject, 6% disagreed, and only 4.0% strongly disagreed that Somalia confronts difficulties by enacting a workable federal government. According to Table 9, Somalia has difficulties putting in place an effective federal structure.

Table10: The distribution of power and resources between the federal government and regional states has impacted state-building efforts in Somalia.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly Agree	46	46.0	46.0	46.0
	Agree	36	36.0	36.0	82.0
	Neutral	8	8.0	8.0	90.0
	Disagree	4	4.0	4.0	94.0
	Strongly Disagree	6	6.0	6.0	100.0
	Total	**100**	**100.0**	**100.0**	

Table 10 shows that 46.0% of respondents strongly agreed, 36.0% agreed, 8.0% said they were neutral on the issue, 4% disagreed, and only 6.0% strongly disagreed that Somalia's state- building efforts have been hampered by the division of power and resources between the federal government and regional states. Table 10 shows how Somalia's efforts to construct a state have been impacted by the division of authority and resources between the central government and regional states

Discussion

Table 1 shows that 60% of respondents believed that federalism contributed positively to Somalia's state-building process. Additionally, according to Table 3, 52.5% of respondents said that the federal system may aid in Somalia's political consolidation and democratic advancement. Therefore, a federal system is appropriate for Somalia and can aid in the peace-building process that would lead to the country's democratic development. According to Table 5, 62% of respondents thought Somalia's central government was trying to reconcile differences among social groups and resolve conflicts. Furthermore, Table 6 shows that 60% of respondents said the national government had worked to reestablish state institutions, lessen violence, and advance peace and order in the nation. As a result, Somalia's central government works to resolve social issues and lessen ongoing hostilities among its citizens.

In response to political and economic change processes, state governments are expected to play a substantial role in both planning for them and providing a response, according to Table 8's responses. In order to meet human needs, state governments must provide and facilitate government services for state member societies. Table 9 reveals that 86% of respondents concurred that Somalia faced difficulties in putting in place a workable federal structure. That is accurate since federalism is a system that is founded on western society and not on our norms, values, or cultures.

Conclusion and Recommendation

The study looked at how Somalia's federalism and state reconstruction interacted. This study has demonstrated that the federalism in Somalia differs from that of the rest of the world. The clan system in Somalia serves as the foundation for the federal structure there.
So, the study also recommends: Somali federalism should not be similar to the federalism of western countries. The federal system should originate from the societal, sociocultural, economic, and political values of Somalia.

Educating and raising awareness of the federal system in order to ensure political stability. For the survival of the current constitution, the constitution must be approved, and there must be consensus amongst the country's political elite in order to guard against 'spoilers. The Government of Somalia should ensure coordination, advocacy, collaboration, and networking with the various development partners

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PART 3

EDUCATION FOR RECOVERY & STATE BUILDING



The Impact of Armed Conflict on Leadership and Management of Schools in Banadir Region, Somali Headteachers' Perspective

Dr. Abdishakur Tarah

Abstract

This paper aims to capture Headteachers' perspectives on managing and leading schools during active conflict. Moreover, the paper examines what strategies Headteachers apply to fulfil their headship roles in conflict-affected environments, such as managing and supporting staff, managing school resources, ensuring the safety of children and staff, and maintaining good education attainment for children. The theoretical framework used for this study draws on two components, environmental factors and competencies, of Mumford's Skills Model. The methodology chosen for this research is qualitative, with semi-structured interviews with current and retired Headteachers. The interviews with participants were conducted in Somali so that it enabled participants to answer interview questions in a language that they were able to express openly. The interviews were audio-recorded and translated from Somali to English, requiring a good understanding of transliteration and contextual translations.

Key words: *school leadership, leadership skills, environmental factors, conflict, crisis, personal attributes*

Introduction

A number of researchers discuss the great impact of armed conflict on education in many facets. Some of them highlight the physical destruction of the education system, while others have looked at the extent to which these conflicts affect social development, human resources in education, and the emotional well-being of children in conflict (Tarah and Sood, 2022). Globally, of the 28.5 million primary school-aged children out of school in conflict-affected countries, 12.6 million live in sub-Saharan Africa, 5.3 million in South and West Asia, and 4 million in the Arab States. The vast majority, 95%, live in low- and lower-middle-income countries. Girls, who make up 55% of the total, are the worst affected, as they are often victims of rape and other sexual violence that accompanies armed conflicts (UNESCO, 2011, p. 4).

There are many barriers faced by children living in armed conflict; these barriers "range from schools simply not being available in the worst affected areas of a country to the difficulty of recruiting sufficient teachers or persuading former teachers to return to teaching" (Save the Children, 2013, p. 3). The 'Attacks on Education' published by Save the Children (2013) further explains that "even where children can access schools or schools are functioning, the chances of receiving a good-quality education — and learning basic skills — can be diminished as a result of, for example, disrupted attendance, poor learning environments, unsafe or no school reconstruction, and reduced distribution of learning materials. In an already precarious context, these constitute additional barriers that can lead children to drop out permanently" (p. 4).

The context

Gardner (1990; cited in Baker, 2014, p. 356) defines leadership as "the process of persuasion or example by which an individual or team induces a group to act". Since most leaders are also engaged in management, it is useful to distinguish between these two interrelated processes: leadership and management. "Leadership and management are not synonymous terms; one can be a leader without being a manager" (Bush and Coleman 2000, p. 18; Schon, 1984). Citing Bush and Coleman (2000, p. 19), Schon (1984) further explains that "one can

fulfil many of the symbolic, inspirational, educational, and normative functions of a leader and thus represent what an organisation stands for without carrying any of the formal burdens of management". In discussing the aspect of 'management' or being a 'manager,' they state, "One can manage without leading, monitor and control organisational activities, make decisions, and allocate resources without fulfilling the above-mentioned norms" (p. 19). In the field of leadership in education, "educational leadership and management is pluralist, with many competing perspectives and an inevitable lack of agreement on the exact nature of the discipline" (Bush, 2008a, p. 1).

A central element in many definitions of leadership is that there is a process of influence. Wasserberg (2002, p. 158) claims that "the primary role of any leader is the unification of people around key values". From his perspective as a secondary Headteacher, he argues that these core values come down to: a) schools are concerned with learning, and all members of the school community are learners, b) every member of the school community is valued as an individual, c) the school exists to serve its students and the local community, d) learning is about the development of the whole person and happens in and out of classrooms.

In discussing the strategic dimension of leadership, West-Burnham and Harris (2015, p. 8) suggest three things that enable us to understand the strategic dimension of leadership: principle—the values informing an organisation's culture and priorities: purpose—the dominant view of the most important reason for the existence of the school; and people—their engagement, motivation, and performance in securing principles and purpose. They further suggest that the operational aspect of leadership, by contract, is "concerned with the routines, systems, structures, and procedures that translate principles and aspirations into actual goal-oriented results. Leadership and management work in a symbiotic relationship, but this should always be with leadership driving the management" (p. 8).

School leadership in a conflict-affected environment

The enormity of the effects on education during and after armed conflict was felt everywhere. These effects included the complete destruction of education in both physical and human forms. "Despite these effects, the post-conflict educational debates have largely undermined the voice of those who were at the frontlines during the crisis" (Pherali, 2016, p.1). There is a high prevalence of attacks on schools during armed conflict, with a commonality of deaths among pupils, teachers, and school leaders. Although there is an increasing amount of literature that deals with relationships between education and armed personnel, "there is still a research gap in terms of understanding how teachers and school leaders experience and navigate through both physical and psychological threats and how they trade off their survival in the context of a protracted conflict" (Pherali, 2016, p. 1).

In their previous study on Somali headteachers' experience in operating in an active conflict environment, Tarah and Sood (2022) found despite community mobilisation to safely reopen schools, many school leaders face challenges in recovering school buildings for a safe return for children. Somali Headteachers have experiences of the conflict in managing their schools. Here are a number of key personal accounts where school leaders face violence and have to work in a challenging environment (Tarah & Sood, 2022).

As a school leader, with help from local communities, school staff had to clear debris and dead bodies from school buildings before it was safe for students and staff. Staff removed 17 dead bodies from his school ground before the community had the trust to send their children there. These were not isolated cases but rather common ones. Another Headteacher revealed that it took more than 2 years to negotiate with militiamen to vacate the school premises, and the deal on which they agreed to leave was a monthly share of 50% of the collected revenue.

They also reported that Headteachers experience trauma and other psychological disturbances, with no support being available to them during those difficult times. Tarah and Sood's study also found school leaders were compelled to pay financial support to grieving families, although the schools themselves were in financial difficulties. Waiting for bad news of the death or injury of a member of staff or a student who was on the way to school was their daily expected briefing. Another effect of the conflict on schools was a shortage of teachers which sometimes impels school

leaders to teach, especially those who possess teaching skills. These staff turbulences have a knock-on effect on schools' overall subscriptions, as parents can remove their children if a school does not have sufficient teachers to teach them (Tarah & Sood, 2022).

As a result of the absence of government regulation and support, there are no institutions that prepare and develop Headteachers in Somalia. Also, there is no formal training and leadership development for public and private primary Headteachers in Somalia, whereas, in contrast, there is a growing recognition of the significance of school leadership preparation through professional development and training across the world. Comparatively, the procedures used in appointing and offering pre-service training in many countries, particularly in Africa, are inadequate. Induction and in-service training for Headteachers are also inappropriate in many developing countries, especially those within the continent of Africa (Bush & Oduro, 2006). Globally, "the majority of school heads do not receive training prior to the assumption of office, and they perform their work from experience; this is not ideal for creating an effective and supportive environment for teachers and other staff in schools." (Kayiwa, 2011, p.1).

Although there are no specific Somalia-related studies on the availability of professional development opportunities for school leaders or a skills audit of current leaders of low-cost private schools in Somalia, the World Bank (2018) suggested that "there is a need to further study the role of school leadership, since leaders have important roles in determining quality through resource allocation, hiring practices, and establishing school guidelines. It is vital for Headteachers to possess the required competencies and skills to lead, support, and challenge members of their institutions, including teachers, support staff, and Administrators, as well as manage external relations effectively" (World Bank, 2018, p. 72).

It is important to acknowledge the link between the leadership competencies of school leaders and their positive impact on the success of schools. " This indicates an increasing acceptance that Principals play a significant role in affecting student achievement and should be held accountable for it (Davis et al., 2005, p. 3). In discussing this further in the context of school improvement and students' learning outcomes, it is important to acknowledge the relationship between different sections of schooling, including leadership and management. In addition to the role they play in improving students' achievements, it is also important to point out that the principal's role also includes developing effective

relationships among staff members, acquiring and allocating resources, promoting teacher development, improving student outcomes, and building mutually supportive school community relations.

According to a recent document published by the Federal Government of Somalia, one of the key components of its Education Sector Strategic Plan is the enhancement of the quality of education and children's learning outcomes through the provision of school-based coaching for headteachers to improve school performance (ESSP, 2017). To achieve this, it will develop comprehensive and consolidated Headteacher training programmes. This strategy only applies to the education sector in Somalia (Benadir Region and Federal Member States), as Somaliland has its own ESSP. Although Somaliland's ESSP has extensive references to increasing female Headteachers in Somaliland, there is nevertheless no mention of any direct government policy for preparing, developing, and training Headteachers.

The realities of school leadership in Somalia are complex. There are neither post- secondary educational leadership programmes nor school-based apprenticeship programmes in Somalia. This makes it more difficult for school leaders to learn how to enact any type of leadership other than daily unavoidable managerial tasks (Khalifa et al., 2014, p. 236). This leaves Headteachers untrained and with no professional development programmes available to them. We therefore need further study to understand the role of Headteachers in post-conflict education in Somalia (World Bank, 2018, p. 72). Thus, participatory action research (PAR) was the appropriate approach to collecting their views on what constitutes an effective school leader in a conflict and post-conflict environment and what factors influence their day-to-day role in managing their schools.

Benadir Regional Administration

Mogadishu, which is the main area of the Benadir Administration, is the capital city of Somalia with an estimated population of 1.6 million people which accounts for about 13% of the total population of Somalia and it is the headquarters of the Federal Government and the small number of schools it manages (ESSP, 2017). The city has the largest private primary and secondary schools in the country, and these are members of a large umbrella association.

Despite the government restoring its role in the education sector, the position of umbrella associations remains strong, as important providers

of education and guarantors of a minimal quality of education. Government data indicates that there are over 1,000 umbrella-affiliated schools in Somalia, providing education to over 250,000 students (p. 22). Unlike Puntland and Somaliland, the Benadir Regional Administration does not have its own education policy although it has recently been mandated to take over 23 public schools which were under the direct management of the MOECHE of the federal government. These schools were part of the Benadir Administration's initial statutory responsibilities with a view to subsequent progress.

Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework adopted by the paper is Mumford's Skills-Based Model (Mumford, 2000), which examines the relationship between a leader's knowledge, skills, and capabilities (Northouse, 2016). The skills-based model is relevant to the Somalia context, as leadership is less likely about status and position in a hierarchy than the possession of essential competencies, skills, and expertise (Morrison, 1998, p. 205; Khalifa et al., 2014, p. 246). The paper discusses only two of the five components in this model: competencies and environmental factors, which are discussed next.

Competencies

The term competence is both a complex and contested concept. Competency is a way of doing things better, "karti," in Somali. Consequently, school leaders must gain the necessary competencies for effective karti. These competencies are developed not only through organised training but also through guided practice to be upskilled (Gurmu, 2020, p. 655). It is worth noting the significant role a Headteacher plays in raising educational standards. The Headteachers do this by planning the organisational management of the school, planning for effective teaching and learning activities, creating a positive school climate, building a collaborative organisational learning culture, developing staff, and building community leadership (Day and Sammons 2016, p. 7). It is important to highlight that these outcomes are strongly influenced by a leader's competencies, like problem-solving skills, social judgement skills, and knowledge (Northouse, 2016, p. 53).

Managing Environmental Impacts

The environment can be influenced both internally and externally. Environmental factors relate to internal factors such as working space, communication infrastructure, and the capability of subordinates, as well as external factors such as economic, political, and social issues (Northouse, 2016, p. 55). In the context of Somalia, a shortage of school places, a lack of trained teachers, and the absence of professional development opportunities for teachers are key environmental factors that Headteachers must manage, which for some Headteachers negatively impacts their capability of supporting teaching and learning effectively. Conflict, security, political instability, and the new system of governance—federalism—have hindered the education system's development, and these factors contribute to the lack of planning in the country's education system.

For example, the security situation may lead parents to send their children to nearby schools to avoid travelling through potentially dangerous neighbourhoods (World Bank, 2018, p. 63). If school leaders are to successfully respond to the distinctive challenges presented by schools' internal and external environments, their development must be seen in line with the environment in which they have to operate. To minimise any potential negative impact or influence on schools' operations, leaders must apply personal skills.

An effective performance by a leader during a crisis is determined by their capability and skills in problem solving, social judgement skills, and knowledge (Mumford et al., 2000). Problem-solving skills are a leader's creative ability to solve new and unusual, ill-defined organisational problems. "The skills include; being able to define significant problems, gather problem information, formulate new understandings about the problem, and generate prototype plans for problem solutions" (Northouse, 2016, p. 48).

Social judgement skills include perspective-taking, social perception, behavioural flexibility, and social performance (Northouse, 2016; Mumford et al., 2000). A leader should possess social skills; they may need to adjust to differences in people's personalities and understand their perspectives and goals. They further assert that "perspective-taking means understanding the attitudes that others have towards a particular problem or solution (Northouse, 2016, p. 50). Social perception is the process by which individuals interpret and understand the behaviour, characteristics,

and intentions of others in social situations. Social perception is an essential aspect of human interaction, as it helps us make judgements, form impressions, and navigate social dynamics.

A leader's success depends on his or her ability to acquire and utilise resources effectively during crises. These successes are determined by changes applied by a leader, including redefining culture and structure, resources, the roles and responsibilities of staff and their own, and managing external relations, which are vital in the case of armed conflict. As highlighted above, there is a high prevalence of attacks on schools during armed conflict, with a commonality of death among pupils, teachers, and school leaders. Leaders are expected to respond to these factors by applying the necessary skills to minimise disruption to school operations. Although there is an increasing amount of literature that deals with relationships between education and armed personnel, "there is still a research gap in terms of understanding how Teachers and school leaders experience and navigate through both physical and psychological threats and how they trade off their survival in the context of a protracted conflict" (Pherali, 2016, p. 1).

Methodologies and Methods

The main aim of this research was to explore Somali Headteachers' leadership and management experiences during armed conflict. The paper had made strenuous efforts to understand how conflict impacted their roles. This exploration was needed to further study the role of school leadership in Somalia and to identify variables that could not be easily measured or heard (Murray & Wayne 2001). As highlighted in a study carried out in Somalia by the World Bank (2018), "there is a need to further study the role of school leadership, since leaders have important roles in determining quality through resource allocation, hiring practices, and establishing school guidelines (World Bank, 2018, p. 72).

The qualitative approach was chosen to conduct this study as it was the appropriate method to conduct research when an issue or a problem needs to be explored (Creswell 2013, p. 47–48). Denzin (1989) in Olesen (2004) also gave a similar insertion by describing people's lived experiences, events, or situations that have meaningful social and historical contexts and experiences, and the significance of emotional content to open up the words of whoever or whatever is being studied. The paper used a semi-structured interview as it allowed the exploration of a

series of specific questions or issues. This helped the paper probe and ask follow-up questions.

The paper selected 10 participants, and all consented to take part in the study. These were the Head teachers who would provide the richest and most interesting information (Best & Kahn, 2006). The participants of this research were Head teachers of private primary schools in Somalia, and a purposeful sampling method was used to select thirty private primary school Head teachers in Somaliland, Puntland, and Banadir regions. The selection of the ten Head teachers was based on their age, number of years of headship, qualifications, and teaching or non-teaching experience. They had given their consent during the initial introductory meeting, which was held individually. Important information was provided by the Head teachers during this meeting, like their personal data as well as individual profiles charting their career journey.

The interview

As Creswell (2013) recommends, the paper reduced the entire study to a single, overarching central question and several sub-questions. "Drafting this central question took considerable work because of its breadth" (p. 139). To reach the overarching central question, the paper took Creswell's advice to state the broadest question to address the research problem and hence addressed the following main question: What impact has the armed conflict had on the leadership and management of schools?
Participants were presented with a set of questions about their experiences and their four key interview questions were incorporated into the central question the paper sought.

Interview question 1:

Were you a Head teacher before the Civil War? Were you working in education before the conflict?
Was your school in operation during the armed conflict?

Interview question 2:

Were you a Headteacher during the armed conflict?
How has the armed conflict impacted your role as Headteacher?

Interview question 3:

What strategies or managerial responses have you undertaken to minimize any impact?

Interview question 4:

Were there any other challenges in applying these strategies/ approaches?

Findings

The paper has generated a number of key points, and these were taken for the discussion along with the key points presented in the introduction and the literature review section of the paper. Participants were asked to respond to some structured interview questions based on Mumford's Skills Model: competencies and managing environmental changes.

Key points that emerged from interviews

Sixty percent of those interviewed were Headteachers before the civil war erupted. Of that number, 55% are still Headteachers, while 10% have retired. Thirty-five percent indicated that they were not Headteachers before the armed conflict, and only 15 percent of this cohort were working in education, while 20% of this group were in education or school management.

The vast majority of the participants' serving as Headteachers had experience ranging between 6 to 30 years. Over 80% had served more than ten years as a Headteacher, while 20% were in this role for more than six years. In responding to the question regarding school operation during active armed conflict, only 20% stated that their schools were in operation at the start of the conflict, while 62% indicated their schools were irregular in terms of operation due to school premises being occupied by armed militia or influential people who were not associated with any armed groups.

Sixty-five percent of the participants have indicated that they were Headteachers during armed conflict, after successful re-opening of their schools on an on-off basis due to ongoing conflict. In their responses to the negative impact on school operations, including staff

and children's safety, recruiting teachers, and managing teaching and learning resources, participants indicated that their personal skills and experience played a significant role in the way they managed the effect of the conflict. Participants further explained the direct impact of the conflict on their role as Headteachers and stated that these impacts include:

- Reopening of schools
- Concerns about safety to and from school for staff and children
- Safety during school time
- Teacher recruitment and retention
- Lack of means to manage staff performance and support.
- Lack of resources
- Lack of support for Teachers and other staff from outside the school
- Managing and maintaining external relations
- Volatility of the situations and instabilities
- Lack of means to manage teaching and learning assessment

In their responses to the question related to the strategies or managerial responses that participants undertook to minimise any impact of the armed conflict on their roles as Headteachers, their responses varied; some were too generic and less detailed, while others (HT 06, HT 09, and HT 12) provided detailed responses to the question.

Participant (HT06)

"My school was reopened as a result of community-led mobilisation, and this has enabled me to count on the support of the community. I led the school in partnership with the community and like-minded individuals. I think this was the best approach to managing the school during a crisis. Joint planning and organisational management with members of the community have enabled the management of the school to create a protected and positive learning environment for staff and children. Personal qualities and competencies have had a great influence on the way I applied this strategy."

Participant (HT09)

"I believe the effective outcome of a leader during a crisis is influenced by their personal and professional skills in dealing with challenges faced by the school. The skills include how you treat your staff, deal with significant issues, including safety and resources, and manage internal and external disputes. If teachers and staff are not happy, they will leave, and no teacher means no students. There is a high demand for teachers' increased pay and safety in certain areas where conflict may still be active. Shortages of teachers sometimes force school leaders to teach, especially those who possess teaching skills. These staff turbulences have knock-on effect on schools' overall subscription as parents remove their children if a school doesn't have any teachers to teach their children".

Participant (HT12)

"Every school leader must be equipped with skills that help him or her to deal with people who are experiencing many challenges in life, including trauma and different personalities. The school leader must understand the circumstances surrounding the school during a crisis, including the armed conflict. Social skills, knowledge, and spiritual competency are vital skills for me and for others when it comes to being a leader. My personal experience during the armed conflict was that staff faced repercussions from parents and relatives of students if they failed or gave low marks to their children. In some cases, staff had to choose between life and death situations in assessing students, particularly those whose parents or relatives are part of the militia group. Communities will have greater respect for leaders who hold stronger spiritual competencies, compassion, and knowledge of education.

Discussion and Conclusion

The enormity of the effects on education during and after armed conflict was felt everywhere. These effects included the complete destruction of education in both physical and human forms. One of the main priorities for any parent or community during a crisis is the continuation of education. However noble this effort of reopening schools, this is not without a challenge. Most schools were not used for years during the conflict because they were in areas where armed conflict continued to be active. In responding to the question related to managing external environmental factors and their direct impact on

education, some participants were explicit with their responses to the question. The leader's skills in dealing with these changes matter significantly. He or she should have the ability to reconsider the operating systems that existed before the conflict and revisit these systems and their relevance to the changing environment. A significant number of participants were Headteachers before the civil war and felt the negative impact of the conflict immediately. Although participants' responses vary in strategies, they used to continue education during armed conflict, and they strongly agreed that the conflict had a negative impact on schools' day-to-day operations.

There is clear evidence that their approaches to responding to external changes vary, and these are influenced by their skills, experience, personal and professional competencies. These responses link with the statement by Mumford et al. (2000), who state that an effective performance by a leader during a crisis is determined by their capability and skills in problem solving, social judgement skills, and knowledge. These skills include being able to define significant problems, gather problem information, formulate new understandings about the problem, and generate prototype plans for problem solutions" (Northouse, 2016, p. 48). Defining these problems includes how leaders pay attention to these changes and their impact on school life and work with others and communities to mobilise a collective response. Good social skills, knowledge, and spiritual competencies are vital when it comes to working with people from different entities, such as school staff, parents, and the wider community.

Participants also acknowledge that their main role as headteachers was to ensure normalcy and effective relationships among staff members are maintained by acquiring and allocating resources, maintaining effective external relations, and building a mutually supportive school community. This is what Day and Sammons highlighted earlier: "Headteachers do this through planning the organisational management of the school, planning for effective teaching and learning activities, creating a positive school climate, building a collaborative organisational learning culture, developing staff, and building community leadership" (Day & Sammons 2016, p. 7).

In conclusion, participants agreed with the notion that leaders' successes in leading and managing schools during conflict depend on how they redefine culture and structure, resource management, the roles and responsibilities of staff, and their own, as well as managing

external relations, which are vital in the case of armed conflict. Leaders must gain the necessary competencies for effective 'karti,' and these require a set of skills including personal and professional, cultural, and spiritual competencies, as well as experience and knowledge.

Recommendations

The paper acknowledges the uniqueness of Somalia's education system, which has experienced total destruction for more than two decades. The enormity of the effects on education during and after armed conflict was felt everywhere, including in the teacher training provision as well as in the preparation and development of schools and school leaders. The paper makes the following recommendations:

- Further research is needed on the impact of conflict on school management during conflict and what support is made available to them.

- There is a need for comprehensive education policies that guide all stakeholders in the provision of education services that support school leaders.
- Training and development for school leaders
- School owners and the wider community support keeping children, staff, and school leaders safe during crises.
- For the headteachers, they create distributed leadership opportunities for middle managers. This helps middle leaders' step in, in the event of a leadership absence.

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PART 4

EFFECTIVE GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC SERVICE



Health Investment and Economic Growth: A Pathway to Sustainable Development for Somalia

Dr. Mohammed A.M Ahmed

Abstract

This study presents an in-depth analysis of the impact of health investment on Somalia's economic growth, predominantly utilizing secondary data. It aims to establish a correlation between increased healthcare investment and subsequent economic development, emphasizing the role of improved health conditions in fostering a more productive and educated workforce. The research methodology centers on the analysis of existing quantitative data, complemented by secondary qualitative sources such as published interviews and case studies. This method facilitates a detailed examination of the ways in which healthcare investment contributes to enhanced life expectancy, reduced disease burden, and increased population productivity and educational attainment. The study also delves into the potential of public-private partnerships in enhancing healthcare delivery in low- and middle-income countries, with a particular focus on primary healthcare. Significantly, the findings highlight an economic leverage effect, where investing one dollar in healthcare is projected to yield a four-dollar return in economic growth. This result underscores the efficiency and effectiveness of health investments, suggesting substantial economic benefits such as improved workforce participation, enhanced productivity, and overall economic growth. The study accentuates the crucial role of health investments as a key driver of sustainable development, particularly in contexts like Somalia, where such strategic investments are vital for long-term economic and societal progress.

Keywords: *Health Investment, Economic Growth, Somalia, Public-Private Partnerships, Sustainable Developments.*

Introduction

Health is a fundamental aspect of human development, and its impact on economic growth has gained significant attention in recent years. This article explores the relationship between health investment and economic growth, highlighting the various mechanisms through which improvements in health can contribute to long-term economic development. Somalia's health system has been weakened by three decades of civil war and instability, which has resulted in some of the lowest health indicators in the world. Between 26-70% of Somalia's 15 million people live in poverty, and an estimated 2.6 million people have been internally displaced[1]. The Somali government is committed to using current opportunities to strengthen health and social development, including the implementation of the Somali National Development Plan for 2019–2024 and the Somali Universal Health Coverage (UHC) Roadmap, launched in September 2019. Both plans identify primary health care as the main approach to improving health outcomes in the country[1].

The private sector has a significant role to play in improving health service delivery in Somalia. Private health services and the pharmaceutical sector are largely unregulated in Somalia but could contribute to improving access and achieving UHC [1], [2]. Public-private partnerships (PPPs) remain one of the important approaches adopted by Somalia to address the situation [3]. A study conducted in Somalia found that lease contracts and afterimage contracts are vital in public-private partnerships, which also influence the delivery of health services to the people within [4].

The Global Action Plan for Healthy Lives and Well-being for All (GAP) is a collaborative initiative among 12 signatory agencies to help countries achieve their major health priorities. The initial focus has been on strengthening primary health care and sustainable financing for health. Somalia is one of the countries where progress under the GAP is most advanced and where its added value has been most clearly demonstrated. The GAP agencies and multilateral and bilateral partners have identified 5 priorities for enhanced collaboration to accelerate progress towards UHC. These include the establishment of the Health Sector Coordination Committee, which brings together partners across the federal and local governments, Somaliland, UN agencies, donors, and civil society to build consensus around a priority package of essential services and critical health system reforms [1].

Health Investment: Definition and Types

Investing in health encompasses a wide range of interventions, summarized in the following three categories:

- Healthcare infrastructure: This includes building and maintaining hospitals, clinics, laboratories, and other facilities that provide health services to the population.
- Access to essential services: This involves ensuring that people have access to quality and affordable health services, such as primary care, maternal and child health, emergency care, and specialized care.
- Disease prevention and health promotion: This covers activities that aim to prevent or reduce the burden of diseases and promote healthy behaviors, such as vaccinations, health screenings, health education, sanitation, and nutrition.

"Health *is state of complete physical, mental and social wellbeing and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity". (WHO)*
"Health Care; Protecting and promoting the health of people is essential to human welfare and sustained economy and social development". (Alma-Ata Declaration September,1978).

Health Investment and Economic Growth: Theoretical and Empirical Linkages

Investments in health have led to improved population health outcomes, which, in turn, have profound implications for economic growth. The main linkages between health investment and economic growth are:

1. **Increased life expectancy and productivity:** Investments in health can increase life expectancy by reducing mortality rates from infectious and chronic diseases. Longer lives mean more years of productive work, resulting in growth in GDP. A recent study estimates that every dollar invested in health in a developing country yields between $2 to $4 in economic returns1. Fig





Figure 1 Investment in Health

2. **Increased workforce participation and educational attainment:** Investments in health can also increase workforce participation by reducing morbidity rates from diseases and injuries. A healthy population is more likely to be productive, contribute to increased labor supply, higher educational attainment, and reduced absenteeism due to sicknesses. Moreover, healthier individuals have higher earning potential, leading to greater income generation and overall economic prosperity of the country[2]. Fig 2

Figure 2: Disability Adjusted Life Years Daly



3. **Reduced healthcare costs:** Investments in health can also play a crucial role in reducing healthcare costs, by focusing on preventive measures, such as vaccinations, health screenings, and health education that can mitigate the impact of costly diseases and epidemics. This not only preserves public resources but also allows individuals and households to allocate their financial resources towards other investments, further contributing to economic growth[3].

Health Investment and Impacts on economic Growth in Low- and Middle-Income Countries (LMICs).

In LMICs, health investments take on added significance due to specific economic and social contexts:

1. **High Impact Potential:** Health investments in LMICs can have a disproportionately high impact on economic growth. These countries often face a higher burden of preventable diseases, and investments in healthcare infrastructure, disease prevention, and health promotion can lead to significant improvements in population health.

2. **Economic Catch-Up:** Many LMICs are in the process of economic catch-up, seeking to close the income gap with high-income countries. Improving health can be a crucial driver of this catch-up process, as healthier populations are more productive and can contribute more to economic growth.

3. **Human Capital Development:** In the human capital' revolution in economics, there was a conceptual base that health is a core contributor to an individual's human capital. In addition, health of an individual is capital which diminishes with natural aging. Diseases accelerate the fade out of health, therefore investing in health slows down this loss. From this point of view, LMICs can benefit substantially from health investments as they strive to build human capital. A healthy population is better equipped to acquire education and skills, which are essential for economic development. This can contribute to a more skilled and productive workforce.

4. **Reduced Economic Vulnerability:** Health investments can help LMICs reduce economic vulnerability, particularly in the face of health crises such as Covid-19. A robust healthcare system and investments in preparedness can prevent significant economic losses during pandemics or other health emergencies.

5. **Inequality Reduction and health equity:** Health investments in LMICs should address health inequalities, as these countries often have stark disparities in healthcare access and outcomes. Reducing health disparities can promote social cohesion and enhance economic stability.

6. **Private Sector Role (Public Private Partnerships PPP):** The private sector often plays a significant role in healthcare delivery in LMICs. Encouraging responsible private sector engagement can improve access to healthcare services and contribute to both health and economic outcomes.

7. **Resource Constraints:** Many LMICs face resource constraints, which can make it challenging to allocate sufficient funds to health investments. International aid and partnerships to make sustainable health programs can be vital in supporting these countries' efforts to improve healthcare infrastructure and services. **Mixed financing Models**, involving the state, the private sector, people and non-governmental organizations would be a solution to get funding for healthcare investments.

8. **Long-Term Vision:** LMICs need to balance short-term economic pressures with long-term health investments. While immediate economic gains are essential, long-term health investments can lay the foundation for sustained economic growth.

9. **Global Interconnectedness:** The health of populations in LMICs is not isolated from the global community. Diseases can spread across borders, affecting both health and economic stability. International collaboration and support for LMICs' health systems are crucial for global health security and economic well-being of the whole world.

10. **Technology Transfer and Innovation:** Through partnerships knowledge sharing and cooperation LMICs can leverage technology transfer and innovations to improve healthcare delivery and outcomes. Access to affordable healthcare technologies and pharmaceuticals can drive both health improvements and economic development.

Conclusion

Investments in health are essential for achieving sustainable economic development. By improving population health outcomes, health investments can increase life expectancy, productivity, workforce participation, education attainment, income generation, and reduce healthcare costs. Therefore, policy makers should prioritize health investment particularly public private partnerships, mixed financing methods and afterimage contracts as the key strategy for enhancing healthcare delivery and economic growth in Somalia.

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PART 5

ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE IN SOMALIA: MITIGATIONS AND SUSTAINABLE SOLUTIONS



Climate Change Impact and Mitigation in Somalia: Water Harvesting and Conservation

Dr. Shariff Osman, Ph.D.

Abstract

This article offers an overview of the impact of climate change in Somalia and proposes a sustainable water harvesting and conservation program as a solution. The article examines the far-reaching consequences of climate change in Somalia, highlighting the severe repercussions of annual flooding, droughts, and erratic seasonal rainfall, which have resulted in dire famine-like conditions among the population. Based on our thorough observations, we put forward a recommendation for a sustainable water harvesting and conservation program aimed at alleviating these effects and fostering resilience in both the land and the nation, thereby fortifying them against future disasters. The proposed program forms an integral part of a comprehensive ecosystem restoration plan specifically tailored for Somalia's arid and semiarid regions. By implementing this initiative, we can rejuvenate the land and bring tangible advantages to the local inhabitants, their livestock, and agricultural activities. Moreover, this program stands out for being cost-effective, sustainable, and manageable, aligning harmoniously with the United Nations' "Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 15," which focuses on safeguarding and rehabilitating terrestrial ecosystems. To ensure the robustness and effectiveness of our findings and recommendations, we eagerly welcome feedback and insights from the expert community. By engaging in constructive dialogue, we aim to refine our approach and enhance the proposed solutions to address the pressing challenges posed by climate change in Somalia.

***Keywords*:** *Climate change, droughts, water harvesting, conservation, Dams*

Introduction

This article explains the impact of climate change on Somalia and attempts to propose mitigation about the best prospects to confront this ever-escalating Somali and global problem. Climate change refers to long-term shifts in temperatures and weather patterns. These shifts may be natural, such as through variations in the solar cycle (Majid et al. 2023). During the last decade, the change in the world climate due to the use of fossil fuels for energy generation and industrial production was felt and experienced in every continent. It became one of the most pressing topics of human discourse. Moreover, scientists have proven the continuous rise of global temperature, 1.01° C since the 1800s, and its adverse impact on human well-being while at the same time providing warnings and proposing methods of mitigation to avert severe climate change consequences (Adham, Riksen, Ouessar, & Ritsema, 2016). Thus, many international and national conferences are convened to discuss the best ideas to curb rising temperatures and simultaneously mitigate global warming in the future. Climate change has adversely impacted some of the developing countries in Africa due to their fragile socioeconomic status. In Africa, Somalia is one of the most fragile countries geographically, economically, and socio-politically which has been adversely impacted by climate change.

Climate Change Impact on Somalia

Somalia is a fragile country in various ways. About two-thirds of the country is geographically dry land, mainly dependent on erratic and unreliable rainy seasons. In addition, recovering from a long civil war and still suffering from insecurity, the current drought (2022-2023) looming for the last three years has made matters even worse (Kotikula, & Masaki, 2022). These are the complex conditions that further complicate the fragility of the economy and the sociopolitical state of the country. Today in Somalia, every single minute of every single day, a child is admitted to a health facility for treatment of severe acute malnutrition (UNICEF, 2022). The latest admission rates from August show 44,000 children admitted with severe acute malnutrition. That is a child per minute." In a related (UNICEF, 2022) Report, drought has influenced 7.8 million Somalis [out of a population of 18 million], with 213,000 in danger of famine. The COVID-19 pandemic burden compounded this, and now, the Russia-Ukraine war.

On the other hand, Somalia has been affected by climate change's impact, which results from a century-long accumulation of global warming. The reduction of Somalia's annual precipitation and the increase of climatic

warming between 1901 and 2021 are depicted in the following chart (High Charts, World Bank Group, 2021). In the diagram, the high precipitation (blue) is replaced by high temperature (red). The chart indicates how the temperature has been warming for the last 100 years, resulting in precipitation loss. Hence, one can relate the real impact of climate change on Somalia, practically attested by the current drought, which has put the country on the edge of famine.

Chart 1: The Somali loss of precipitation and increase of temperature from 1901 – 2021



Source: HighCharts.com, in World Bank Group 2021

In this fragile setting, the climate change impact on Somalia is evident, where natural calamities are annually alternated between droughts and floods. After every drought, flash floods submerge towns and villages, destroying properties and washing away whatever harvest or livestock are salvaged from the drought. By comparison, before the Civil War, droughts and floods used to be decennary incidents that occurred once in a decade or two.

According to (World Bank, 2020) data, while the water dependency of Somalia is estimated at 59%, the country loses 4 billion (cubic meters) m3 of fresh water per year. This large amount of water could be harvested and utilized during the dry seasons to avoid droughts.

Table 1: Somalia water information

Renewable water resources	15 billion m3/year
Water use per capita	997 m3/year
Annual water loss	4 billion m3/year
Water Dependency	59%

Source: World Bank, 2020

Moreover, the continuous felling of trees since the collapse of the Somali state in 1991 has barred the land from its protective layers of plants and good soil, transforming it into a barren land. Compounded with insecurity, the previously fertile regions in the proximity of Juba and Shebelle Rivers are today abandoned by the farmers displaced by recurrent droughts, floods, and insecurity.

More than 53% of the Somali population live in rural areas and depend on farming and livestock as their livelihoods (World Bank, 2020). Nevertheless, those two occupations depend on the mercy of climate, and as the Somali economy relies on agriculture and livestock, both are sustained by seasonal rains. Hence, the dependency of livelihoods and the national economy on seasonal changes, weather patterns, and meteorological thermal shifts places the country captive to climate change. Hence, these climate-resultant conditions necessitate mitigation actions to minimize or alleviate the current and future environmental impacts. In the following segments, we explore the water stress of Somalia and the most appropriate mitigation options to utilize in this situation, concurrent to the UN's Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 15. (Mundondo et al. 2018) argue that this aims to protect, restore, and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss.

Somalia Water Stress

The overuse of water due to the increase in the Somali population and livestock over the years has created water stress, where the usage has increased, and the overall precipitation has decreased. The traditional seasonal rainfall (depicted in the following table) is no longer regular and reliable, where the rains are delayed at best and missed at the worst conditions. Practically speaking, since 2018, seasonal rains have been either missed or insufficient in most regions of the country, thus creating the worst drought in the last four decades. On the other hand, the most crucial seasonal rain of Somalia is the GU' (see the table below), which provides 75% of the annual rains, but if this rain season is missed, which usually happens nowadays, then the dayr season with just the 25% annual is not enough, and that results in a drought in the country.

Table 2: Somalia average seasonal rainfall

Seasonal Average Rainfall		
Gu' rains	April – June	75%
Dayr rains	Oct. – Dec.)	25%
Total	April – Dec.	100%

Source: World Bank (2020)

Options of Climate Change Impact Mitigation

The environmental degradation of Somalia, apart from climate change, ensues from deforestation and desertification, on the one hand, and prevalent scarcity of water and water resource mismanagement, on the other hand. These two conditions, which are somehow interrelated, have put the country into a fragile situation prone to a climatic predicament. Thus, confronting these two elements takes the principle of ecosystem restoration, which includes environmental protection and conservation, specifically forests and water. However, in this section, we discuss the importance of water harvesting and conservation, more so on water damming, which is the answer to the recurrent droughts in the country.

The two concepts of water harvesting and conservation are interconnected: Harvesting is the first step, and conservation is the second. Nonetheless, conservation encompasses preserving harvested water and the already naturally existing bodies of water. The mitigation concept contends to mitigate climate change's impact on vulnerable communities, intending to achieve climate resilience through the following approaches: the construction of water dams of various capacities along the fragile arid and semiarid drylands.

These water facilities could be dams, reservoirs, and canals, among other things. The opportunity to harvest and conserve water in Somalia is available because the average countrywide rainfall is estimated at 200mm (see the table below). While some dryland regions are 50-200 mm., others get 400- 600mm. of rainfall annually. In addition, even when seasonal rains are missed, the upstream water basins from the Ethiopian highland provide enough water worth conserving. These upstream waters flood Somali regions every other year along the banks of Juba and Shebelle basins. Most of those flood waters could be harvested and conserved for flood control and future use during the dry seasons.

Table 3: Countrywide average rainfall

Regional Average annual rainfall		
Northern coastline	50 mm	
Sothern (regions)	400 mm	
Southwest	600 mm	
Total average rainfall	200 mm	
Average annual %	April - Dec.	200mm

Source: World Bank (2021)

Water Harvesting

Water harvesting is simply a process in which rainwater, runoff, or seasonal rivers and spring waters are collected into pre-prepared water catchments or dams for the purpose of water conservation and management. Harvesting and conservation are interconnected and treated as a holistic "method for inducing, collecting, storing and conserving local surface runoff for [livestock and] agriculture in arid and semiarid regions (Adham et al., 2016). The objective is to collect water at the time of abundance and use it during scarcity.

Historically speaking, African nations have long recognized the importance of water harvesting and have audaciously started implementing man-made or artificial lakes in the 60s and 70s. These African countries have since benefited immensely from these development projects, ecologically and economically, which is something we can learn from them. In the following table, we listed five of the major artificial lakes in Africa, their locations, and sizes:

Table 4: African man-made lakes

Africa		Location	Size
1	Lake Nasser	Egypt	7,502 square miles
2	Lake Kariba	Zambia /Zimbabwe	2,150 square miles
3	Lake Volta	Ghana	3,275 square miles
4	Lake Kainji	Nigeria	772 square miles
5	Cahora Bassa	Mozambique	1,752 square miles

Source: Flash Uganda media (2023)

Hence, in Somalia, we often see springs and rivers flooding the land during the rainy seasons and then drying up as soon as the dry season starts. During the rainy seasons, we have to harvest the flush water to use it during the drought times. In some cases, there are low-budget water harvesting systems designed to satisfy the needs of a household. At the same time, at other times, there are medium and large projects, such as reservoirs and dams, designed to satisfy the needs of entire communities. For example, the Gabiley Dam, about the size of one Km2 and with a volume of 1 million m3 of water, was built in 2021 with a budget of less than two million dollars and was implemented in just six months. This dam is an excellent example of an efficient water project in terms of its low budget, period of implementation, and capacity to serve the whole region of Gabiley. That is one of the reasons that we advocate for the implementation of more Gabiley-like dams in Somalia

Integrated Water Harvesting Systems

In rural and semi-rural areas, the integrated water harvesting system is most appropriate, where water catchments or dams are combined with artisan wells built in the same area, with the deliberate intention of benefiting from the dam permeation process to replenish the subsurface water systems, even after the dams dry up. It was realized that the Gabiley Dam had replenished the subsurface water of 10 km2 area. Integrated water harvesting requires excavating swales around the integrated catchment to slow down runoff water for water permeation purposes in the nearby land. This process is primarily suitable for rural and semi-urban dry lands. However, there are different kinds of water catchments based on the nature of the land topography.

Harvesting water around highland areas is easy, where watersheds drain rainwater into the underlying valleys to form seasonal rivers and springs. A watershed is formed when several spring-like water collectors drain runoff water into a central water system. Some significant watersheds create rivers, while the minor ones become seasonal or temporary springs that dry up after several days or weeks. The latter one is usually selected for harvesting before it dries up.

Thus, it is easy to harvest water from highlands and even from low-lying hilly vicinities. However, even in plains (flatland areas), landscaping designated to form water drainage sources that drain runoff water into the dams is created. This landscaping happens while excavating the dam or the

catchment, where the removed sand is emptied into a water drainage arrangement that collects water into the dam. Moreover, it is also possible to design grounded aqueducts around the catchment area to channel water into the required direction of the dam.

Fig. 1. Integrated water harvesting layout



Source: Digital diagram by the Author

This cross-sectional drawing indicates how the excavated sand or soil is arranged as water drainage to collect water into the dam. Swales are also shown at the left corner of the dam to slow down runoff water and replenish the water table.

The Rationale Behind Water Harvesting

During droughts, rivers and springs dry up, and water wells, traditionally the ultimate water resources, either dry up or become semi-dry. Only the deep-water boreholes become the only source of water. This scarcity of water creates a large number of people and livestock competing for this limited water resource, resulting in a conflict. For the last few years, the Ministry of Energy and Water Resources and numerous other nongovernmental agencies, including Qatar Charity, have shown reluctance to invest in water wells unless it is a deep-water borehole with an approximate depth of hundreds of meters. However, investing in deep-water wells compared to water dams is not viable because of the multipurpose added value of water dams. While the water wells provide water to a limited population and their livestock, dams are more reliable and provide more water with other value-added resources.

Climate Change will create a decline in Somalia's water resources over time. In an interview with people aged 55 - 75 years who were born on the riverbanks of towns along the Shebelle River, they unanimously indicated that the current follow of the river is well below what they used to see during their young lives, especially in the last 40 years. The same thing is happening to the neighboring countries, and each country is anxious to conserve its share of

water resources. This condition puts Somalia in a precarious situation since the country is downstream, and thus, 59% of the national water resources come from Ethiopia. This situation is worsened because the two countries have no water-related agreements, and every time Ethiopia develops a water development project upstream, this adds up to more decline in the downstream water sources. This water stress, again, necessitates the importance of water damming and conservation on the part of Somalia to reserve enough water for its population.

The Importance of Water Damming

In this article, we strongly advocate for investment in dams, highlighting their numerous benefits. Some of the key advantages of dams include:

1. Irrigation: Dams enable the irrigation of land, allowing the area people to irrigate their land to grow crops and fodder for their livestock during the dry seasons.
2. Ecosystem restoration and water table replenishment: Dams help replenish the water table in their vicinity, ensuring a sustainable water supply for both human and ecological needs and restoring the surrounding ecosystem.
3. Ecotourism attraction: Dams can serve as attractive tourist destinations, promoting ecotourism and contributing to local economies through increased visitor traffic.
4. Fish farming opportunities: Dams provide a favorable environment for fish farming, offering a valuable source of food and income for the local population, particularly during drought seasons.

Given the current situation of climate change-induced droughts, we strongly urge governments and international agencies to invest in small and medium-sized multipurpose dams. Such infrastructure is crucial in addressing the water scarcity challenges faced by rural communities. By harnessing the potential of these dams, we can effectively alleviate the adverse impacts of droughts on vulnerable populations. Moving forward, we will now outline in detail the various benefits associated with water dams.

Water Dam Irrigation

Irrigation plays a crucial role in promoting agricultural practices that enable individuals to cultivate crops necessary for sustaining their livelihoods. For nomadic communities, this means transitioning from solely relying on livestock to adopting agro pastoral methods, thereby combining agricultural and livestock activities to enhance their overall productivity. By diversifying their income sources through farming, these communities can establish a more sustainable way of life.

In addition to cultivating crops, nomads can leverage the byproducts of their traditional produce, such as corn, sorghum, and sesame, as fodder for their livestock. This agro pastoral practice of producing fodder not only ensures a steady supply of feed for the animals but also fosters resilience within the community. By integrating crop farming and livestock rearing, the community becomes better equipped to withstand challenges and adapt to changing circumstances.

Fish Farming

Fish farming is a crucial economic activity that brings significant benefits to Somalia's low- income and rural communities. This viable economic venture can be undertaken in nearly any region with a permanent or semi-permanent body of water. The livelihoods of these rural communities are heavily reliant on seasonal rains, which, unfortunately, have become increasingly erratic and unreliable as a result of climate change. Consequently, the construction of a water dam that could support fish farming would greatly enhance the well-being of these communities. It would enable them to sustain their livelihoods during dry seasons, thus mitigating the risk of famine and ensuring a more secure future.

Ecotourism

Water dams offer an additional advantage by fostering the growth of ecotourism. By providing a source of water, they nurture ecosystems that support diverse flora and fauna, attracting a wide range of wildlife species. This flourishing ecosystem becomes a magnet for visitors, thereby generating ecotourism opportunities for local communities. Tourists are willing to spend on services such as transportation, accommodation, and tour guides, thereby stimulating the local economy. In turn, this economic activity creates employment opportunities and fosters the development of small family businesses within a community.

Ecosystem Restoration

Considering the water stress situation in the country, it is essential to recognize the advantages of water dams. One significant benefit is the rejuvenation of the surrounding environmental systems. Through water permeation, the water table is replenished, leading to the restoration of shallow water wells and the irrigation of land around the dam. This active ecosystem restoration is crucial for maintaining a healthy and sustainable environment. Additionally, water dams provide a reliable water source for agricultural and industrial use, contributing to communities' overall development and growth. Therefore, Somali experts must continue exploring and expanding our knowledge of water dams' benefits and potential drawbacks to ensure responsible and effective management of this valuable resource.

Resettlement Initiative

As time passes and the various activities mentioned earlier begin to take place, human settlements tend to form in the vicinity of the dam. This is due to the fact that the dam provides a range of amenities that support human life. Over time, some of the pastoral communities that reside in these areas are able to explore new options and opportunities, such as becoming semi- rural farmers, agro-pastoralists, fish farmers, tour guides, and service providers for the tourism industry. These new opportunities allow these communities to expand their horizons and improve their standard of living, while also contributing to the local economy.

Possible Disadvantages

Waterborne diseases pose a significant threat in humid tropical environments where water is abundant. Malaria, bilharzia disease, and yellow fever exemplify the health hazards associated with untreated water. Nevertheless, these risks can be minimized through diligent monitoring of water sanitation and hygiene, along with strict adherence to regulations governing dam usage and maintenance. It is imperative for expert communities to comprehend the potential perils of waterborne diseases and the requisite preventive measures. Equally important is the dissemination of awareness about these issues to the general public, given the potential devastating impact of waterborne diseases on communities. By fostering collaboration and implementing effective strategies, the communities can collectively tackle this challenge.

Dam Management and Maintenance

When it comes to managing dams, there are two main approaches: a government-led system under the Ministry of Energy and Water Resources, and a community-managed system under a government-set protocol. While both of these approaches have their pros and cons, we recommend the latter for its efficiency and cost-effectiveness. In Somalia, communities have a long history of effective water management systems spanning centuries. Typically, a committee of elders is selected by the community to manage water reservoirs, with subcommittees working with the elders to facilitate their recommendations and decrees. We can safeguard against the spread of waterborne illnesses and create a safer, healthier world for all.

By empowering local communities to manage dams, the cost of management and maintenance is absorbed by the community, making it a one-time investment project. However, it is important to note that dams cannot continue to function without regular maintenance and management. Maintenance may involve issues such as sanitation and silt derangement, which need to be addressed every few years. By establishing a community-led system for managing dams, the maintenance and management costs can be efficiently and effectively shared, making it a sustainable solution for ensuring the long-term success of these important infrastructure projects. As researchers in this field, we understand the importance of effective dam management and are committed to expanding our knowledge and expertise in this area. By working closely with local communities and government officials, we can help to develop sustainable, community-led solutions for managing dams that are both environmentally and economically responsible.

Conclusion

The impact of climate change on Somalia is severe, and mitigation measures must be taken immediately. One of the best courses of action is the construction of multipurpose dams and reservoirs. As environmental and water resources researchers, we must understand that water wells are single-purpose, expensive, and often shallow, which causes them to dry up during the dry seasons when water is most needed. In contrast, dams are cost-effective, retain water during the dry seasons, and provide value-added economic significance as tourist destinations and fish farming opportunities for local communities. During droughts, fish consumption is life-saving when harvests fail, and livestock is unsuitable for consumption due to physical health conditions. Another compelling reason for water harvesting is the 4 billion m3 of freshwater Somalia loses yearly, necessitating water harvesting

and conservation. Therefore, we know that the construction of dams allows for the growth of certain crops and the provision of fish meat during severe droughts. Hence, we highly recommend the construction of multipurpose dams and reservoirs in Somalia. Not only will they help mitigate the impact of climate change, but they will also provide economic benefits to local communities and ensure the conservation of freshwater resources.

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PART 6
CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE STATE-BUILDING PROCESS



The Role of Civil Society on State Building in Somali

Ahmed Osman Nur

Abstract

The study aims to explore the role of civil society in state-building in Somalia. It seeks to understand how civil society organizations participate in the process of state-building, examine their involvement in Somalia's state-building efforts, and evaluate their overall impact and significance. The research methodology employed in the study involves a comprehensive review of existing literature, reports, and case studies related to civil society and state-building in Somalia. Additionally, interviews and consultations with experts, stakeholders, and representatives from civil society organizations will be conducted to gather firsthand insights and perspectives. The findings of the study will contribute to a deeper understanding of the dynamics between civil society and state-building in Somalia. It will shed light on the various ways in which civil society organizations have been actively engaged in state-building, such as advocating for good governance, promoting human rights, facilitating peacebuilding initiatives, and providing essential services to communities. Furthermore, the study will assess the impact of civil society's involvement in state-building efforts, including the challenges and opportunities they encounter. It will evaluate the effectiveness of their strategies, the extent of their influence on policy-making processes, and their ability to mobilize communities and foster social cohesion. The results of the study will be significant for policymakers, practitioners, and researchers interested in understanding the complex dynamics of state-building in fragile contexts like Somalia. It will provide insights into the potential contributions of civil society organizations and inform strategies for enhancing their role in state-building processes. Ultimately, the research aims to contribute to the ongoing efforts to establish a stable, inclusive, and effective state in Somalia, with the active participation of civil society as a crucial component.

Keywords: *Civil society, state building, governance, social cohesion, conflict, political instability, human rights, service provision, civic engagement, accountability, transparency*.

Introduction

Civil society plays a significant role in state building at various levels, including global, regional, and within specific countries and regions. In Africa, and more specifically in East Africa, civil society organizations have been actively engaged in shaping governance structures, advocating for human rights, and contributing to the development of inclusive and democratic societies. The introduction will focus on the role of civil society in state building in Africa, East Africa, and particularly Somalia. In Somalia, civil society faces significant challenges in state building and governance since the collapse of its central government in 1991. The absence of a functioning state has resulted in political instability, armed conflict, and humanitarian crises. In such a context, civil society has emerged as a critical actor in the state-building process, playing a crucial role in filling governance gaps, promoting peace and reconciliation, and addressing the needs of the population. The study examines the role of civil society in state building in Somalia, highlighting its contributions, challenges, and potential for fostering sustainable development and stability.

According to Brinkerhoff, & Brinkerhoff, (2017), civil society has been instrumental in promoting democratic values, fostering citizen participation, and advocating for accountable governance. In many countries, civil society organizations have emerged as key actors in challenging authoritarian regimes, promoting social justice, and advocating for policy reforms that prioritize the well-being of citizens. They have played a crucial role in ensuring that governments are held accountable for their actions, promoting transparency, and advocating for the protection of civil liberties and human rights.

Within the East African region, civil society organizations have been at the forefront of promoting regional integration, peace, and stability. They have been involved in conflict resolution, peacebuilding initiatives, and reconciliation processes in countries such as Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, and Burundi. By fostering dialogue, promoting understanding, and advocating for peaceful solutions, civil society has contributed to the prevention and resolution of conflicts, ultimately facilitating state-building efforts in the region (De Waal, 2010).

In Somalia, civil society has faced unique challenges due to decades of conflict, political instability, and the presence of armed groups. However, civil society organizations have played a crucial role in providing essential services, promoting human rights, and advocating for democratic governance. They

have been actively engaged in efforts to rebuild institutions, strengthen the rule of law, and promote social cohesion in the country. Civil society actors have worked towards empowering marginalized communities, supporting women's rights, and advocating for inclusive political processes (Kanyinga, & Mitullah, 2009).

Despite the challenging environment, civil society organizations in Somalia have been resilient and have made notable contributions to state building. They have been involved in processes such as constitutional reforms, electoral support, and community development initiatives. By amplifying the voices of marginalized groups, advocating for their rights, and fostering citizen participation, civil society has played a vital role in shaping the trajectory of state-building in Somalia (Omaar, 2013).

Civil society plays a crucial role in state-building processes by fostering inclusive governance, promoting citizen participation, and advocating for social and political reforms. It encompasses diverse range of non-governmental organizations, community groups, professional associations, trade unions, and grassroots movements that operate independently from the state and contribute to shaping public policies and decision-making (Muula, 2011).

However, the role of civil society in state building is not without challenges. CSOs often face constraints such as limited resources, legal restrictions, and government crackdowns on civic freedoms. Governments must recognize and respect the autonomy and independence of civil society, allowing them to operate freely and contribute to the development of a robust and inclusive state. In summary, civil society plays a vital role in state-building by promoting citizen participation, advocating for social and political reforms, fostering accountability, and contributing to the development of inclusive and democratic societies. By bridging the gap between the government and citizens, civil society strengthens governance structures and helps build resilient and responsive states.

Problem Statement

Years of conflict and neglect have left Somalia with a severely underdeveloped infrastructure. Basic services, such as electricity, clean water, transportation, and communication systems, are lacking or inadequate in many parts of the country. This hampers economic development and social progress. However, corruption has been a persistent issue in Somalia, undermining governance, public trust, and economic development. It hampers effective

service delivery, diverts public resources, and perpetuates inequality and poverty. Furthermore, Somalia's political landscape is heavily influenced by clan-based politics, which can hinder national unity and effective governance. Clan rivalries and power struggles have often impeded the establishment of inclusive and stable institutions.

First, Somalia has experienced political instability for decades, with frequent changes in government, weak institutions, and ongoing conflicts. The country has not had a functioning central government since the fall of Siad Barre's regime in 1991, leading to a power vacuum and a lack of effective governance. Secondly, there are armed conflicts with various factions and armed groups vying for power. The extremist group Al-Shabaab has been particularly active, conducting terrorist attacks and controlling large parts of the country. These conflicts have resulted in significant loss of life, displacement of people, and a general sense of insecurity. Thirdly, Somali has faced recurrent droughts, famine, and other natural disasters, exacerbating the already dire humanitarian situation. Millions of people have been affected, leading to widespread displacement, food insecurity, and inadequate access to healthcare and education. Also, the waters off the coast of Somalia have been infested with piracy, posing a significant threat to international shipping and trade. Somali pirates have hijacked commercial vessels, demanded ransoms, and caused economic losses. Finally, external interference from regional and international actors, with competing interests and interventions exacerbates the country's problems. Foreign interventions have at times further complicated the political dynamics and impeded progress towards stability.

In conclusion, addressing these challenges requires sustained efforts in building strong and inclusive institutions, promoting reconciliation and peacebuilding, investing in infrastructure and basic services, tackling corruption, and fostering economic development. It also necessitates international support and cooperation to help Somalia overcome its longstanding problems and establish a stable and prosperous state. Therefore, my research focuses on how civil society can be involved in resolving state-building among Somali people, to investigate the conflict issues to get a permanent solution and sustainable stability in the future.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of the study was to explore and understand the role of civil society in state-building specifically within the context of Somalia. Somalia has faced significant challenges related to state fragility, political instability, and prolonged conflict, making it an important case study for examining the contributions of civil society in the state-building process. By focusing on civil society's role, the study aimed to shed light on the initiatives, activities, and impact of civil society organizations in Somalia's state-building efforts. It sought to identify how civil society has contributed to peacebuilding, social cohesion, and sustainable development, as well as its involvement in promoting democratic governance, accountability, and citizen participation.

Research Objectives

i. To determine how civil society participates in state building in Somalia.
ii. To examine the historical involvement of civil society in state building in Somalia.
iii. To evaluate the role of civil society in the state-building process in Somalia.

Conceptual Framework

The conceptual framework for studying the role of civil society in state-building in Somalia can be structured around the following key dimensions:



Figure 1: Conceptual Framework

The conceptual framework above examines how collaboration enhances the impact of civil society and fosters collective efforts toward state-building in Somalia. By utilizing the conceptual framework, researchers can systematically analyze the role of civil society in state-building in Somalia. It provides a structure for examining the various dimensions, interactions, and dynamics involved in civil society's contributions to the state-building process.

Literature Review

Modem Civil Society Organizations on State-Building

Modem civil society organizations (CSOs) perform a vital part in state-building processes by promoting good governance, fostering democratic participation, advocating for human rights, and providing essential services to communities. Their engagement helps strengthen the relationship between the state and its citizens, facilitates social cohesion, and contributes to the overall development and stability of a nation. Here are some key roles of CSOs in state building, supported by relevant citations.

Promoting citizen participation and accountability: According to (Ottaway, and Carothers, 2000) CSOs act as intermediaries between the state and its citizens, promoting active participation in decision-making processes and holding governments accountable for their actions. They facilitate dialogue, organize public consultations, and advocate for inclusive policies that reflect the needs and aspirations of the people (Ottaway & Carothers, 2000). Advocating for human rights and social justice as mentioned by Risse and Sikkink (1999), CSOs serve as watchdogs, monitoring the state's adherence to human rights standards and advocating for social justice. They provide a platform for marginalized groups to voice their concerns, challenge discriminatory practices, and work towards creating an inclusive society. CSOs often fill gaps in service delivery by providing essential services such as healthcare, education, and economic support. Their initiatives complement state efforts, especially in areas where the government may have limited capacity or resources, contributing to social development and poverty reduction (Brinkerhoff, & Brinkerhoff, 2004).

CSOs play a crucial role in building social capital by fostering trust, cooperation, and networks among diverse groups within society. They bridge social divides, promote dialogue, and facilitate collective action, contributing to the overall stability and resilience of the state (Putnam, 1993). However, CSOs engage in policy advocacy, research, and analysis to influence policy

decisions and push for institutional reforms. They provide evidence-based recommendations, propose alternative solutions, and contribute to policy debates, leading to more effective and responsive governance. CSOs often play a critical role in conflict-affected areas by facilitating peacebuilding processes, promoting dialogue, and fostering reconciliation among different groups. They work towards addressing the root causes of conflicts, promoting understanding, and building trust among communities (Richmond, 2011).

CSOs act as independent monitors, assessing the performance of the state institutions, scrutinizing policies, and ensuring transparency and accountability in the governance process. They provide valuable feedback and recommendations to improve the functioning of public institutions and enhance public trust (Richmond, 2011). CSOs contribute to the capacity building of individuals and communities by providing training, education, and skills development programs. They empower citizens to actively engage in the state-building process, fostering a culture of participation and collective action (Edwards & Hulme, 1996). CSOs engage in advocacy campaigns to promote policy and legal reforms that align with democratic principles, social justice, and human rights. They work towards creating an enabling environment for civil society, advocating for legal frameworks that protect freedom of association, expression, and assembly (Pallas & Urpelainen, 2017). Finally, CSOs often act as intermediaries between local communities and global actors, facilitating the exchange of information, resources, and knowledge. They help amplify local voices on global platforms, contributing to the formulation of international policies and agendas that reflect the needs and priorities of the communities they represent (Clark, 2003).

Community-Based Civil Society Organizations on State-Building

Community-based civil society organizations play a crucial role in state-building processes. These organizations, often operating at the grassroots level, are driven by the interests and needs of local communities. Their efforts contribute to building a stronger and more inclusive state by promoting active citizen participation, fostering social cohesion, and addressing the specific challenges faced by marginalized groups. Here are some key roles played by community-based civil society organizations in state-building.

Community-based organizations facilitate citizen engagement and participation in decision-making processes. They provide platforms for community members to voice their concerns, opinions, and aspirations. By bridging the gap between citizens and the state, these organizations strengthen

democracy and governance, allowing citizens to influence policy and hold the state accountable (Hearn & Robinson, 2019).

However, Civil society organizations often advocate for policies and reforms that address the needs and rights of marginalized groups within a society. They work to ensure that the state's policies and programs are inclusive and responsive to the diverse needs of the population. Through research, lobbying, and public awareness campaigns, these organizations influence policy-making processes and promote social justice. Community-based civil society organizations often fill gaps in service delivery where the state may be unable to reach or provide adequate services (Carothers & Brechenmacher, 2014). They implement projects and programs that address community development needs, such as education, healthcare, infrastructure, and livelihood support. By doing so, these organizations contribute to building the capacity of local communities and reducing dependency on the state (Kaldor, 2003).

In post-conflict or fragile states, community-based civil society organizations play a vital role in promoting peace and reconciliation. They work on conflict resolution, fostering dialogue between different groups, and promoting social cohesion. These organizations often have a deep understanding of local dynamics and can bridge divides within communities, contributing to the stability and resilience of the state. Furthermore, in post-conflict or fragile states, civil society organizations play a significant role in promoting peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts. They work towards healing divisions, fostering dialogue, and building trust among different societal groups. Civil society organizations also provide platforms for mediation and conflict resolution, contributing to the overall stability and peace consolidation in the state (Carothers and Brechenmacher, 2014; Hadenius and Uggla, 2018).

Conclusion, civil society organizations act as independent watchdogs, monitoring the actions of the state and holding it accountable for its policies and practices. They provide transparency and oversight, ensuring that the state functions in the best interest of the citizens. By exposing corruption, advocating for good governance, and demanding accountability, these organizations contribute to building a more transparent and accountable state (UNDP, 2013).

Traditional Civil Society Organizations

Traditional civil society organizations play a crucial role in state-building processes by contributing to democratic governance, fostering social cohesion, advocating for citizens' rights, and providing essential services. Their activities can promote transparency, accountability, and citizen participation, which are fundamental to the development and consolidation of a strong and inclusive state. Here are some key roles that traditional civil society organizations fulfill in state-building.

Traditional civil society organizations often engage in capacity-building initiatives to strengthen the capabilities of individuals and communities in areas such as governance, human rights, and organizational management. By empowering citizens and fostering active citizenship, civil society organizations contribute to the development of an engaged and accountable society (Hadenius and Uggla, 2018). Civil society organizations often engage in activities that promote democratic values and practices, such as advocating for free and fair elections, monitoring the functioning of government institutions, and ensuring the rule of law. By doing so, they contribute to the establishment of accountable and transparent governance structures within the state (Keane, 2018).

Civil society organizations play a crucial role in promoting social cohesion and bridging social divides. They provide platforms for dialogue, facilitate community engagement, and promote inclusive policies that address social inequalities and promote social integration (Carothers and Brechenmacher, 2014). However, Civil society organizations are often at the forefront of advocating for human rights, civil liberties, and social justice. They monitor and report human rights violations, provide legal aid to marginalized communities, and advocate for policy changes that protect and promote citizens' rights (Hadenius & Uggla, 2018). Civil society organizations often engage in advocacy and policy influence to shape the development agenda and policy-making processes. They conduct research, gather evidence, and provide expertise on various social, economic, and political issues. By influencing policy formulation and implementation, civil society organizations contribute to the development of effective and responsive governance frameworks (Carothers & Brechenmacher, 2014).

However, traditional civil society organizations often fill gaps in service delivery, particularly in areas where the state's capacity is limited. They provide essential services such as healthcare, education, poverty alleviation, and disaster relief, thereby improving the well-being of citizens and

contributing to state-building efforts (Carothers & Brechenmacher, 2014). Furthermore, civil society organizations facilitate citizen participation in decision-making processes, enabling individuals and communities to have a voice in shaping public policies and holding governments accountable. They organize public forums, advocacy campaigns, and grassroots mobilization efforts to ensure that citizens' concerns are heard and addressed by the state (Keane, 2018).

Research Methodology

Methods of Data Collection

The paper discusses the role of civil society in state-building in Somalia. The study used quantitative non-experimental correlation and descriptive design. The sample of the study was 291 respondents drawn from a target population of 1,200 and the data collection process involved engaging with participants who filled out the questionnaires. However, due to the challenges and complexities in accessing the target population in Somalia, purposive sampling was used in selecting respondents from civil society organizations, government officials, community leaders, and other stakeholders who were actively engaged (businesses, private sector organizations, academic institutions, research organizations, media outlets, international organizations, and individuals who are directly affected by specific issues) in state-building processes. However, these samples were selected because of their availability and experience of the role of civil society in state-building in Somalia. The data was coded, organized, analyzed, and interpreted using the Statistical Packages for Social Scientists (SPSS). The study was conducted in Mogadishu which is the capital city of Somalia. Therefore, Table 1.2 below presents the total population, sample size, and sampling procedures as follows:

Table 1: Total population, sample size, and sampling procedures as follows

#	Category	Target population	Sample Size	Sampling Procedure
1	Civil society organizations	300	73	Purposive Sampling
2	Government officials	300	73	Purposive Sampling
3	Community leaders	300	73	Purposive Sampling
4	Other stakeholders actively engaged	300	72	Purposive Sampling
	Total	1200	291	

Source: Krejcie and Morgan (1970).

The researchers used the content validity index (CVI) test to ensure that the the items for the construct correspond to the substance in the conceptual framework. In addition to that, the reliability of the questionnaire was also tested with the use of Cronbach's alpha coefficient with a worth of more than 70%.

Results

The study finds multiple ways in which civil society contributes to state-building in Somalia. Advocacy involves raising awareness, promoting dialogue, and influencing policy decisions. Capacity building focuses on enhancing the skills and capabilities of individuals and organizations within civil society. Grassroots initiatives involve community-led projects and activities that address local needs. Policy formulation refers to the active involvement of civil society in shaping and influencing government policies. Furthermore, the research provides a historical perspective on civil society's involvement in state-building in Somalia. It examines past experiences, initiatives, and movements that have shaped the relationship between civil society and the state. Lessons learned from previous efforts are highlighted, along with challenges faced by civil society actors in their state-building.

However, the study evaluation of civil society's impact on state-building in Somalia underscores its positive contributions. Civil society organizations have played a crucial role in promoting good governance, fostering peacebuilding efforts, and advancing democratization processes. Their activities have contributed to the development of accountable institutions, inclusive decision-making, and citizen participation. Finally, the study identifies key factors that can either enable or hinder the effectiveness of civil society in state-building. These factors may include legal frameworks and regulations, political will, financial resources, collaboration with other stakeholders, social cohesion, and external support. Understanding these factors is crucial for optimizing the impact of civil society in state-building efforts.

Overall, the research findings indicate the significant role civil society plays in state-building in Somalia, the challenges it faces, and the potential for strengthening its contributions through supportive policies and partnerships. The findings demonstrate that civil society plays a significant role in conflict resolution in Somalia, thereby contributing to the broader state-building efforts in the country. This research provides valuable insights into the potential of civil society in fostering stability and development in fragile states like Somalia.

Conclusions

In conclusion, civil society theatres a decisive part in state-building efforts in Somalia. In a country that has experienced decades of conflict, civil society organizations have emerged as key actors in promoting peace, stability, and development. Their contributions can be observed in various aspects of state building, including governance, security, justice, and social services.

Firstly, civil society organizations in Somalia have been instrumental in promoting good governance and accountability. They have advocated for transparency in government processes, monitored elections, and encouraged citizen participation in decision-making. Through their advocacy and watchdog functions, civil society groups have pushed for reforms and contributed to the establishment of democratic institutions.

Secondly, civil society organizations have played a vital role in advancing security and peacebuilding efforts in Somalia. They have worked to mitigate conflicts, promote dialogue, and encourage reconciliation among different communities. By engaging with local populations, they have helped to build trust, bridge divides, and promote social cohesion.

Thirdly, civil society organizations have been active in promoting access to justice and human rights in Somalia. They have provided legal aid services, raised awareness about human rights abuses, and advocated for the rule of law. Their efforts have been crucial in holding perpetrators accountable and ensuring justice for victims.

Lastly, civil society organizations have been involved in delivering essential social services to communities affected by conflict and displacement. They have provided humanitarian assistance, education, healthcare, and livelihood support to vulnerable populations. These initiatives have helped to alleviate suffering, empower communities, and contribute to the overall development of the country.

Somali Women Development Centre (SWDC): SWDC is a prominent organization that focuses on women's empowerment, gender equality, and human rights. They have been instrumental in advocating for women's participation in decision-making processes, promoting women's rights, and providing support services to women affected by violence and displacement. Somali NGO Consortium: The Somali NGO Consortium is a network of local and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) operating in

Somalia. They work together to coordinate humanitarian and development efforts, share resources and expertise, and advocate for improved policies and practices in the country. The consortium dramas a vital role in delivering essential services to communities and promoting effective partnerships between civil society organizations and the government.

Center for Research and Dialogue (CRD): CRD is a research and policy advocacy organization that focuses on peacebuilding and conflict resolution in Somalia. They conduct research, facilitate dialogue processes, and provide policy recommendations to address the root causes of conflict and promote sustainable peace. CRD's work has contributed to peacebuilding efforts and reconciliation initiatives in the country. Somali Human Rights Association (SOHRA): SOHRA is a leading human rights organization in Somalia. They work to promote and protect human rights through monitoring, documentation, and advocacy. SOHRA has played a crucial role in raising awareness about human rights violations, supporting victims, and advocating for justice and accountability.

Puntland Development and Research Center (PDRC): PDRC is a local organization based in the Puntland region of Somalia. They focus on research, policy analysis, and development initiatives. PDRC's work includes promoting good governance, supporting local economic development, and advocating for effective resource management. However, it is important to acknowledge the challenges faced by civil society in Somalia. Limited resources, security threats, and political instability can hinder their work. Therefore, the government and international partners need to support and strengthen the role of civil society in state-building efforts.

In conclusion, civil society organizations in Somalia have made significant contributions to state-building by promoting good governance, peace, justice, and social development. Their active engagement and participation have been crucial in rebuilding the country and fostering a more inclusive and stable society.

Recommendations

The recommendations are based on the role of civil society in state-building in Somalia. The study recommends encouraging effective collaboration and coordination among civil society organizations in Somalia which requires proactive measures and supportive frameworks.

- **Strengthen Support and Funding**: The government of Somalia and its international partners should prioritize and increase support and funding for civil society organizations. This includes providing financial resources, capacity-building programs, and technical assistance to enhance their effectiveness and sustainability.
- **Foster Collaboration and Coordination**: Encourage collaboration and coordination among civil society organizations, government institutions, and international actors. This can be achieved through the establishment of platforms, networks, and forums where different stakeholders can share information, exchange best practices, and work together towards common goals.
- **Promote Inclusivity and Representation:** Ensure that civil society organizations are inclusive and representative of different segments of society, including women, youth, marginalized communities, and minority groups. Encourage their active participation in decision-making processes and provide support to amplify their voices and perspectives.
- **Support Peacebuilding and Conflict Resolution:** Strengthen initiatives that promote peacebuilding and conflict resolution, such as dialogue processes, mediation, and reconciliation programs. Civil society organizations should be actively involved in these efforts, working closely with local communities to address grievances, promote social cohesion, and prevent the recurrence of conflicts.
- **Enhance Civic Education and Awareness**: Invest in civic education programs to enhance citizens' understanding of their rights, responsibilities, and the importance of active citizenship. Civil society organizations can play a crucial role in conducting awareness campaigns, providing training, and disseminating information to empower individuals and communities.
- **Advocate for Good Governance and Accountability**: Civil society organizations should continue to advocate for good governance, transparency, and accountability at all levels of government. This includes monitoring government activities, promoting anti-corruption measures, and engaging in policy advocacy to ensure resource efficiency and equitable use.
- **Support Service Delivery and Social Development**: Strengthen civil society organizations' capacity to deliver essential social services, such as education, healthcare, and livelihood support, particularly in underserved areas. They will contribute to improving the well-being of communities and addressing socio-economic challenges.
- **Ensure Security and Protection:** Provide a secure environment for civil society organizations to operate effectively. The government should take measures to protect activists, human rights defenders, and organizations

from threats and acts of violence, ensuring their safety and freedom to carry out their work.

- **Establish Networking Platforms:** Facilitate the creation of networking platforms where civil society organizations can come together to share information, exchange ideas, and build relationships. This can include regular meetings, workshops, conferences, and online forums. These platforms can be initiated by government institutions, international organizations, or existing civil society networks.
- **Promote Information Sharing**: Encourage civil society organizations to share information, resources, and best practices with each other. This can be done through the establishment of centralized databases, online platforms, or knowledge-sharing mechanisms. Providing access to relevant data, research, and reports can enhance collaboration and enable organizations to learn from each other's experiences.
- **Support Consortiums and Coalitions**: Facilitate the formation of consortiums or coalitions among civil society organizations working in similar thematic areas or geographic regions. These collaborations can pool resources, coordinate activities, and amplify their collective impact. The government and international partners can provide funding, technical assistance, and capacity-building support to such consortiums.
- **Strengthen Coordination Mechanisms**: Develop coordination mechanisms that involve civil society organizations, government entities, and other stakeholders. This can include establishing coordination committees, task forces, or working groups dedicated to specific sectors or issues. Regular meetings and joint planning sessions can enhance communication, alignment of goals, and collective decision-making.
- **Enhance Capacity Building**: Offer capacity-building programs that specifically focus on collaboration and coordination skills for civil society organizations. Training workshops on project management, partnership development, conflict resolution, and negotiation can equip organizations with the necessary tools to effectively collaborate with others.
- **Foster Trust and Mutual Respect**: Encourage a culture of trust, mutual respect, and inclusivity among civil society organizations. This can be achieved through promoting open dialogue, respecting diverse perspectives, and valuing the contributions of each organization. Building relationships based on trust can enhance collaboration and create a conducive environment for joint initiatives.

By implementing these recommendations, the role of civil society organizations in state-building in Somalia can be further enhanced, leading to more inclusive governance, sustainable peace, and social development.

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The Role of Women in State-Building in Somalia: Lesson Learned & Amp; The Way Forwarded

Suad Haji Hassan

Abstract

Background: The general objective of the study is to identify the role of women in state building in Somalia. The study specifically focusses on promoting awareness and changing societal attitudes towards gender roles, increasing the representation and active participation of women in political processes, promoting and expanding access to quality education and capacity-building programs for women and enhancing women's involvement in peacebuilding processes and conflict resolution mechanisms at all levels.

Materials and Methods: The study was descriptive, cross sectional and quantitative in design. Cross sectional means to collect research data from the study area at one point in time and there is no need to collect data from the study area again and again. The study was quantitative in design. Quantitative research deals with numerical value of a particular issue in a particular time. In this type of design, there is no need to go deep into a problem but only to identify numeric values of the problem under investigation. 109 respondents were selected. Non-probability sampling was used as a sample technique. Questionnaires were used as a research tool and finally data was analyzed using SPSS.

Result: The majority of the respondents 61(56%) were Female while only 48(44%) were Male. The majority of the respondents 48(44%) were between 20 – 30 years, 33(30.3%) were between 31 – 40 Years, 20 (18.3%) were between 41 – 50 Years while only 8(7.3%) were above 51 years. The majority of the respondents 86(78.9%) were Female while only 23(21.1%) were male. The majority of the respondents 51(46.8%) were bachelor Level, 42(38.5%) were master level while only 16(14.7%) were PhD level. The majority of the respondents 91(83.5%) were employed while only 18(16.5%) were unemployed.

Keywords: *State building, study area, Promote Awareness, Majority, Female, Male*

Introduction

Somali's journey towards stability and growth has been aided by the international community support for state building in Somalia. The international community' s state-building agenda has encouraged Somalis to work on institutions that are instrumental to this growth such as the Federal Government with particular attention to security, taxation and popular representation. What role do women play in state-building? How does the state-building process in Somalia impact women' s participation? While support for Somalia' s state-building has been essential for the country's stability and growth, there is a lack of gender analysis of the process as well as real opportunities to promote gender equality. This policy brief presents findings from the 6th PDRC Talks event that took place on 22nd October 2022 graced by Honorable Fawzia Yusuf H. Adam themed 'The Role of Somali Women in State building". The discussion that ensued revealed that although Somali women have been active participants in Somalia' s state-building process before and after the collapse of the nation, inequalities in terms of representation were and are still prevalent. It is worth noting that post-conflict state-building involves a redistribution of power that represents an opportunity to reshape patterns of power to include Somali women (Puntland Development & Research Center, 2019).

In conflict and post-conflict settings, the international community operates with the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda supporting gender equality. During and after war, gender roles are often deeply contested as part of larger societal transformations and uncertainties. In Somalia since the 1960s, gender identities and roles have undergone substantial changes, influenced by contemporary political systems, the women's movement, civil war and religious transformations. The international community's role in these societal transformations should not be over-estimated. Life history research with Somali women shows that debates on women's roles in the public sphere are taking place irrespective of the international agenda. Somali women have, at least since the 1960s, held civil-political leadership positions, despite substantial disagreements on the public role of women in Somalia. Furthermore, the "international" and "local" are difficult to disentangle. The Somali female elite have often spent years abroad and introduced new gender perspectives from places as divergent as Egypt, Russia and the United States. Global cultural and religious trends are influencing post-war Somalia, Somaliland and Puntland. In this complex socio-cultural landscape, the international WPS agenda can support but also risk delegitimizing Somali processes and perspectives. The article illustrates the gap that exists between

global norms and local realities by focusing on Somali discourse on women's public roles and political participation (Journal of East African Studies, 2017).

Witness Somalia increases awareness around violent extremism through public messaging and religious interpretation. They recognize the religious leaders' crucial role as interpreters of Islamic texts and traditions, and include such leaders in their work. They use a gender responsive approach to expand the role of women in society. They train youth to challenge religious militancy and violent extremism (UN Women, 2018). As a result, young people have been mobilized to respond to their communities after terrorist attacks. To reach the public, Witness Somalia launched a radio program to discuss gender equality, women's rights, and their role in peacebuilding. Despite the taboos surrounding art in the larger culture, Witness Somalia recognizes art as a form of expression and understands the role of artists in raising public awareness around complex issues. They trained a small group of artists in advocacy, freedom of expression, and the intersection of the arts and peacebuilding. They have capitalized on art, music, drama, and sports to engage youth in alternative forms of expression and self-development. Through such programs, Witness Somalia has reached 32 youth groups and NGOs and 218 youth (including 135 women). The arts have enabled people to resist extremism and raise their voices to transform their society (International Civil Society Action Network, 2021).

Problem Statement

Despite the significant challenges faced by Somalia in its state-building process, the role of women remains largely marginalized and underutilized. This research aims to investigate the obstacles that hinder women's meaningful participation and empowerment in state-building initiatives in Somalia and explore potential strategies to enhance their inclusion, recognizing the importance of their contributions for sustainable peace, development, and effective governance in the country.

The considerable under representation of women in state building in Somalia continues to impede the nation's efforts to achieve lasting peace, economic growth, and efficient governance. Despite the enormous difficulties Somalia has encountered in creating its own state, women's contributions are sometimes undervalued and ignored. By examining the fundamental barriers that prevent women's meaningful participation and empowerment in state-building projects, this research intends to solve the ongoing issue of women's exclusion. This study aims to identify these hurdles in order to suggest methods and interventions to improve women's inclusion, acknowledging the

crucial part that women play in determining Somalia's future (Save the Children, 2023).

The exclusion of women from state-building initiatives in Somalia, a country that has been severely damaged by continuous conflict, political instability, and poor governance, constitutes a substantial barrier to long-lasting good transformation. Women's ideas and voices are routinely marginalized, which keeps women from fully participating in decision-making and impedes the attainment of gender equality. As a result, women's potential contributions to creating a society that is inclusive and sustainable are mostly unrealized.

Women are disadvantaged in the process of creating states for a variety of reasons. Women's access to resources and opportunities, agency, and mobility are all constrained by cultural norms and traditional gender roles. Gender gaps in the political, social, and economic realms are further exacerbated by patriarchal structures, which continue to promote prejudice and exclusion. The safety and security of women are also at stake due to persistent security issues, which limits their participation in civic activities and state-building projects. Therefore, this study is intended to bridge this gap and to find out the role of women in state building in Somalia.

Significance of the Study

This study will be useful for future researchers because it will act as a source of information and also a guide for them to follow in the subsequent studies related to the same problem under investigation.

Promote Awareness and Change Societal Attitudes towards Gender Roles

Gender roles are based on the different expectations that individuals, groups, and societies have of individuals based on their sex and based on each society's values and beliefs about gender. Gender roles are the product of the interactions between individuals and their environments, and they give individuals cues about what sort of behavior is believed to be appropriate for what sex. Appropriate gender roles are defined according to a society's beliefs about differences between the sexes. Understanding the term "gender roles" requires an understanding of the term "gender". Gender is a social term that is often confused with the term "sex:' Sex and gender are different concepts. Sex is a biological concept, determined on the basis of individuals' primary sex characteristics. Gender, on the other hand, refers to the meanings, values, and characteristics that people ascribe to different sexes. Oakley (1972) was one

of the first social scientists to distinguish the concept of gender from the concept of sex. According to Oakley, gender parallels the biological division of sex into male and female, but it involves the division and social valuation of masculinity and femininity. In other words, gender is a concept that humans create socially, through their interactions with one another and their environments, yet it relies heavily upon biological differences between males and females. Because humans create the concept of gender socially, gender is referred to as a social construction. The social construction of gender is demonstrated by the fact that individuals, groups, and societies ascribe particular traits, statuses, or values to individuals purely because of their sex, yet these ascriptions differ across societies and cultures, and over time within the same society.

Gender roles are the roles that men and women are expected to occupy based on their sex. Traditionally, many Western societies have believed that women are more nurturing than men. Therefore, the traditional view of the feminine gender role prescribes that women should behave in ways that are nurturing. One way that a woman might engage in the traditional feminine gender role would be to nurture her family by working full-time within the home rather than taking employment outside of the home. Men, on the other hand, are presumed by traditional views of gender roles to be leaders. The traditional view of the masculine gender role, therefore, suggests that men should be the heads of their households by providing financially for the family and making important family decisions. While these views remain dominant in many spheres of society, alternative perspectives on traditional beliefs about gender roles have gained increasing support in the twenty-first century (The University of Maine, 2003).

Over the latter part of the twentieth century and into the first decades of the twenty-first century, societal gender role attitudes (henceforth GRAs, also termed gender role beliefs or ideology) have become more egalitarian among both men and women, paralleling broader social and economic changes. There have been striking increases in the proportion of adults choosing to cohabit rather than marry and also, among women, particularly those with children, in the proportion in employment (UK employment rates in 1974 and 2003, respectively, were 95 and 86 % in men, 67 and 73 % in childless women and 36 and 58 % in mothers). In contrast, although men's involvement in domestic work rose from the 1960s, it reached a plateau in the mid-1990s, changing little in the following decade. The implications of these changes in attitudes and roles for other aspects of life are not well understood. In particular, it has been suggested that 'internalization of sex roles and gender stereotypes and the ramifications of these roles, both of which can be measured at an individual

level, are rarely among the inputs studied when health is the output' (p. 370). Changes in GRAs and roles, or changes in the meanings associated with particular roles are, therefore, important in respect of the impact they might have on patterns of psychological distress in men and women. In this paper we focus on how GRAs and indicators of men's and women's actual roles in the home and the labor market are associated with psychological distress. Inclusion of both GRAs and roles means we can investigate the relative importance of each. Analyses are based on data from the UK British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) which allows us to look at men and women from three different working age groups (20–34, 35–49 and 50–64) at two different dates (1991 and 2007) (Institute for Social and Economic Research, University of Essex, 2013).

According to World Health Organization (WHO), gender is the social construction of the characteristics of women and men such as roles, norms, and relationships between groups of women and men. Emotions, attitudes, behaviors, and differences between roles that boys and girls learn, and what culture finds "suitable" for their gender in the process of socialization are gender differences. Gender inequality means any discrimination, deprivation, or restrictions based on gender which prevents or eliminates or intends to prevent or eliminate the recognition, use, and utilization of human rights and basic freedoms of women in political, economic, social, cultural, or business life. Gender equality causes numerous problems by affecting women's participation in education and business life or their income negatively and creating social pressure. Education and employment status are significant resources for empowering women.

The difference between literacy and schooling of women and men is the most significant indicator of gender inequality. In the whole world, two-thirds of the 900 million illiterate people are women. The underlying causes of disadvantages that women, who constitute approximately half of the world's population, are involved in business life are mostly economic and cultural. The economic and social welfare and development of a country are in parallel with improving the employment status of women and increasing employment opportunities for them. In European Union member countries, the rate of women in business life is 53%. In Turkey, the participation rate in labor is found as 70.4% for men and 29.3% for women. The barriers that women encounter in business life are mostly because of their gender. Problems regarding this matter can be listed in various aspects from not being able to get equal pay for equal work and social roles that women undertake as people who are deemed responsible for childcare and housework. In a study conducted with teachers, it was found that gender role attitudes of female

teachers were better than male teachers; it was found that gender attitudes of women were high level in a different study conducted with married women. In research carried out with university students, it was determined that students had equalitarian attitude in terms of gender roles in general, female students had more equalitarian gender perception than male students. In the study of Aydın et al. (2016), it was found that attitudes regarding gender roles were egalitarian (Ankara Medical Journal, 2021).

Increase Representation and Active Participation of Women in Political Processes

Over the past 30 years, NDI has worked in nearly 100 countries to increase the number and effectiveness of women in the political life of their countries. Women's political participation results in tangible gains for democracy, including greater responsiveness to citizen needs, increased cooperation across party and ethnic lines, and more sustainable peace, among other benefits. As more women reach leadership within political parties and get elected to legislatures in significant numbers, these institutions tend to prioritize issues such as health care, education and economic issues that impact the daily lives of citizens.

In a study of 31 democratic countries, the presence of more women in parliament has enhanced government legitimacy among both men and women. In places as diverse as Timor-Leste, Croatia, Morocco and South Africa, the increase in the number of female lawmakers led to legislation related to anti-discrimination, domestic violence, family codes, inheritance, and child support and protection. Yet, women continue to be under-represented as voters, political leaders and elected officials. During the last decade, the rate of women's representation in national parliaments globally has incrementally increased from 15 percent in 2021 to 20 percent in 2012, way below the 30 percent benchmark often identified as the necessary level of representation of women needed for legislative, policy and behavioral changes to occur. For democratic governments to deliver to their constituents, they must be truly representative. NDI recognizes that women must be equal partners in the process of democratic development; as activists, elected officials and constituents; their contributions are crucial to building a strong and vibrant society (National Democratic Institute, 2013).

Women's full and effective political participation is a matter of human rights, inclusive growth and sustainable development (OECD, 2018). The active participation of women, on equal terms with men, at all levels of

decision-making and political involvement is essential to the achievement of equality, sustainable development, peace and democracy and the inclusion of their perspectives and experiences into the decision-making processes. Despite this, (Kumar, 2018) states that in the twenty-first century, women are facing obstacles in their political participation worldwide.

Women around the world at every socio-political level find themselves under-represented in parliament and far removed from decision-making levels. As noted in the Millennium Development Goals (United Nations, 2019), women's equal participation with men in power and decision-making is part of their fundamental right to participate in political life, and at the core of gender equality and women's empowerment. Strategies to increase women's participation in politics have been advanced through conventions, protocols and international agreements for gender mainstreaming, but they are yet to prove effective in achieving gender parity in the highest government rankings (Morobane, 2014). Half of the world's population are women, but today women only hold 23% of all seats in parliaments and senates globally. Given the fact that many states have ratified international conventions and protocols on gender equality and women political participation, the low level of women's representation in government and political may be considered a violation of women's fundamental democratic rights.

The African government's public commitments have not materialized into better protection for women and support for victims and this has made women to play outside the political ground. According to (Rop, 2013) many African states sign and commit themselves to promoting gender parity in political participation, but end up shelving the agreement. Abuse of office and desire to acquire power through self-centered means has resulted in the state ignoring women concerns. Thus, women continue to be underrepresented in governments across the nation and face barriers that often make it difficult for them to exercise political power and assume leadership positions in the public sphere. The (UN, 2011) concurs and states that, "women in every part of the world continue to be largely marginalized from the political sphere, often as a result of discriminatory laws, practices, attitudes and gender stereotypes, low levels of education, lack of access to health care and the disproportionate effect of poverty on women" (Cogent Social Sciences, 2019).

Political parties remain the major entities through which people can choose their representatives and are conceivably indispensable institutions for democratic politics and representation. The central functions of political parties in modern representative democracies are: to develop consistent policies and government programs (the interest articulation function); to

transmit demands from society and aggregate them (the interest aggregation function); to recruit, select and position people for positions in government and the legislature and to oversee and control government (Catón 2007). Political parties have long been seen as playing an essential role in the functioning of modern representative democracy, as they are among the key institutions for inclusive participation and accountable representation.

Generally, people get involved in public life through political parties and support candidates and parties that reflect their views and interests. While the debate over whether political parties make democracy more democratic continues, in most countries political parties are identified as instrumental in the recruitment, nomination and election of candidates for public office, socialization of prospective political representatives and leaders, dissemination of political information and the exposing of citizens to democratic politics. Although it is widely accepted that in most countries political parties are central to representative democracy and to the process of democratization, they are also perceived to be increasingly weak and to have numerous imperfections in performing functions essential to a healthy democracy. These imperfections include institutional, structural and ideological values and cultures that can cause parties to act in ways contrary to democracy. Specifically, political parties tend to create barriers for women and are generally underperforming on the equal participation and representation of women and men in positions of power and decision-making at all levels (International IDEA Technical Paper, 2021).

Promote and Expand Access to Quality Education and Capacity-Building Programs for Women

While globally the number of out-of-school girls and boys of primary and secondary school age is virtually the same (131.7 million girls and 131.3 million boys), two gender differences manifest differently in different regions. Girls are more likely than boys to be out of school in Sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa and South Asia, where many GPE developing country partners (DCPs) are located. Even if girls are enrolled in school, they face gender-based challenges with access, progression, participation and learning outcomes that originate both inside the school system and in the broader context in which the school is located. These challenges represent a key barrier to achieving gender equality in and through education. Gender inequality is also a facet of the high dropout rates at primary and secondary levels, particularly of girls in many countries as well as boys in some countries.

Gender intersects with other inequalities of race, ethnicity, class, disability and location to create education exclusion. Inequalities can also be embedded in aspects of the education system itself, even if these are less easily seen: Curriculum, learning materials teaching pedagogy, teacher education, management, administration, assessment, monitoring and evaluation processes may all perpetuate hidden gender bias. Prejudice and discrimination can become taken-for-granted everyday approaches unless there are opportunities for critical evaluation and reflection. Targeted policies, practices and research are needed to change these processes and assure that the education system promotes gender-equitable experiences for all, both in and through schooling (Global Partnership for Education, 2019).

Although higher educational institutions have expanded in developing countries, participant rate for females at the post-secondary level continue to be considerably lower than for males. Clearly, gender parity in enrollments in higher education has not received as much attention as expansion of places. The disparity is most strongly evident in Sub-Sahara Africa and South Asia. Even where gender parity may have been achieved, gender-streaming of disciplines persists, with women mostly concentrated in traditional fields. Education of women is important not only from the angle of equal education opportunity between the sexes, but also for the substantial social and economic returns to female education that can be achieved by raising women's productivity and income level, producing better educated and healthier children, and reducing fertility rates (Schultz 1989; Herz et al. 1991; Subbarao and Raney 1992; Summers 1992). Investments in higher education, particularly in developing countries, have high private rates of return measured by associated wage increases reflecting the existence of productive opportunities in the labor market. Wide gender disparity suggests prima facie that a large number of potential candidates are denied the opportunity to participate actively in productive activities and contribute to faster economic development. The World Bank began lending for education in 1963. The shift in Bank' investment precipitated from changes in economic thought in the early 1960s when education came to be seen as a critical investment in human capital, essential to the development process.

The objectives of many early education projects were to build infrastructures such as schools and to develop educational planning capacity. Since the early 1980s, the Bank projects have introduced policy reforms affecting the expansion, financing and internal efficiency especially of higher education systems. The reforms were designed to reduce uncontrolled growth of higher education expenditures by capping university intake, limiting grants

and subsidies to students, introducing student fees, and rationalizing academic programs and staffing.

Enhance Women's Involvement in Peacebuilding Processes and Conflict Resolution Mechanisms at all Levels

Global peace has been in decline for four consecutive years, with the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region having numerous high-intensity armed conflicts and regarded as the world's least peaceful region. Despite significant efforts by the UN and others, including civil society and regional organizations, high-level peace processes in the region remain largely stalled and women's meaningful participation and influence in official processes limited. This under-representation and participation of women has a deleterious effect on prospects for reaching durable agreements. In the context of a large number of protracted conflicts and stalled peace processes in the MENA region and across the world, women and communities affected by violent conflict, peace and security practitioners and decision-makers are increasingly calling for transformative approaches to conflict resolution, including the need for more inclusivity, stronger coordination amongst a broader array of actors and a consistent commitment to preventative approaches.

On 29 and 30 November 2018, UN Women convened the conference 'Women's Meaningful Participation in Peace Processes: Modalities and Strategies Across Tracks' with support from the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. Discussions included over 60 practitioners, analysts, and advocates from around the globe, including the MENA region. It provided an opportunity to explore good practices on modalities and strategies to secure women's meaningful participation in peace processes, with a strong emphasis on contributing toward new and existing peacemaking efforts in the MENA region. The primary focus was to explore innovations, trends and challenges in the interplay between official, high-level processes at the track 1 level and unofficial processes in which civil society often plays a leadership role at the track 2 level (UN Women, 2018).

Recurrent and emerging armed conflicts, expanded terrorist and extremist networks, increased targeting of civilians, and record levels of mass displacement have defined global security in the twenty-first century. Data shows that standard peacemaking methods have proved ineffective at addressing these trends: nearly half of the conflict resolution agreements forged during the 1990s failed within five years. Recidivism for civil war is

alarmingly high, with 90 percent of civil wars in the 2000s occurring in countries that had already experienced civil war during the previous thirty years. New thinking on peace and security is needed. A growing body of research suggests that standard peace and security processes routinely overlook a critical strategy that could reduce conflict and advance stability: the inclusion of women. Evidence indicates that women's participation in conflict prevention and resolution advances security interests.

One study found that substantial inclusion of women and civil society groups in a peace negotiation makes the resulting agreement 64 percent less likely to fail and, according to another study, 35 percent more likely to last at least fifteen years. Several analysts suggest also that higher levels of gender equality are associated with a lower propensity for conflict, both between and within states. Despite growing international recognition of women's role in security, the representation of women in peace and security processes has lagged. Between 1992 and 2011, women represented less than 4 percent of signatories to peace agreements and 9 percent of negotiators (see figure 1).6 In 2015, only 3 percent of UN military peacekeepers and 10 percent of UN police personnel were women, substantially lower than the UN target of 20 percent. In addition, despite the role that local women's groups could play in preventing and resolving conflicts, they received just 0.4 percent of the aid to fragile states from major donor countries in 2012–2013 (Council on Foreign Relations, 2016).

The October 2000 adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (SCR 1325) was celebrated as a defining achievement for women's peace and security on a global scale. This landmark legal and political framework acknowledged the impact of conflict on women, and the importance of the participation of women and inclusion of gender perspectives in decision-making, conflict resolution, a peace processes, humanitarian planning, peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding. With the arrival of the resolution's ten-year commemorative anniversary, attention has shifted from policy and planning to critical analysis of progress and impact. At this stage, considered reflection is merited to assess how and to what extent the international community has translated the language and aspirations of SCR 1325 into action. One fundamental question is whether the resolution's potential as a useful operational tool has been realized. Current practice strongly suggests that it has not. SCR 1325 has four key thematic areas: participation, protection, prevention, and mainstreaming of a gender perspective.

This publication focuses on participation. It aims to provide an easily accessible 'how to' reference, in the form of operational guidelines for key actors, to enhance the participation of women in conflict resolution and peace processes. It identifies areas of policy and practice, measures and activities to promote women's involvement specifically in dialogue, mediation, peace processes and related activities for the prevention, management and resolution of conflict. It also highlights examples of women's representation and participation in specific situations, and seeks to identify what has worked and what has not. Options, challenges and policy-relevant recommendations are presented to inform good practice and maximize women's meaningful involvement in the indicated areas. The target audience includes policy and decision-makers in government, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, community and civil society actors, official and non-official mediators and other intermediaries (so-called 'third parties'), and the professional staff that support their work (Initiative on Quiet Diplomacy, 2010).

Methodology

Data Collection Techniques

The study used questionnaire method of data collection. Questionnaire is the best tool for determining the level of knowledge, opinions, attitudes, believes, ideas, feelings, experiences and perceptions as well as to gather general information about the respondents (Oso, 2013).

Data Analysis

SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) is a software package used for statistical analysis in social science research. It provides a range of tools and features for data management, descriptive statistics, inferential statistics, and graphical visualization.

Sample Collection

In research, sample collection refers to the process of gathering data from a group of individuals or entities that are representative of the larger population being studied. The collection of non-spatial information on the role of women in state building and their effects used primary data in the form of questionnaires. To answer the objectives set forth by the researcher for the study's purpose, primary data were intentionally obtained. In order to quickly and efficiently analyse vast amounts of data from many different people in a cost-effective manner, questionnaires were used.

Data Description

Data description refers to the process of summarizing and describing the characteristics of a dataset. It is a critical step in data analysis as it provides an overview of the data and helps to identify patterns, trends, and potential issues.

Results and Discussions

Table 3.1: Gender of Respondents

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Male	48	44.0	44.0	44.0
	Female	61	56.0	56.0	100.0
	Total	**109**	**100.0**	**100.0**	

According to Table 4.1: The majority of the respondents 61(56%) were Female while only 48(44%) were Male.

Table 3.2: Age of Respondents

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	20-30 years	48	44.0	44.0	44.0
	31-40 years	33	30.3	30.3	74.3
	41-50 years	20	18.3	18.3	92.7
	Above 51	8	7.3	7.3	100.0
	Total	**109**	**100.0**	**100.0**	

According to Table 4.2: The majority of the respondents 48(44%) were between 20 – 30 years, 33(30.3%) were between 31 – 40 years, 20 (18.3%) were between 41 – 50 years while only 8(7.3%) were above 51 years.

Table 3.3: Marital Status of Respondents

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Single	23	21.1	21.1	21.1
	Married	86	78.9	78.9	100.0
	Total	**109**	**100.0**	**100.0**	

According to table 4.3: The majority of the respondents 86(78.9%) were Female while only 23(21.1%) were male.

Table 3.4: Educational level

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Bachelor Level	51	46.8	46.8	46.8
	Master Level	42	38.5	38.5	85.3
	PhD Level	16	14.7	14.7	100.0
	Total	**109**	**100.0**	**100.0**	

According to Table 4.4: The majority of the respondents 51(46.8%) were bachelor level, 42(38.5%) were master level while only 16(14.7%) were PhD level.

Table 3.5: Occupation of Respondents

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Employee	91	83.5	83.5	83.5
	Unemployed	18	16.5	16.5	100.0
	Total	**109**	**100.0**	**100.0**	

According to Table 4.5: The majority of the respondents 91(83.5%) were employed while only 18(16.5%) were unemployed.

Table 3.6: Education and awareness play a crucial role in challenging and changing societal attitudes towards gender roles

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strong Agree	62	56.9	56.9	56.9
	Agree	23	21.1	21.1	78.0
	Neutral	6	5.5	5.5	83.5
	Strong Disagree	7	6.4	6.4	89.9
	Disagree	11	10.1	10.1	100.0
	Total	**109**	**100.0**	**100.0**	

According to Table 4.6: The majority of the respondents 62(56.9%) strongly agreed that the Education and awareness play a crucial role in

challenging and changing societal attitudes towards gender roles, 23(21.1%) agreed that education and awareness play a crucial role in challenging and changing societal attitudes towards gender roles, 7(6.4%) strongly disagreed that education and awareness plays a crucial role in challenging and changing societal attitudes towards gender roles, 11(10.1%) disagreed that education and awareness play a crucial role in challenging and changing societal attitudes towards gender roles while only 6(5.5%) were neutral.

Table 3.7: Highlighting positive role models who challenge traditional gender roles can be influential in changing societal attitudes

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strong Agree	58	53.2	53.2	53.2
	Agree	21	19.3	19.3	72.5
	Neutral	4	3.7	3.7	76.1
	Strong Disagree	9	8.3	8.3	84.4
	Disagree	17	15.6	15.6	100.0
	Total	**109**	**100.0**	**100.0**	

According to Table 4.7: The majority of the respondents 58(53.2%) strongly agreed that highlighting positive role models who challenge traditional gender roles can be influential in changing societal attitudes, 21(19.2%) agreed that highlighting positive role models who challenge traditional gender roles can be influential in changing societal attitudes, 9(8.3%) strongly disagreed that the highlighting positive role models who challenge traditional gender roles can be influential in changing societal attitudes, 17(15.6%) disagreed that highlighting positive role models who challenge traditional gender roles can be influential in changing societal attitudes while only 4(3.7%) were neutral.

Table 3.8: Changing societal attitudes towards gender roles is a long-term commitment, continuously assess and adapt your strategies based on evolving social dynamics and emerging challenges.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	89	81.7	81.7	81.7
	No	20	18.3	18.3	100.0
	Total	**109**	**100.0**	**100.0**	

According to Table 4.8: The majority of the respondents 89(81.7%) believed that changing societal attitudes towards gender roles are a long-term commitment, continuously assess and adapt your strategies based on evolving social dynamics and emerging challenges while only 20(18.3%) believed that changing societal attitudes towards gender roles is not a long-term commitment, continuously assess and adapt your strategies based on evolving social dynamics and emerging challenges.

Table 3.9: Engage with young people through schools, youth organizations, and online platforms to promote gender equality and challenge gender stereotypes

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strong Agree	43	39.4	39.4	39.4
	Agree	39	35.8	35.8	75.2
	Neutral	4	3.7	3.7	78.9
	Strong Disagree	16	14.7	14.7	93.6
	Disagree	7	6.4	6.4	100.0
	Total	**109**	**100.0**	**100.0**	

According to Table 4.9: the majority of the respondents 43(39.4%) strongly agreed that engaging with young people through schools, youth organizations, and online platforms promotes gender equality and challenges gender stereotypes, 39(35.8%) agreed that engaging with young people through schools, youth organizations, and online platforms promotes gender equality and challenges gender stereotypes, 16(14.7%) strongly disagreed that engaging with young people through schools, youth organizations, and online platforms promotes gender equality and challenges gender stereotypes,

7(6.4%) disagreed that engaging with young people through schools, youth organizations, and online platforms promotes gender equality and challenges gender stereotypes while only 4(3.7%) were neutral.

Table 3.10: Engage with media outlets to promote accurate and positive portrayals of diverse gender identities and challenge harmful stereotypes,

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	68	62.4	62.4	62.4
	No	41	37.6	37.6	100.0
	Total	**109**	**100.0**	**100.0**	

According to Table 4.10: The majority of the respondents 68(62.4%) believed that engaging with media outlets promotes accurate and positive portrayals of diverse gender identities and challenges harmful stereotypes while only 41(37.6%) did not believe that engaging with media outlets promotes accurate and positive portrayals of diverse gender identities and challenges harmful stereotypes.

Table 3.11: Provide political education and training programs specifically tailored for women, equipping them with the necessary knowledge, skills, and confidence to participate effectively in political processes.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strong Agree	45	41.3	41.3	41.3
	Agree	36	33.0	33.0	74.3
	Neutral	13	11.9	11.9	86.2
	Strong Disagree	6	5.5	5.5	91.7
	Disagree	9	8.3	8.3	100.0
	Total	**109**	**100.0**	**100.0**	

According to Table 4.11: The majority of the respondents 45(41.3%) strongly agreed that providing political education and training programs specifically tailored for women, equips them with the necessary knowledge, skills, and confidence to participate effectively in political processes, 36(33%) agreed that providing political education and training programs specifically tailored for women, equips them with the necessary knowledge, skills, and confidence to participate effectively in political processes, 13(11.9%) were

neutral, 9(8.3%) disagreed that providing political education and training programs specifically tailored for women, equips them with the necessary knowledge, skills, and confidence to participate effectively in political processes while only strongly disagreed that providing political education and training programs specifically tailored for women, equips them with the necessary knowledge, skills, and confidence to participate effectively in political processes.

Table 3.12: Actively encourage women to run for political office by highlighting the importance of their voices and perspectives in decision-making processes.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	74	67.9	67.9	67.9
	No	35	32.1	32.1	100.0
	Total	**109**	**100.0**	**100.0**	

According to Table 4.12: The majority of the respondents 74(67.9%) believed that highlighting the importance of their voices and perspectives in decision-making processes, actively encourages women to run for political office while only 35(32.1%) did not believe that highlighting the importance of their voices and perspectives in decision-making processes. Actively encourages women to run for political office.

Table 3.13: Raise awareness about gender bias and discrimination in political environments and work towards addressing these issues.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strong Agree	49	45.0	45.0	45.0
	Agree	36	33.0	33.0	78.0
	Neutral	11	10.1	10.1	88.1
	Strong Disagree	5	4.6	4.6	92.7
	Disagree	8	7.3	7.3	100.0
	Total	**109**	**100.0**	**100.0**	

According to Table 4.13: The majority of the respondents 49(45%) strongly agreed that there was need to raise awareness about gender bias and discrimination in political environments and work towards addressing these

issues, 36(33%) agreed that there was need to raise awareness about gender bias and discrimination in political environments and work towards addressing these issues, 11(10.1%) were neutral, 8(7.3%) disagreed that there was need to raise awareness about gender bias and discrimination in political environments and work towards addressing these issues while only 5(4.6%) strongly disagreed that there was need to raise awareness about gender bias and discrimination in political environments and work towards addressing these issues.

Table 3.14: Collaborate with international organizations, governments, and civil society groups to share best practices, experiences, and resources in promoting women's political participation.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	78	71.6	71.6	71.6
	No	31	28.4	28.4	100.0
	Total	**109**	**100.0**	**100.0**	

According to Table 4.14: The majority of the respondents 78(71.6%) believed that there was need to collaborate with international organizations, governments, and civil society groups to share best practices, experiences, and resources in promoting women's political participation while only 31(28.4%) did not believe that there was need to collaborate with international organizations, governments, and civil society groups to share best practices, experiences, and resources in promoting women's political participation.

Table 3.15: Collaborate with civil society organizations that focus on women's rights, gender equality, and political empowerment.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	88	80.7	80.7	80.7
	No	21	19.3	19.3	100.0
	Total	**109**	**100.0**	**100.0**	

According to Table 4.15: The majority of the respondents 88(80.7%) believed that there was need to collaborate with civil society organizations that focus on women's rights, gender equality, and political empowerment while only 21(19.3%) did not believe that there was need to collaborate with civil

society organizations that focus on women's rights, gender equality, and political empowerment.

Tale 3.16: Promoting and expanding access to quality education for women should be a top priority for governments and stakeholders worldwide.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strong Agree	62	56.9	56.9	56.9
	Agree	35	32.1	32.1	89.0
	Neutral	3	2.8	2.8	91.7
	Strong Disagree	4	3.7	3.7	95.4
	Disagree	5	4.6	4.6	100.0
	Total	**109**	**100.0**	**100.0**	

According to Table 4.16: The majority of the respondents 62(56.9%) strongly agreed that promoting and expanding access to quality education for women should be a top priority for governments and stakeholders worldwide, 35(32.1%) agreed that promoting and expanding access to quality education for women should be a top priority for governments and stakeholders worldwide, 4(3.7%) strongly disagreed that promoting and expanding access to quality education for women should be a top priority for governments and stakeholders worldwide, 5(4.6%) disagreed that promoting and expanding access to quality education for women should be a top priority for governments and stakeholders worldwide while only 3(2.8%) were neutral.

Table 3.17: Expanding access to quality education and capacity-building programs for women is crucial for building a more inclusive and equitable society.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strong Agree	51	46.8	46.8	46.8
	Agree	47	43.1	43.1	89.9
	Neutral	6	5.5	5.5	95.4
	Strong Disagree	2	1.8	1.8	97.2
	Disagree	3	2.8	2.8	100.0
	Total	**109**	**100.0**	**100.0**	

According to Table 4.18: The majority of the respondents 51(46.8%) strongly agreed that expanding access to quality education and capacity-building programs for women is crucial for building a more inclusive and equitable society, 47(43.1%) agreed that expanding access to quality education and capacity-building programs for women is crucial for building a more inclusive and equitable society, 6(5.5%) were neutral, 3(2.8) disagreed that expanding access to quality education and capacity-building programs for women is crucial for building a more inclusive and equitable society while only 2(1.8%) strongly disagreed that expanding access to quality education and capacity-building programs for women is crucial for building a more inclusive and equitable society.

Table 3.18: Access to quality education plays a transformative role in empowering women, enabling them to acquire knowledge, skills, and abilities that can positively impact their personal growth, economic independence, and overall well-being.

		Frequency	**Percent**	**Valid Percent**	**Cumulative Percent**
Valid	Yes	98	89.9	89.9	89.9
	No	11	10.1	10.1	100.0
	Total	**109**	**100.0**	**100.0**	

According to Table 4.18: The majority of the respondents 98(89.9%) believed that access to quality education plays a transformative role in empowering women, enabling them to acquire knowledge, skills, and abilities that can positively impact their personal growth, economic independence, and overall well-being while only 11(10.1%) believed that access to quality education plays a transformative role in empowering women, enabling them to acquire knowledge, skills, and abilities that cannot positively impact their personal growth, economic independence, and overall well-being.

Table 3.19: Mentorship programs can effectively support women in their educational journey and professional development.

		Frequency	**Percent**	**Valid Percent**	**Cumulative Percent**
Valid	Yes	91	83.5	83.5	83.5
	No	18	16.5	16.5	100.0
	Total	**109**	**100.0**	**100.0**	

According to Table 4.19: The majority of the respondents 91(83.5%) believed that the mentorship programs can effectively support women in their educational journey and professional development while only 18(16.5%) believed that the mentorship programs cannot effectively support women in their educational journey and professional development.

Table 3.20: Technology and digital platforms can play a transformative role in expanding access to education for women, especially in underserved areas.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strong Agree	39	35.8	35.8	35.8
	Agree	42	38.5	38.5	74.3
	Neutral	8	7.3	7.3	81.7
	Strong Disagree	12	11.0	11.0	92.7
	Disagree	8	7.3	7.3	100.0
	Total	**109**	**100.0**	**100.0**	

According to the Table 4.20: The majority of the respondents 39(35.8%) strongly agreed that the technology and digital platforms can play a transformative role in expanding access to education for women, especially in underserved areas, 42(38.5%) agreed that the technology and digital platforms can play a transformative role in expanding access to education for women, especially in underserved areas, 12(11%) strongly disagreed that the technology and digital platforms can play a transformative role in expanding access to education for women, especially in underserved areas, 8(7.3%) disagreed that the technology and digital platforms can play a transformative role in expanding access to education for women, especially in underserved areas while only 8(7.3%) were neutral.

Table 3.21: Capacity-building programs that specifically focus on enhancing women's leadership and negotiation skills can empower them to play a more significant role in peacebuilding efforts.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strong Agree	33	30.3	30.3	30.3
	Agree	48	44.0	44.0	74.3
	Neutral	10	9.2	9.2	83.5
	Strong Disagree	9	8.3	8.3	91.7
	Disagree	9	8.3	8.3	100.0
	Total	**109**	**100.0**	**100.0**	

According to the Table 4.21: The majority of the respondents 48(44%) agreed that the capacity-building programs that specifically focus on enhancing women's leadership and negotiation skills can empower them to play a more significant role in peacebuilding efforts, 33(30.3%) strongly agreed that the capacity-building programs that specifically focus on enhancing women's leadership and negotiation skills can empower them to play a more significant role in peacebuilding efforts,10(9.2%) were neutral, 9(8.3%) strongly disagreed that the capacity-building programs that specifically focus on enhancing women's leadership and negotiation skills can empower them to play a more significant role in peacebuilding efforts while only 9(8.3%) disagreed that the capacity-building programs that specifically focus on enhancing women's leadership and negotiation skills can empower them to play a more significant role in peacebuilding efforts.

Table 3.22: Women's involvement in conflict prevention and resolution can contribute to addressing the root causes of conflicts and building more inclusive societies.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	95	87.2	87.2	87.2
	No	14	12.8	12.8	100.0
	Total	**109**	**100.0**	**100.0**	

According to the Table 4.22: The majority of the respondents 95(87.2%) believed that the women's involvement in conflict prevention and resolution

can contribute to addressing the root causes of conflicts and building more inclusive societies while only 14(12.8%) did not believe that the women's involvement in conflict prevention and resolution can contribute to addressing the root causes of conflicts and building more inclusive societies.

Table 3.23: Women's involvement in peacebuilding promotes gender equality and contributes to the overall advancement of society.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	97	89.0	89.0	89.0
	No	12	11.0	11.0	100.0
	Total	**109**	**100.0**	**100.0**	

According to the Table 4.23: The majority of the respondents 97(89%) believed that women's involvement in peacebuilding promotes gender equality and contributes to the overall advancement of society while only 12(11%) did not believe that women's involvement in peacebuilding promotes gender equality and contributes to the overall advancement of society.

Table 3.24: Women bring unique perspectives and approaches to conflict resolution that can contribute to more effective and long-lasting solutions.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strong Agree	41	37.6	37.6	37.6
	Agree	45	41.3	41.3	78.9
	Neutral	13	11.9	11.9	90.8
	Strong Disagree	6	5.5	5.5	96.3
	Disagree	4	3.7	3.7	100.0
	Total	**109**	**100.0**	**100.0**	

According to the Table 4.24: The majority of the respondents 45(41.3%) agreed that women bring unique perspectives and approaches to conflict resolution that can contribute to more effective and long-lasting solutions, 41(37.6%) strongly agreed that omen bring unique perspectives and approaches to conflict resolution that can contribute to more effective and long-lasting solutions, 13(11.9%) were neutral, 6(5.5%) strongly disagreed

that the Women bring unique perspectives and approaches to conflict resolution that can contribute to more effective and long-lasting solutions while only 4(3.7%) disagreed that women bring unique perspectives and approaches to conflict resolution that can contribute to more effective and long-lasting solutions.

Table 3.25: Capacity-building programs that specifically focus on enhancing women's leadership, negotiation, and conflict resolution skills are essential for empowering women to play a more significant role in peacebuilding.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strong Agree	51	46.8	46.8	46.8
	Agree	39	35.8	35.8	82.6
	Neutral	8	7.3	7.3	89.9
	Strong Disagree	6	5.5	5.5	95.4
	Disagree	5	4.6	4.6	100.0
	Total	**109**	**100.0**	**100.0**	

According to Table 4.25: The majority of the respondents 51(46.8%) strongly agreed that the capacity-building programs that specifically focus on enhancing women's leadership, negotiation, and conflict resolution skills are essential for empowering women to play a more significant role in peacebuilding, 39(35.8%) agreed that the capacity-building programs that specifically focus on enhancing women's leadership, negotiation, and conflict resolution skills are essential for empowering women to play a more significant role in peacebuilding, 8(7.3%) were neural, 6(5.5%) strongly agreed that the capacity-building programs that specifically focus on enhancing women's leadership, negotiation, and conflict resolution skills are essential for empowering women to play a more significant role in peacebuilding while only 5(4.6%) disagreed that the capacity-building programs that specifically focus on enhancing women's leadership, negotiation, and conflict resolution skills are essential for empowering women to play a more significant role in peacebuilding.

Conclusion

Background

Somali's journey towards stability and growth has been aided by the international community's support for state building in Somalia. The International community's state-building agenda has encouraged Somalis to work on institutions that are instrumental to this growth such as the Federal Government with particular attention to security, taxation and popular representation. What role do women play in state-building? How does the state-building process in Somalia impact women' s participation? While support for Somalia' s state-building has been essential for the country's stability and growth, there is a lack of gender analysis of the process as well as real opportunities to promote gender equality. This policy brief presents findings from the 6th PDRC Talks event that took place on 22nd of October graced by Honorable Fawzia Yusuf H. Adam themed 'The Role of Somali Women in State building". The discussion that ensued revealed that although Somali women have been active participants in Somalia' s state-building process before and after the collapse of the nation, inequalities in terms of representation were and are still prevalent. It is worth noting that post-conflict state building involves a redistribution of power that represents an opportunity to reshape patterns of power to include Somali women (Puntland Development & Research Center, ND).

Objectives

The general objective of the study is to identify the role of women in state building in Somalia. The study specifically focuses on promoting awareness and change societal attitudes towards gender roles, increasing the representation and active participation of women in political processes, promoting and expand access to quality education and capacity-building programs for women and enhancing women's involvement in peacebuilding processes and conflict resolution mechanisms at all levels.

Methodology

The study was descriptive, cross sectional and quantitative in design. 44 respondents were selected. Non-probability sampling was used as a sample technique. Questionnaires were used as a research tool and finally data was analyzed using SPSS.

Results

The majority of the respondents 61(56%) were Female while only 48(44%) were Male. The majority of the respondents 48(44%) were between 20 – 30 years, 33(30.3%) were between 31 – 40 years, 20 (18.3%) were between 41 – 50 years while only 8(7.3%) were above 51 years. The majority of the respondents 86(78.9%) were Female while only 23(21.1%) were male. The majority of the respondents 51(46.8%) were bachelor Level, 42(38.5%) were master level while only 16(14.7%) were PhD level. The majority of the respondents 91(83.5%) were employed while only 18(16.5%) were unemployed.

Recommendation

1. It is important to not only increase the number of women in political positions but also to create an inclusive and supportive environment for their participation.
2. Women have a unique perspective and valuable contributions to offer in peacebuilding processes. Their involvement in peace negotiations, conflict resolution, and post-conflict reconstruction efforts can lead to more inclusive and sustainable outcomes.
3. Building the capacity of institutions to mainstream gender equality is essential. This involves training government officials, civil servants, and law enforcement personnel on gender-sensitive approaches.
4. International support is essential for advancing women's rights and empowerment in Somalia. Partnering with international organizations, donor agencies, and regional bodies can provide financial resources, technical expertise, and best practices.
5. Providing training, mentoring, and leadership development programs specifically tailored for women can enhance their capacity to actively participate in state building.
6. Promoting gender equality requires the involvement of men and boys as allies in challenging gender norms and promoting women's rights.
7. Collaboration with civil society organizations, including women's rights organizations and grassroots groups, is essential for advancing gender equality and women's empowerment.

Recommendation for Further Research

1. Examine the relationship between women's access to quality education and their participation in state building processes.

2. Explore the specific challenges faced by women in the context of natural disasters and climate change in Somalia.
3. Explore the linkages between women's rights, gender equality, and the establishment of a strong rule of law in Somalia.
4. Explore the importance of women's leadership in local governance structures and its impact on community development.
5. Explore the specific strategies and approaches that women can employ to counter violent extremism in Somalia.

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PART 7

CONFERENCE PANEL DISCUSSIONS



The conference served as an intellectual crucible where the intricate challenges facing Somalia's state-building process were meticulously examined. Panels drew upon a diverse range of expertise to dissect Somalia's state failure, causes and potential remedies. The discussions stressed the unifying potential of Islam, the imperative of revisiting Somali values, and the urgency of professionalism in governance.
The main thematic area of panel discussion addressed during the conference were as follows:

1. Exploring the state failure in Somalia – Causes and factors
2. State Building in Somalia: Prospects for a Functioning and Inclusive State
3. Towards One Person One Vote: Challenges & Tasks.

The panel discussions delved into the complex issue of the state-building process in Somalia. Distinguished panelists provided multifaceted perspectives. Their discussions illuminated the intricate nature of Somalia's path toward democratic ideals, emphasizing the importance of internal reflection and awareness of external influences and interests. Together, these sessions offered profound insights into Somalia's ongoing state-building journey.



Exploring the State Failure in Somalia - Causes and Factors

The conference's first panel was titled "Exploring State Failure in Somalia: Causes and Factors." A distinguished and diverse expertise of panelists discussed the topic and exchanged precious ideas. The panelists were Dr. Adan Shidane Guuled, the president of Hormud University, Dr. Abdirazak Takar, the president of East Africa University, Mr. Mahad Wasuge, director of the Somali Public Agenda and Eng. Asad Nuh, Board Director for Red Sea University. The panel was moderated by Dr. Mohamed Osman, an economist and economic advisor to the president of the Federal Government of Somalia Hasan Sheikh Mohamud.



Dr. Abdirazak Mohamud Takar, The President of East Africa University – Panelist

Dr. Abdirazak Mohamud Takar, raised concerns about the prevailing political culture in Somalia and its impact on state-building. He criticized the tendency of individuals in positions of power to prioritize self-interest and the interests of their close associates, rather than serving the ordinary Somali peopled. Takar pointed out that such self-serving approach in the public sector hampers the progress of state building and the overall development of Somalia. The focus on personal gain and patronage networks can hinder effective governance, undermine accountability, and perpetuate a culture of corruption.

On the other side, Dr. Takar highlighted the positive developments in the private sector, where meritocracy plays a central role in staff selection. The private sector's emphasis on merit-based recruitment and performance evaluation allows for the growth and success of businesses. This approach rewards competence and fosters a culture of professionalism and excellence.

Dr. Takar emphasized the need for a mindset change, particularly in relation to the perception of the public sector. Shifting the perception and attitude towards the public sector is crucial for creating a system that prioritizes public service, integrity, and accountability. It requires a shift away from self-interest and patronage towards a focus on serving the needs of the Somali people and promoting the common good.



Dr. Adan Shidane Guleed, the president of Hormuud University and Notable Figure in The Academic Community - Panelist

Dr. Adan Shidane Guleed, contributed his extensive experience and insights, shedding light on the complex dynamics at play in Somalia's state failure. He is the President of Hormuud University, Mogadishu, Somalia. He is an alumnus of Mogadishu University and since the collapse of the central government, he has taught at various local educational institutions, actively contributing to the revival of education in Somalia. Dr. Guuled, the President of Hormuud University, highlighted the significance of understanding and learning from past political mistakes in Somalia. He emphasized the importance of avoiding the repetition of historical errors and urged for a transformative trajectory in Somali politics. Dr. Guuled emphasized the need to widen the political space in Somalia, allowing for diverse perspectives and voices to be heard. This inclusivity fosters a more comprehensive understanding of the challenges and potential solutions, encouraging a more participatory and inclusive decision-making process.

Dr. Guuled also stated that by listening to different points of view and actively engaging in decision-making, Somalia can benefit from a broader range of ideas, experiences, and expertise. This approach can help in formulating more effective and sustainable solutions to the complex issues facing the country. The recognition of past mistakes is crucial in order to break away from negative patterns and chart a new course for political transformation. By acknowledging and learning from these mistakes, Somalia can avoid repeating them and instead implement strategies that promote stability, good governance, and the welfare of its citizens. His remarks highlight the importance of introspection, self-reflection, and a willingness to adapt, improve and emphasize the role of constructive dialogue, cooperation, and

inclusivity in fostering a more resilient and effective political system in Somalia.



Mr. Mahad Wasuge is the Executive Director of the Somali Public Agenda - Panelist

Mr. Mahad Wasuge, shed some light on the root causes of the misguided perception regarding the purpose of the state's existence in Somalia. He traces this perception back to the early days of independence when the notion of the state as a source of personal wealth was ingrained. According to Mr. Waasuge, instead of utilizing state institutions to serve the public and promote the common good, they were often diverted for personal enrichment. This approach, which prioritized personal gain over public service, ultimately contributed to the breakdown of the entire system. Among the earliest and well-known sayings just after the independence are “Hasha Maandeeq”, equating the nation to a camel, and “Aan Maalno Hasheena” which means let’s milk our camel. The perception of the state as a means for personal enrichment creates a culture of corruption and undermines the principles of good governance, accountability, and transparency. When individuals in positions of power prioritize their own interests over the welfare of the Somali people, it erodes trust in the state and hampers the effective functioning of institutions.

To address this issue, Mr. Mahad suggested that it is crucial to foster a fundamental shift in the perception of the state and its purpose. The focus should be on promoting a culture of public service, where state institutions are seen as vehicles for delivering essential services, ensuring justice, and improving the lives of the Somali people. He stated that building a strong and accountable state requires a comprehensive approach that includes institutional reforms, anti-corruption measures, capacity-building, and civic education. By promoting transparency, accountability, and the rule of law, Somalia can gradually overcome the legacy of personal enrichment and establish a system that truly serves the interests of its citizens. Mr. Waasuge's remarks highlighted the need for a collective effort to change the perception of the state's purpose and rebuild trust in public institutions. It is through this transformation that Somalia can work towards a more inclusive, accountable, and prosperous future for its people.



Eng. Asad Nuh, The Chairperson of the Board of Trustees of Red Sea University - Panelist

Eng. Asad Nuh, provided valuable input, underscoring the significance of cross-border collaboration and the exchange of ideas for Somalia's betterment. In his key note during the panel, he highlighted the failure in Somalia as stemming from a widespread lack of understanding and knowledge regarding the administration and leadership of state functions. He emphasized the absence of state-building expertise and knowledge as one of the primary obstacles that have impeded progress over the past three decades. Mr. Asad drew a comparison the experiences of countries like Malaysia and South Korea during their own state and nation-building processes. These countries were successful in their development because they prioritized the cultivation of expertise and knowledge in governance and administration.

To overcome the challenges faced by Somalia, Mr. Asad Nuh underscored the importance of strengthening public awareness and understanding of the significance of unity and cohesiveness. Bolstering public conscience towards these values is crucial in building a foundation for effective state-building efforts. By promoting a sense of unity and togetherness, Somalia can foster a collective mindset that transcends individual or clan interests. This collective mindset can provide the necessary foundation for the establishment of functional state institutions, the rule of law, and effective governance. To address the knowledge gap and promote expertise in state-building, he suggested that efforts should be made to invest in education and capacity-building programs. This includes training individuals in governance, administration, and public policy to develop a skilled workforce capable of leading the country's institutions effectively. Also, learning from the experiences of countries that have successfully undergone state-building processes can provide valuable insights and lessons for Somalia's own journey. In summary, Mr. Asad emphasized the need to address the lack of expertise and knowledge in state-building in Somalia. By bolstering public awareness and understanding, promoting unity, and investing in education and capacity-building, Somalia.



The second panel of the conference which was titled "State Building in Somalia: Prospects for a Functioning and Inclusive State" convened distinguished experts for a thought-provoking discussion on the prospects of building an inclusive state in Somalia. The diverse expertise of the participants contributed to a rich dialogue that explored various facets of state-building, humanitarianism, development, and technology. The panelists were Mr. Abdi Mohamed (Baafo), a former minister and currently the director of Dhaxalreeb Center for Leadership. Prof. Ibrahim Farah (Bursaliid), academician and expert on state and peacebuilding. Mrs. Shukri Hassan Osman, a social activist and lecturer at Mogadishu University and lastly, Dr. Abdisalan M. Issa-Salwe, Deputy president of East Africa University, Somalia.



Mrs. Shukri Hassan Osman, A Lecturer at Mogadishu University and A Dedicated Humanitarian Worker - Panelist

Shukri Hassan Osman, brought valuable insights from her experiences. Mrs. Shukri Hassan emphasized the significance of inclusivity for Somalia and the necessity of engaging different segments of the population, particularly women, in order to establish a functioning state. She highlights the missing role of women in the political realm, despite representing half of the population and playing a pivotal role in sustaining Somali families as mothers throughout the civil war. Mrs. Shukri pointed out that women have historically played important roles in Somali society, both socially and economically. They have often acted as breadwinners and have been instrumental in maintaining the stability and well-being of their families.

However, despite their significant contributions, women are marginalized and underrepresented in political decision-making processes.

She also pointed out that the lack of women's representation in politics and decision-making is a notable gap that hinders the achievement of true inclusivity in Somalia. Inclusive governance necessitates the active participation and representation of all segments of society, including women, who bring diverse perspectives, experiences, and priorities to the table. By excluding women from political participation, Somalia misses out on valuable contributions and perspectives that can contribute to more comprehensive and effective decision-making. Empowering women politically not only ensures gender equality but also strengthens the overall governance and development of the country. Efforts to promote gender equality and women's participation in politics should encompass various aspects, including creating an enabling legal and institutional framework, addressing cultural and societal barriers, and promoting women's leadership and political empowerment at all levels.



Prof. Abdi Ahmed Mohamed (Baafo), Former Minister of Agriculture in Somalia and Executive director of Dhaxalreeb Center for Leadership - Panelist

Prof. Abdi Ahmed Mohamed Baafo, shared his wealth of knowledge, including his former role as Minister of Agriculture in Somalia. Mr. Baafo provided insights into the concept of an inclusive state during a panel discussion. He defined an inclusive state as a system of just and equitable power sharing among the people residing within a specific territory. The notion of an inclusive state gained prominence following the end of the Cold War and the outbreak of ethnic and clan-based civil wars in various countries around the world. In efforts to end conflicts and establish lasting peace, broad-based coalition governments were sought with the support of donor communities. In the Arta peace conference implemented the four-point-five power-sharing formula as an interim mechanism. This formula aimed to reduce suspicion among powerful and armed clans while seeking an alternative power-sharing arrangement that would be more just, effective, and sustainable. However, as Mr. Baafo highlighted, no one anticipated that the clan-based power-sharing formula would persist for more than two decades.

Mr. Baafo's remarks shed light on the initial intentions behind the implementation of the four-point-five formula in Somalia. The goal was to provide a temporary mechanism to build trust and stability, with the

expectation that a more inclusive and sustainable power-sharing formula would be developed in the long run. He emphasized the fact that the clan-based power-sharing arrangement has endured for an extended period raises questions about the challenges of transitioning to a more inclusive and representative political system in Somalia. It underscores the complexities involved in finding alternative power-sharing mechanisms that can address the diverse interests and identities within the country. Moving forward, it is crucial to continue exploring and discussing alternative power-sharing models that can transcend clan-based divisions and foster greater inclusivity in Somali politics. By doing so, Somalia can work towards establishing a more robust and sustainable political system that reflects the aspirations of all its citizens.



Prof. Ibrahim Farah Bursalid, An Expert in State and Peacebuilding and International Relations - Panelist

Prof. Ibrahim Farah Bursalid, added a global perspective to the conversation. Prof. Ibrahim Farah Bursalid's insights shed light on the psychological impact of the prolonged period of war and chaos in Somalia and its influence on the political perception and behavior of the Somali people. He suggests that individuals who have benefited from the chaos and injustice that prevailed for a significant period may find it challenging to accept a system based on justice and inclusivity, where all Somali people, regardless of clan affiliation, can reap the benefits of the state. In this context, Prof. Bursalid emphasizes the importance of revisiting the religious and cultural foundations of the Somali people. He suggests that these elements hold the potential to provide guidance and inspiration in addressing the complex challenges facing the country. By going back to the core values and teachings found within religion and culture, Prof. Bursalid suggested that Somalia can find a basis for resolving the interconnected issues it faces. This approach recognizes the potential of religious and cultural traditions to serve as a unifying force and a source of moral guidance for the Somali people.



Dr. Abdisalam M. Issa-Salwe, Vice-president of East Africa University and Professor of Computer Science and Information Systems - Panelist

Dr. Abdisalam M. Issa-Salwe highlighted the significance of inclusion as a crucial element for ensuring sustainable peace and effective governance in Somalia. He draws an analogy between a functioning system and the importance of balance and harmonious relations among its components. According to Prof. Salwe, any system, including a political system, requires a balanced set of components that work together to achieve their objectives in the context of Somalia, this means that a sustainable and peaceful political system necessitates the inclusion of all relevant stakeholders and the establishment of harmonious relations among them. Inclusion ensures that diverse voices, perspectives, and interests are taken into account, leading to a more balanced and representative decision-making process. When a political system lacks inclusion, certain components or segments of society may be marginalized or excluded, leading to imbalances and potentially hindering the achievement of the system's objectives. Inclusion, on the other hand, fosters a sense of ownership, participation, and accountability among the various components of society, contributing to a more stable and effective governance system.

By emphasizing the importance of inclusion, Dr. Salwe underscores the need for broad-based participation and representation in Somali politics. This entails creating mechanisms and institutions that actively engage and empower marginalized groups, promote diversity in decision-making processes, and ensure that the benefits of governance are accessible to all segments of society. Achieving a balanced and inclusive political system requires ongoing efforts to address historical grievances, build trust among different groups, and promote social cohesion. It also necessitates the development of inclusive policies and institutions that can accommodate the diverse needs and aspirations of the Somali people.

Dr. Salwe perspective highlighted the essential role of inclusion in creating a sustainable and effective political system in Somalia. By ensuring a balanced set of components and fostering harmonious relations among them, Somalia can work towards achieving its objectives of peace, stability, and good governance.



The third panel of the conference was riveting one under the theme "Towards One Person One Vote: Challenges & Tasks". Panelists were Prof. Dr. Abdirahman M. Abdullahi (Baadiyow), Reconciliation Advisor to the president of the Federal Government of Somalia, Prof. Hassan Abdi Keynan, Scholar, and expert in state building, Dr. Hassan Sh. Ali, scholar and political analyst, Mrs. Halimo Ismail Ibrahim (Halima Yarey), the chair of Galmudug Election Commission and the Former Chairperson of the Transitional National Electoral Commission. The panel was moderated by Dr. Hodan Ali, an advisor to the president of the Federal Government of Somalia.

Prof. Dr. Abdurahman M. Abdullahi (Baadiyow) highlighted the trajectory of democratization in Somalia during a panel discussion. According to Professor Baadiyow, he divided the process into three eras: the time of civilian government (1960-1969), the military regime era with closed political space, and the post-civil war era. He emphasized that the backslide of democracy did not start with the military regime but rather earlier, during the civilian government, when the ruling party of SYL rigged the 1969 election and suppressed meaningful opposition parties.

By mishandling the electoral process and suppressing political alternatives, the civilian government of the time sowed seeds of resentment among the public. This laid the groundwork for the subsequent military coup in 1969. Professor Baadiyow argued that the importance of well-structured direct elections, specifically one-man one-vote elections, cannot be overstated in Somalia. He believes that such elections are necessary to overcome the longstanding political challenges that have hindered state-building efforts in the country.

The call for well-structured direct elections reflects the need for a fair and inclusive electoral process that allows for broad participation and representation. By conducting credible and transparent elections, Somalia could take significant steps towards strengthening democratic institutions, promoting political stability, and addressing the historical issues that have impeded the country's progress.



Mrs. Halima Ibrahim (Yareey), the chair of Galmudug Election Commission and the Former Chairperson of the Transitional National Electoral Commission - Panelist

Halima Yarey introduced an external perspective, emphasizing that much of Somalia's fate had been influenced by foreign interests. She encouraged Somalis to define their aspirations and establish a multiparty system with clear rules and regulations. Yarey called for a unified vision and the determination to control their destiny. Mrs. Halima Yareey, the former Chairperson of the Transitional National Electoral Commission, expressed criticism towards the mentality of Somali politicians, particularly regarding their lack of sincerity and transparency in participating in the political process. During her tenure, she registered over a hundred political parties, but she highlighted that these parties were essentially superficial and owned by a single individual without any real political agenda or manifesto.

According to Mrs. Yareey, the lack of genuine political engagement and the presence of shallow or non-existent party platforms hinder the progress of Somalia. To salvage the country from its current challenges, she emphasized the importance of taking the legitimacy of leaders seriously, which can only be achieved through free and fair elections. The sentiment expressed by Mrs. Yareey underscores the need for meaningful political participation, transparent processes, and accountable leadership in Somalia. By conducting elections that are inclusive, transparent, and reflect the will of the people, the country can work towards establishing a legitimate and credible political system. Such efforts can contribute to rebuilding trust, fostering stability, and advancing the state-building process in Somalia.



Dr. Hassan Sheikh Ali, Prominent Academic Figure - Panelist

Dr. Hassan Sheikh's perspective offered a different approach to the election issue in Somalia, taking into consideration the challenges posed by the lack of territorial control and ongoing political conflicts. According to Dr. Hassan, the absence of a state that can protect the country's territorial integrity makes it difficult to hold peaceful elections, particularly in areas outside of state control. The current political conflicts in the federal member states of Somalia often stem from election disputes, indicating a lack of strong rules and regulations governing the process. In light of these challenges, Dr. Hassan Sheikh proposes enhancing the current political dispensation in Somalia, which is based on the four-point five formula. This formula aims to ensure inclusivity and power-sharing among different clans and groups within the country. By strengthening the existing political framework and waiting for the full return of sovereignty and improved state capacity, Dr. Hassan believes that the country can potentially achieve more stability and legitimacy in the long term.

Dr. Hassan Sheikh expresses concerns that moving towards universal suffrage elections in the current complex situation may backfire. Universal suffrage, which typically refers to the principle of one person, one vote, may not be feasible or effective without the necessary state capacity and security conditions in place. It is important to address the underlying issues and build a foundation of stability, governance, and rule of law before transitioning to universal suffrage elections. His perspective highlights the need to prioritize stability and state-building efforts in Somalia before fully transitioning to universal suffrage elections. By gradually strengthening the political system and ensuring inclusive representation, Somalia can work towards establishing a more robust and sustainable democratic framework in the future.

Throughout the discussion, the audience actively engaged with probing questions and insightful comments, further enriching the discourse. The panelists' varied perspectives highlighted the complexity of the issues surrounding One Man One Vote in Somalia. It was a powerful reminder that the path to this democratic ideal involves not only internal reflection but also an awareness of external influences and interests.



Prof. Dr. Abdulrahman M. Abdullahi (Baadiyow), Chairman of Board of Trustees of Mogadishu University. Scholar of Somali History, Islam, and Transitional Justice - Panelist

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The call for well-structured direct elections reflects the need for a fair and inclusive electoral process that allows for broad participation and representation. By conducting credible and transparent elections, Somalia could take significant steps towards strengthening democratic institutions, promoting political stability, and addressing the historical issues that have impeded the country's progress.



Prof. Hassan Abdi Keynan, independent advocate, author, and analyst for peace, literacy, governance and sustainable Development in the Hornof Africa – Panelist

Prof. Hassan Abdi Kaynan's note in the panel highlighted the significance of considering the culture and identity of the Somali people when working towards the revival of the Somali state. He emphasizes that the challenges related to elections and representation are part of a broader issue of state-building. According to Professor Kaynan, the difficulties encountered in conducting elections and establishing effective political representation reflect the shortcomings and missteps taken in the process of rebuilding the Somali state over the past three decades. This implies that the approach taken in the state-building process may not have adequately taken into account the cultural and identity dynamics of the Somali population.

To address this issue, it becomes crucial to incorporate cultural sensitivity and a deep understanding of Somali identity into the state-building efforts. By recognizing and respecting the cultural and identity we can promote inclusivity, foster a sense of ownership which will contribute to the legitimacy of the state-building process.

Moreover, understanding the historical, social, and cultural context of Somalia can help shape political institutions and systems that are better aligned with the needs and aspirations of the Somali people. By taking into account the cultural and identity dimensions, it is possible to develop political structures that resonate with the population and have a higher chance of success in the long run.

PART 8

CLOSING SESSION





Prof. Dr. Ali Sheikh Ahmed, General Director of East Africa Association for Research and Development (DAD)

Prof. Dr. Ali Sheikh Ahmed, General Director of East Africa Association for Research and Development (DAD) stood at the culmination of an intellectually enriching and transformative conference, gazing upon the assembly of minds and hearts that had collectively contributed to this momentous event. His closing remarks, delivered with eloquence and deep emotion, were more than a mere conclusion; they were a profound reflection on the journey that every participant had embarked upon together, a journey through the intricate landscape of state-building in Somalia.

Dr. Ahmed's words resonated with profound appreciation as he expressed heartfelt gratitude to every participant who had played a pivotal role in shaping this illuminating odyssey. The conference had not been a solitary endeavor but a testament to the power of collective dedication and effort. It was a gathering that transcended boundaries, drawing scholars, researchers, policymakers, and attendees from diverse backgrounds into a vibrant intellectual melting pot. Here, ideas didn't merely circulate; they intertwined, fused, and transformed into a shared vision for Somalia's future.

In his closing address, Dr. Ahmed painted a vivid picture of the conference as a crucible of knowledge—a space where the brightest minds had converged, not merely to exchange ideas but to engage in a profound dissection, discussion, and deliberation of the complex tapestry that is state-building in Somalia. The conference had, in essence, become a journey of discovery—a rediscovery of Somalia's identity, culture, and aspirations. His words served as a testament to the power of collaborative thinking and shared responsibility. Together, participants had ventured into the depths of introspection, probing Somalia's past, critically analyzing its present challenges, and collectively envisioning a brighter and more inclusive future. It was a journey through time and context, marked by intellectual rigor and profound insights. As Dr. Ahmed's closing remarks resonated through the conference hall, they left an indelible mark on the hearts and minds of all attendees. There was a palpable sense of accomplishment, not just in the proceedings of the conference but also in the realization that the collective wisdom, passion, and dedication gathered here would be instrumental in

shaping Somalia's trajectory. The conference was not merely an event; it was a milestone in the ongoing narrative of Somalia's state-building, setting a course guided by the brilliance and shared aspirations of those who had journeyed together in the spirit of unity and progress.



H.E. Hassan M. Mohamud, the Minister of Justice and Constitutional affairs of the Federal Government of Somalia – Closing Keynote Speaker

H.E. Hassan M. Mohamud, the Minister of Justice and Constitutional affairs of the Federal Government of Somalia, took the stage, and his presence at that moment symbolized a harmonious confluence—the coming together of governance and scholarship. It was a compelling reminder that knowledge transcends the boundaries of academia; it is, in fact, the bedrock upon which informed and enlightened governance is built. In his closing address, Mr. Mohamud eloquently and passionately underlined a fundamental truth—the paramount importance of education and research in every facet of society. He emphasized this within the specific context of Somalia's state-building process, highlighting the intrinsic value of knowledge and scholarship in steering the nation toward a future marked by inclusivity, prosperity, and stability.

Throughout the conference, this belief had been not just asserted but vividly demonstrated. Rigorous research and insightful discussions had been the order of the day, unveiling new pathways and innovative solutions for Somalia's complex and multifaceted challenges. Mr. Mohamud's words acted as a profound affirmation of the enduring and transformative power of education. It wasn't just an end in itself; it was the essential means to a loftier end—a Somalia that would emerge as a united, self-reliant, and prosperous nation.

As his closing remarks resonated through the conference hall, they left an indelible impression. They acted as a poignant reminder, especially in the context of Somalia's ongoing state-building journey, where the path may be marked by challenges and uncertainties. Mr. Mohamud's words illuminated the way forward. They underscored that in the grand tapestry of Somalia's progress, knowledge would continue to stand as the guiding light, dispelling

PART 9

Conclusion



The 2nd East Africa Development Forum, 2023 focused on state building in Somalia, underscoring the lessons learned since Somalia's independence and way forward. The conference papers by the prominent scholars indicated that Somalia has adopted enigmatic approach to post-colonial state building in Africa. The ethnically and religiously unified Somali people are failing to build an effective state from 1960 to the present day. Using various research methodologies ranging from comprehensive literature review to qualitative and quantities cross sectional research designs, scholars analyzed Somalia's state building challenges and devised drastic measure to achieving social-political and economic liberations.

From the keynote addresses, different dignitaries discussed valuable points regarding Somalia state building. In his remarks, Prof. Dr. Ali Sheikh Ahmed, the general director of DAD expressed his sincere appreciation to participants comprising ministers and seasoned scholars. He noted that the conference focused on state building studies from the Somalia independence period of June 26, 1960 to the current date of July 22, 2023. He ended his speech by wishing participants nice deliberations in the conference. Also, Prof. Dr. Mohamed Mohamud (Biday), Chairman of the Association of Somali Universities and Rector of Benadir University reiterated the belief that academia possesses the keys to unlocking solutions to even the most complex challenges facing Somalia. He argued that in a nation as diverse and dynamic as Somalia, the amalgamation of intellectual resources from multiple universities holds the promise of multifaceted solutions to multifaceted challenges.

Prof. Hassan Abdi Keynan noted that there are four pivotal factors that contribute to the friction within Somalia: Clan dynamics, Islam, Nomadism, and its far-reaching socio-economic impacts, and the imposition of a modern state by colonial powers. He argued that these factors are the intricate web of historical, cultural, and political factors that have shaped the nation's trajectory.

In his speech, H.E. Yusuf Hussein Jimale Madaale, Governor of Benadir Region and Mayor of Mogadishu city, noted that knowledge finds its true worth when it leads to tangible action. He therefore echoed that the Somalia's path to progress is marked not only by intellectual exploration but also by concrete outcomes that improve citizens' lives. H.E. Jama Taqal Abbas, Ministry of Energy and Water Resources, focused on the importance of having Somali scholars actively contribute to the body of knowledge about their nation. He emphasized that the contribution of local expertise should not only

be in enriching the discourse but also lead to a more comprehensive and holistic understanding of Somalia's intricate and multifaceted realities.

H.E. Dr. Mohamed Sheikh Ali Doodishe, Minister of Internal Security challenged the audience to look beyond immediate political dynamics and delve into the broader evolution of Western nations, where civilization, education, and technology have played pivotal roles in their development. H.E. Farah Sheikh Abdulkadir, Ministry of Education, Culture and Higher Education focused on the Somalia's educational landscape. He indicated that 63 percent of the Somalia population are illiterate, unable to even read the nation's constitution. He therefore argued for increased civic education, social education, and the adoption of micro-responsibilities as essential steps toward Somali state building.

In his study "Theorizing Stability of Somali State: In the Light of the Comprehensive Perspective of Somali Studies", Dr. Abdurahman Baadiyow used the Comprehensive Perspective model to analyze the Somali state-building process' challenges and explored the relationship between modern state structures and traditional Somali society. Among his arguments, Dr. Baadiyow asserted that strong loyalties to Islam, nationalism, and clan are some of the major challenges to Somalia that pose significant hindrances to state building. He therefore recommended adapting **a** comprehensive approach to reconciliation between state and society, focusing on reconciling political elites, restructuring traditional institutions, addressing past grievances, and establishing a foundation for a shared future. This process should be reflected in constitutional provisions and legal frameworks while involving non-state actors like civil society organizations and business communities in order to build a consorted effort to Somali state building.

Relatedly, Mr. Hassan Haji Mohamoud Abdullah presented a paper "Challenges of Somali State Building" that used literature review approach to assess the multifaceted political and socio-economic challenges that hinder state building in Somalia. Prof. Hassan indicated that the division of the Somali political elites horizontally (tribally) and their inability to manage political competition and demonstrate behaviors that correspond to the values of the modern state have led to the loss of priorities in national issues and the spread of corruption in the country. His major argument was that political tribalism is manifested in its clearest form in the dilemma of reconciling political party necessities and tribal representation, a culture that is partly responsible for the continued civil wars over decades. While as reconciliation is an important solution to the prolonged civil wars, Somalia has only implemented one level of the reconciliation process- the top-down approach

that has contributed to worsening the conflict. The bottom-up approach is necessary to promote national reconciliation in the country.

Mr. Mustafa Feiruz presented a paper "Glimpse into the Drawbacks in the Somali Political Landscape in 1960-1969". This paper used desk research methodology to delve into the political dynamics of Somalia's first political era after independence, with a particular focus on the drawbacks that emerged and influenced Somalia's trajectory. These drawbacks include numerous small-sized parties lacking substantive programs and cohesive representation, opportunistic parliamentarians frequently switching allegiance, political clannism emerging within parties and a deficiency in strong democratic institutions and effective checks and balances. The uniqueness of Somalia's election challenges implies that solutions should originate from the societal, sociocultural, economic, and political values of Somalia. Several key steps are therefore recommended including fostering a culture of political pluralism and tolerance, promoting civic education and engagement, strengthening democratic institutions, and establish an inclusive, responsive and resilient political system.

A paper by Hassan Mudane "revisiting the Causes of The Somali civil War in the light of the Protracted social conflict perspective" demonstrated the underlying causes of Somalia's civil war and offered a strong explanation for its outbreak. Utilizing a qualitative approach to critical evaluation of literature on Somalia's civil war, the paper presents politicization of clan identity, deterioration of basic needs, state's repressive role and international linkages as the major causes of the outbreak of the Somali civil war. Though the paper indicated that these are the major causes of the civil war in Somalia and therefore solution on these should be sought, the paper suggests further field research on this topic from a broader perspective. This should investigate the role of politicization of communal content, deprivation of basic needs and external linkages on the Somali conflict and other social conflicts in Africa.

Dr. Mohamed Ghedi Jumale presented a paper "The Role of ATMIS in conflict resolution and reconciliation in Somalia". This paper adopted desk research methodology using John Paul Lederaches' reconciliation approaches to analyze the function of ATMIS in the resolution and reconciliation of Somalia conflict. The scholar argued that reconciliations efforts in Somalia are failing because ATMIS and the international community did not adopt the learning points from the successful pragmatic reconciliations that had taken place in Somaliland and Puntland. The function of ATMIS should therefore include women, youth and clan leaders in the reconciliation efforts to build the Somali state. This implies that the bottom-up approach is a holistic and

community-centered long-term model that has the potential to bring about peace that is sustainable in Somalia.

Using desk research methodology, Dr. Abdisalam M. Issa-Salwe presented a paper titled "Rebuilding the Somali Nation-State: The Needs for Sustainable Peace". The paper discussed the ways conflict resolution and sustainable peacebuilding can transform Somali society to achieve sustainable peace and economic development. The scholar therefore recommended the development of local initiatives to promote inclusive peace processes with regional stakeholders, creation of a sustainable system of aiding societies affected by conflict in transitioning to permanent peace, development of regional peace procedures that involve all local stakeholders and development of evidence-based policy recommendations and solutions through promotion of open dialogues among decision-makers, influential people, and experts from diverse sectors, as the steps to sustainable peacebuilding in Somalia.

Mr. Abdullahi Abshir Abdirahman's paper "The Role of Federalism on State Building in Somalia" utilized cross-sectional and quantitative methodology to investigate the impact of federalism on state building in Somalia. This study demonstrated that Somalia's federalism is founded on clan system making it different from that of the rest of the world. The scholar therefore recommended that the federal system of Somalia should originate from the societal, sociocultural, economic, and political values of Somalia. There is also need for educating and raising awareness of Somalis regarding the federal system best practices in order to ensure political stability. The current constitution also needs to be guarded against the spoilers. This requires consensus and approval by all the country's political elite to build a strong and respected constitution. The scholar also recommended that government of Somalia should ensure coordination, advocacy, collaboration, and networking with the various development partners.

Regarding improving public services, a study by Dr. Abdishakur Tarah, (The Impact of Armed conflict on leadership And Management of Schools in Banadır Region, Somali Headteachers' perspective) and that of Dr. Mohammed A.M Ahmed (Health Investment and Economic Growth: A Pathway to Sustainable Development for Somalia) emphasized the need for Public-Private Partnerships as a solution to achieving sustainable development for Somalia. Utilizing both qualitative, semi-structured interviews and secondary data, the scholars highlighted an economic advantage effect in investing in public services. For example, investing one dollar in healthcare is projected to yield a four-dollar return in economic growth. In education sector for example, scholars emphasized the need for comprehensive education

policies that guide involvement of all stakeholders in the provision of education services that support efficient and effective provision of education services. scholars also noted that adapting Public-Private Partnerships in provision of public services has a substantial economic benefit of improved workforce participation, enhanced productivity, and overall economic growth.

A paper by Dr. Shariff Osman (Climate Change Impact and Mitigation in Somalia: Water Harvesting and Conservation) underscored the need for sustainable water harvesting and conservation program as a strategy to climate change adaptation and resilience in Somalia. Using a qualitative research approach, the study examined the far-reaching consequences of climate change in Somalia, highlighting the severe repercussions of annual flooding, droughts, and erratic seasonal rainfall, which have resulted in dire famine in the country. The proposed sustainable water harvesting and conservation program in this paper forms an integral part of a comprehensive ecosystem restoration plan specifically tailored for Somalia's arid and semiarid regions. By implementing this initiative, the country can rejuvenate the land and bring tangible advantages to the local inhabitants, their livestock, and agricultural activities.

In emphasizing the role of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in state building in Somalia, Ahmed Osman Nur presented a paper “The Role of civil society On State building In Somalia” where he argued that in a country that has experienced decades of conflict, CSOs emerge as key actors in promoting peace, stability, and development. The paper based on a comprehensive review of existing literature, reports, and case studies to examine Civil Society Organizations’ involvement and their overall impact and significance in Somalia's state-building efforts. The scholar argued that the contributions of CSOs are observed in various aspects of state building, including governance, security, justice, and social services. He therefore recommended effective collaboration and coordination between government and CSOs, which requires proactive measures and supportive frameworks. This should be in form of increased funding of CSOs, inclusive representation of all CSOs in governance decisions, providing a secure environment for the CSOs and formation of consortiums among CSOs working in similar thematic areas or geographic regions.

Scholars also recommended a comprehensive stakeholder involvement program in state building, putting emphasis on the inclusion of women and youth in all state building activities. Ms. Suad Haji Hassan Mohamed in his paper “The Role of Women in State-building in Somalia: Lesson Learned & Amp; The Way Forwarded” argued for example, that it is not enough to only

increase the number of women in political positions but also create an inclusive and supportive environment for their participation. The scholar used cross sectional and quantitative research design to a analyze the role of women in state building in Somalia where he noted that women inclusivity requires promoting awareness and changing societal attitudes towards gender roles, promoting and expanding access to quality education and capacity-building programs for women and youth. It also requires enhancing women and youth's involvement in peacebuilding processes and conflict resolution mechanisms at all levels and collaborating with international organizations, donor agencies, and regional bodies to provide financial resources, technical expertise, and best practices guiding women and youth participation in state building.

Based on the conclusions above, it is evident that Somali state building is every Somali and other international partners' responsibility. We therefore challenge Somali seasoned scholars to guide all stakeholders on their specific roles in Somali state building. Scholars should also invest in research on the practical approaches towards implementing good governance and transformative leadership to achieve Somali's political and economic liberation.

In the culmination of the 2nd East Africa Development Forum of 2023, the discourse on state-building in Somalia has been both profound and enlightening. The convergence of scholarly minds has illuminated the path Somalia has tread since its independence, showcasing the unique challenges and proposing forward-looking solutions that resonate with the nation's ethos and aspirations. The insights presented underscore a critical narrative: the journey of Somalia from a post-colonial quandary to envisioning a cohesive, stable, and prosperous state requires a multifaceted, inclusive, and adaptive approach.

The array of papers and discussions highlighted the intricate dance between traditional societal structures and the quest for a modern state mechanism. The scholars, through their meticulous analyses, have unveiled the nuanced complexities of Somali society, where clan loyalties, religious adherence, and the shadows of colonial legacies intertwine, often hindering the path to effective governance and societal harmony. Yet, within these challenges lie the seeds of opportunity—a chance to reimagine state-building in a manner that is uniquely Somali, leveraging the very diversity and traditional frameworks that have been perceived as obstacles.

The emphasis on a comprehensive approach to reconciliation, encompassing both top-down and bottom-up strategies, reflects a deep

understanding of the Somali context. It suggests a pathway not just to political stability but to the healing of a nation's soul, addressing historical grievances and fostering a shared vision for the future. This approach, championed by scholars like Dr. Abdurahman Baadiyow and Mr. Hassan Haji Mahmoud Abdullah, underscores the necessity of embracing Somalia's rich tapestry of identities and experiences as a cornerstone for building a resilient state.

Furthermore, the discussions on public service improvement, through public-private partnerships, highlight a pragmatic avenue for addressing some of Somalia's most pressing needs. The insights into the economic benefits of investing in healthcare and education, as presented by Dr. Abdishakur Tarah and Dr. Mohammed A.M Ahmed, are not just strategic recommendations but a clarion call for a new paradigm in development thinking—one that recognizes the interdependence of social well-being and economic growth.

The role of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), as elucidated by Ahmed Osman Nur, and the inclusion of women and youth in state-building activities, as advocated by Ms. Suad Haji Hassan Mohamed, are reminders of the potency of collective action and the indispensable value of every segment of society in the state-building process. These recommendations are not mere academic propositions but a rallying cry for a more inclusive, equitable, and participatory approach to governance.

In synthesizing the wealth of knowledge and perspectives shared, it becomes clear that the blueprint for Somalia's state-building is one that must be co-authored by all stakeholders—academics, political leaders, civil society, and the international community. The forum has not only provided a platform for critical analysis but has also served as a beacon of hope, illuminating the potential pathways toward a future where Somalia can flourish as a beacon of stability, prosperity, and unity in the Horn of Africa.

As we look forward, the challenge for Somali scholars, policymakers, and the global community is to transition from discourse to action, ensuring that the insights and recommendations distilled from this forum are operationalized. The task at hand is monumental but not insurmountable. With concerted effort, unwavering commitment, and the collective wisdom of Somalia's people and its diaspora, the vision of a rebuilt, rejuvenated Somali nation-state is within reach. Let this forum be remembered not just for the richness of its academic contributions but as a pivotal moment when Somalia, with clarity and purpose, embarked on a renewed journey toward sustainable peace, governance, and prosperity. The roadmap is laid out; the time for action is now.



PART 10

KEY POINTS AND THE OFFICIAL COMMUNIQUE

KEY POINTS AND THE OFFICIAL COMMUNIQUE

The Key Points Session at the conference served as a summation of the valuable insights shared throughout the event, providing a concise overview of critical areas of focus and consideration for the ongoing journey of state-building in Somalia.

Islam was emphasized for its central role in guiding Somalia's state-building journey, highlighting its unifying potential and capacity to transcend clan divisions. The need for more comprehensive reconciliation efforts that go beyond superficial agreements and address underlying tensions and divisions within Somali society was urged.

Unity among various Somali elites, including clan elders, Ulama Al-Diin (religious scholars), politicians, and civil society representatives, around unwavering principles that promote citizen unity and well-being was stressed. The importance of preserving and protecting Somalia's social fabric, which has faced significant challenges over the years, was recognized as a crucial aspect of state-building. Foundational pillars such as inclusivity, human rights, and dignity were highlighted as fundamental elements for building a just and equitable Somali state. Augmenting research endeavors within universities and research centers to tackle governance-related challenges comprehensively was encouraged.

Crafting an all-encompassing constitution that promotes inclusivity, and unifies the nation was considered essential for state-building. The development of robust and effective government institutions was emphasized as a prerequisite for good governance and nation-building. Prioritizing development initiatives and attracting investments to ensure sustainable economic growth was underscored. Upholding accountability and transparency in governance processes was recognized as essential to building public trust and confidence. The critical role of the rule of law, along with its consistent enforcement, in ensuring justice and stability within the nation was identified. Advocacy for the establishment and encouragement of multiple political parties as a means to foster healthy political competition and representation was made.

Lastly, the significance of promoting health awareness and addressing environmental challenges as part of a holistic approach to state-building was acknowledged.

01 Institutional Fortification: The enhancement of institutions fundamental to the functioning of the government.

02 Principled Governance: Advocating for the government of Somalia to be founded on principles such as partnership, unity, nationalism, justice, representation, protection of basic rights, and the promotion of social harmony and mutual respect.

03 Cultural Considerations: Recognizing the pivotal role of Somali culture, including the Islamic religion and societal structure, in shaping governmental operations.

04 Education and Healthcare: The development of high-caliber education and healthcare services in collaboration with governmental entities, private sector, civil society, and non-governmental organizations. These investments should be viewed as strategic assets for the nation's progress.

05 Research Advancements: Augmenting research endeavors within universities and research centers to tackle challenges associated with governance.

06 Economic Growth: Encouraging economic growth and fostering an environment conducive to both domestic and foreign investments.

07 Political Stability: Vigilantly pursuing political stability and eschewing actions that may precipitate political unrest.

08 Anti-Corruption Measures: A resolute commitment to eradicate corruption at all tiers of government.

09 Multi-Party System Implementation: Accelerating the realization of a multi-party-political system.

10 Environmental Preservation: Prioritizing environmental conservation and combating deforestation.

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(Authors, Presenters, Keynote speakers, Panelist, and Scientific and review Committee)



Prof. Dr. Ali Sheikh Ahmed is a highly accomplished scholar and academician, renowned for his expertise in educational and social development. He has held esteemed positions, including Professor of History and Islamic Civilization at King Saud University from 1984 to 1993. Additionally, he played a pivotal role in reviving the education system in Somalia after the collapse of the central government. He is a co-founder of Mogadishu University and served as its President for two decades, from 1996 to 2016. Currently, he serves as Deputy Chairman of the Board of Directors for the Mogadishu Foundation for Educational and Development. Also, he is the Director General of the East Africa Association of Research and Development (DAD). Dr. Ali's unwavering commitment to education and active participation in various initiatives continue to leave a lasting impact on the community in general.



Prof. Hassan Abdi Keynan has an impressive career spanning over 35 years, with extensive experience in senior management positions across academia, research, and international development. He has spent over two decades working with united nations, across three continents- Africa, Asia and Europe, Hassan’s notable achievements include delivering Somalia’s first UNESCO executive Board membership in 1987 and subsequently becoming and alternate executive Board Member. Throughout this career, has focused on social and policy programs in education and sustainable development, with a keen emphasis on lifelong learning.



Dr. Abdurahman M. Abdullahi (Baadiyow) is a renowned academic with a focus on Somali history, Islam, and transitional justice. He holds a PhD and a Master's degree from McGill University, where he completed his thesis on "Tribalism, Nationalism, and Islam: The Crisis of Political Loyalties in Somalia" in 1992. Dr. Baadiyow has written influential books, such as "The Islamic Movement in Somalia: A Case Study of Islah Movement (1950-2000)" (2015) and "Recovering the Somali State: Islam, Islamism, and Transitional Justice" (2017). He has also contributed to academic publications, including "Tribalism and Islam: The Basics of Somaliness" and "Recovering the Somali State: The Islamist Factor." His work continues to shape Somali studies, inspiring future researchers.



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Dr. Shariff Osman, Ph.D., has been Director at the Institute of Peace, Water, and Environment Since 2018 while teaching social culture at the University of Mogadishu. In addition to his academic work, he is a cultural studies researcher who has contributed articles and papers to national and international publications.



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Mr. Hassan Mudane is the Board of Director at Baraarug Library, where he engages youth civic responsibility education for the construction of subsequent Somalia. He also worked as a senior part-time lecturer in IR theories and Political Development at local universities. He graduated from the Istanbul Ticaret University, with a degree of Masters of International Relations and African Studies in 2018. In the year 2016, he wrote a personal development book called Sirta Guusha for young Somalis. In the same year, he founded BARAARUG LIBRARY (A digital library for e-textbooks and scholarly articles).



Dr. Abdisalam M. Issa-Salwe is currently the Vice-Rector of East Africa University and a Professor of Computer Science and Information Systems at the Faculty of Information Science and Technology. He has previously held positions as an assistant/associate professor at Taibah University in Saudi Arabia and as a lecturer in Information Management at Thames Valley University in London, UK. Dr. Issa-Salwe has a PhD in Information Management from Thames Valley University, as well as a Master of Science in Computing and Information Systems and a Master of Arts in Political Studies from Greenwich University, both located in London, UK. He has authored academic papers and books throughout his career.



Mrs. Shukri Hassan Osman is a dedicated social activist and esteemed lecturer at Mogadishu University, renowned for her extensive experience in advocating for women's rights, youth empowerment, and the promotion of peace and social cohesion through education and dialogue. Her advocacy efforts have focused on creating opportunities for empowerment and amplifying the voices of underrepresented communities. Shukrin's academic journey includes an undergraduate degree in Business Administration from Mogadishu University. She further pursued her education and obtained a Master's degree in Business Administration from the Open University of Malaysia, enhancing her knowledge and skills in strategic planning, organizational leadership, and entrepreneurship.



Prof. Ibrahim Farah Bursalid is a highly regarded Somali scholar specializing in political science and International Relations. He has made significant contributions to the field through his extensive research and writings on conflict resolution and development in the Horn of Africa. Prof. Bursalid is known for his expertise in Somalia's foreign policy, which he extensively covered in a seminal book. He obtained his Ph.D. from the University of Nairobi.



Dr. Hassan Sheikh Ali is a prominent Somali scholar and political analyst who has dedicated his career to studying the complex political dynamics of Somalia and the Horn of Africa region. With deep knowledge of Somali politics, he has conducted extensive research on Somalia's political history, governance and conflict resolution. He did his PhD at the University of Malaya in Malaysia under the theme "Somalia as a Failed State: Internal and External Factors". His insights and contributions have informed policy decisions and academic discussions in Somalia and the wider region. Presently besides his public speaking and political activism, he serves as a lecturer at Somali National University.



Dr. Mohamed Ghedi Jumale is a professional banker with nine years of experience in the financial industry. He has worked as the Head for Human Resource and Credit Departments at Premier Bank Somalia and is currently the Managing Director of the bank. Ghedi holds a PhD in Strategic Management, MBA in Human Resource Management, MA in Law and a degree of Bachelor of Business Administration, and. He has also been academic Lecturer at Mogadishu University.



Prof. Dr. Mohamed Ibrahim Abdi is an esteemed scholar and researcher specializing in the field of education. He has made significant contributions to academia through authoring several academic articles on topics such as Somali history and identity, governance, conflict resolution, and development. Dr. Abdi has held positions at various institutions within Somalia, showcasing his extensive experience and expertise. He did his Ph.D. in Modern and Contemporary History (The Institute of Arab Research and Studies in Cairo). Currently, he serves as the Dean of the Faculty of Education and Social Science at the Somali National University, further demonstrating his commitment to advancing education and social sciences within the country.



Dr. Adan Shidane Guled holds Ph.D. in Educational management and planning, Bakhtu-rida University, Sudan. Dr Guled is an associate professor who has more than 20 years' experience in educational management. Also, he is a researcher and trainer in the field of education. He has presented trainings for number of educational institutions and published more than 10 papers in the management and development of educational institutions in Somalia. Currently, Dr. Guled is the president of Hormuud University.



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

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Eng. Asad Nuh is a highly educated professional with a diverse background in computer science, chemical engineering, and business management. He holds a BSc, MSc, and PhD in Computer Science from Finland. With over several years of experience, Asad has worked for renowned companies such as Nokia, Nokia Siemens, Accenture, and QPR. He has also provided training to numerous public and private entities, including RTA, Amal, Salaama Bank, Tawfiq, universities, Ashgal, and Finnish institutions. As a CEO, Asad has led various organizations, including Somali Quality Services, Ipsed Research Center, NRelief, FRF Gabbood, Start Academy, and Hydra. Currently he is the Chairman of the Board of Trustees, Red Sea University.



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Ms. Su'ad Haji Hassan is a highly accomplished academic, with extensive experience in both teaching and leadership roles. She received her bachelor of Business Administration from University of Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, where she honed her skills in business management and administration. In 2015 Su'ad earned her MBA from Benadir University while corresponding with Makerere University, further expanding her knowledge and expertise in the field. Currently, Su'ad serves as a Lecturer at the Faculty of Economics and Management, Benadir University where she imparts her knowledge and expertise to the next generation of business leaders. In this conference, Su'ad will present a research paper titled: *The role of women in state building of Somalia.*



Mr. Abdullahi Abshir Abdirahman, Dean of the Faculty of Economics and Management Science at Hormuud University, holds a Master of Business Administration in General Management from Sudan's University of Al-Butana. He has almost ten years of experience working in the academic field. He lives in Mogadishu, Somalia, and studies management and business-related topics there.



Mr. Hassan Haji Mahmoud Abdullahi is a researcher and a businessman who is a co-founder and board member in Al-Tawfiiq Company, one of the most successful companies in Somalia. He worked in many Arab newspapers, such as Al-Mugtama Magazine (Kuwait), International Report (Pakistan), and Al-Umma Magazine, which was published by the Horn of Africa Center for Studies in Mogadishu. He holds a bachelor's degree in Journalism from Imam Mohammad ibn Saud Islamic University in Saudi Arabia. He earned a degree of Master of Political Science from Mogadishu University. Currently he is in the process of completing his doctoral thesis entitled (Foundations for Rebuilding the Somali State).



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Mr. Nor Abdulle Afrah received his Bachelor's Degree of Science in Accounting from Simad University, Mogadishu, Somalia, in 2013. He gained a double master's degree in MBA and Finance in 2015 and 2022 from Lincoln University College in Malaysia respectively. Nor is a senior lecturer and research fellow with publications. Currently, he is the director of human resources and training at Benadir University.



Mr. Abdullahi Dahir Mohamed holds a Master's degree in Economics from the International University of Africa, a Master's in Human Resources Management from Sudan International University, and a Bachelor's degree in Economics from the International University of Africa. He is a lecturer at Hormuud University. Mr Dahir made several academic writings. His interest topics are related to Islamic Economics and Finance.



Mr. Zakaria Mohamed Ali has graduated from King Fahd University for Petroleum and Minerals in Dhahran - Saudi Arabia. Then, he has worked in Deloitte - Riadh Office for several years before moving to work in the insurance sector. I addition to that, he was actively involved in writing for various Saudi publications, such as Al-Majalla Magazine & Al-Bilad newspaper and for some well-known Arabic websites like Sasa Post and Huffington Post Arabi. Also, he was the chairman of the Sakura Kingdom Group affiliated with the King Abdulaziz Center for National Dialogue in Saudi Arabia. Besides, he was a member in the Philosophical Circle of the Literary Club in Riyadh. Currently, he is the director of the (DAD) office in İstanbul - Turkey.



Mr. Abdiqadar Abdigani Mohamed is a seasoned researcher specializing in Economic Growth and Development. He has authored numerous scholarly papers and op-eds, focusing on topics ranging from remittances' impact on poverty reduction in Somalia to analyzing Ethiopia's economic growth. His work, published in international journals and presented at international conferences, covers critical issues such as Somalia's debt relief, trade relations with Turkey, climate change's impact on East Africa, and looming drought crises. Additionally, he has contributed insightful op-eds to esteemed newspapers, discussing subjects like Somalia's geopolitical shifts, Chinese interests in the region, and the security implications of conflicts in Ethiopia. Abdiqadar holds a master's degree in Economic Growth and Development from Gazi University and is pursuing a Ph.D. in Economics. Driven by his passion for economic advancement, he aims to leverage his expertise to inform policies and promote sustainable development in East Africa and beyond.



Mr. Abdiwali Sayid is a lecturer in the Department of Political Science and Public Administration at Mogadishu University. He is a researcher who focuses on the Horn of Africa’s political, security and social dynamics. He was the former Executive Director of the East Africa Association for Research and Development (DAD). Besides his role in the research and development sector, Sayid contributes op-ed articles to various news outlets. Through his insightful analysis and commentary, he sheds light on the ongoing developments within the Horn of Africa. Presently, he is pursuing a Ph.D. in International Relations at Asia e University, further expanding his expertise and contributing to the field.



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